THE SILESIAN TANGLE.
FRENCHMENand Englishmen must all be heartily sick of the temporary adjustments and accommo- dations by virtue of which the Entente has been said to be in good working order for many months past. The Silesian question is the most important because it is the most diffi- cult problem before the Supreme Council now meeting in Paris. No honest person who has studied the fearful ethnical complications of Upper Silesia will pretend that a solution is easy. Whether you take what is called a pro- Polish or a pro-German view—we use these loose terms for convenience—you can make out a statistical case. That is the trouble with statistics ' • you can notoriously prove anything when you know what you want to prove. Proof by statistics has been developed to its highest pitch in the Balkans and Asia Minor, where, when a statistical pro- position does not seem convincing enough in itself, it can be aided by the procured incursion into a doubtful territory of the nationals of one of the interested parties or by a little judicious massacre. Although, happily, we do not look for barbarities in Upper Silesia, we do look for intrigue, hard swearing, and risings calculated to divide the Supreme Council, upset its authority, and profit by the " accom- plished fact." Although the Supreme Council has faced no more difficult question than it has before it now, there is a good omen in the fact that America is again represented. We are convinced that Mr. Harvey, just because he is the repre- sentative of America, will not be quelled by statistics as such. Thanks to his instinct and training, he will see light through the dense statistical woods, and will know which path must be followed if the journey is to be completed with goodwill. For there undoubtedly is such a path. No path must be chosen for cynical reasons, merely because the choice of it can temporarily be agreed upon though nobody really believes that it is the right path. What is wanted now is a permanent agreement which will as far as possible remove all grievances and avoid creating new ones and will thus ensure the general peace for generations to come.
The meeting of the Supreme Council was preceded by another meeting of the Inter-Allied experts from Upper Silesia, although all the salient facts which the experts can tell us have been known for a long time. If the experts had had before them a purely academic task in which their own feelings were not engaged, no doubt they would have been able to reach a solution among themselves long ago. As it is, they are the representatives of consciously political masters, and figures are frequently used to support an argument which has been determined in advance. When we write on Thursday the only new fact we have before us is that the Upper Silesian statistics have been referred back to the experts with the request that they should examine them again on the principles that one vote should have one value—the peasant's vote being worth not more than that of the artisan ; that the industrial area which had voted for Germany by a majority of two to one should be handed over to Germany ; and that areas contiguous to the disputed industrial triangle should be analysed in order to find out how far they were really connected with the central area.
Roughly, the difference between the British view and the French view may be stated like this. Britain would hand over the industrial triangle almost entirely to Germany on the obvious ground that there is a marked German majority of votes, and that in those parts of the triangle where there are Polish majorities these majorities cannot be allowed to interfere with the decision, because the industrial triangle is an indivisible unit. For our part, we think this plan much the most reasonable that has been suggested. The triangle is a thing full of industrial nerves, arteries, and veins which can no more be severed without causing death than interdependent parts of the human body can be severed. But when this has been admitted of the industrial triangle, it remains to be said that the comparatively undeveloped industrial districts of Rybnik and Pleas ought to go to Poland, for they lie near the Polish frontier and have a very distinct majority of Polish inhabitants. France, however, reluc- tantly accepting the doctrine of indivisibility, declares that this doctrine should be applied to the whole of the industrial area—that is to say, the triangle plus Rybnik and Pless. Thus she declares the whole of this area to be Polish.
The truth is that France has wanted from the beginning to give to Poland much the most important part of Upper Silesia—the coalfields with their dependent factories— although that part contains a distinct majority of Germans. It might have been easier to see a way through the plebiscite figures if the principle of voting by communes, which the French preferred, had not been adopted. But, as it is, there are bound to be hard cases. Solid little islands or pockets of Poles must be engulfed in a German area, and vice versa. As Sir Cecil Hurst pointed out, the French theory presents more hard cases than would result from the British theory. If the French theory prevailed, seven-elevenths of the population in the plebiscite area would go to Poland although seven-elevenths of that population actually voted for Germany. Surely such a fact as that condemns the French policy.
We are brought back once more to the far-reaching difference between British and French motives. France desires to keep Germany as weak as possible. For that reason she wishes that Poland should be a great buffer State permanently preventing the junction of Russia and Germany, and that the Silesian coalfields should be Polish and not German. But this is to give Germany a grievance. It is to create another Alsace-Lorraine. It is impossible to prevent Germany and Russia recovering some day. The brains and imagination of Russia and the energy of Germany will decide their future. To try to put artificial impediments in the way is to take the short view instead of the long view of the affairs of the world. All we desire is a stable peace : the kind of peace which will give perfect security to France because nobody will want to attack her. That is the only kind of peace worth having. Surely Frenchmen, in spite of the alarm and heat of part of their Press, will acquit Britain of any self- seeking in this matter. We have no territorial greed to satisfy in Upper Silesia. We have not an inch of land or a penny's worth of goods to claim there. We want the Silesian question to be settled in what we are sure is the sense of the Treaty of Versailles. We will say no more here about the general differences between France and Britain, as we have written on that subject elsewhere in a review of M. Tardieu's book.
We will add only that the feelings and convictions of the vast majority of Englishmen were admirably expressed by Mr. Lloyd George in his statement to the Supreme Council. Such praise may not be expected from us, and its value may therefore be a little discounted, but we must say that, in spite of some historical inaccuracies, Mr. Lloyd George's statement was thoroughly worthy of a grave occasion both in spirit and in style. We want no better summary of what we have learned in the last few years than these words which we quote by Mr. Lloyd George :— " France was saved in the war by the justice of her cause, which rallied all the Allies to her support. If she were unjustly attacked she would always have defenders. But the British Empire will never consent to be dragged into a war which appears to be provoked by the fact that one of the Allies in a moment of triumph abused her strength or denied justice."
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