13 AUGUST 1965, Page 6

EUROPE

The Pressure on France

From PAUL LEWIS

BRUSSELS

Iis now just six weeks since General de Gaulle 'broke off discussions with his Common Market partners on financing the agricultural policy and plunged the Community into the gravest crisis of its existence by making France, not unfittingly, the first of its members to resort to boycott when her interests appeared in danger. Since then tactics and ambitions have become clearer on both sides, though it is still impossible to foresee with any certainty how a solution can be found. The situation is unlikely to evolve any further before September, when the General holds a press conference, but in the meantime ,Europeans are making the best of the uncertain holiday weather in the knowledge that they may be returning to face an even more sombre climate in the autumn.

What was a mystery to begin with, and to some extent remains one, is why a country like France which has always lived strictly and successfully by the letter of Community law should suddenly put herself unequivocally on its wrong side by refusing to carry out her fundamental obligation under the Rome Treaty to keep the Common Market functioning properly. The French Prime Minister Mr. Pompidou threw some light on it at the end of last month, however, when he pub- licly rebuked the Commission for playing politics over the agricultural finance affair, and so seemed to confirm speculation that General de Gaulle intends to use the present crisis to secure some major changes in the organisation of the Com- munity and the direction in which it is developing.

When the Commission first published its pro- posals to link renewal of the agricultural finance regulations with two decisions that could be seen as giving the Six the embryo of a federal budget structure, there were rumblings in Paris about its 'insolence,' and accusations that it had exceeded its powers. There is now every reason to suppose that at least one of the French terms for a return to normality is that the nine-man executive should be cut down to what de Gaulle has always felt it ought to be—a body of civil servants running a free trade area and not a band of politicians intriguing for the creation of a United States of Europe.

To do this would require changing the Rome Treaty, but there may well be other alterations that France would like to see too. General de Gaulle cannot look forward to the introduction of decision-making on a qualified majority basis in the Council of Ministers next year, though his officials have hitherto made light of this, saying it was inconceivable for a country to be outvoted on a matter of national importance. It could also be that the General would like to see 'political' issues in future discussed between heads of government in a new organisation that would inevitably overshadow the existing Community institutions and reflect his often-stated belief that the nation states are the 'pillars' of European unification because only they have real authority. Some have also seen the intensification of the French assault on NATO and the reserve curren- cies in recent weeks as an effort to raise the stakes in the European crisis.

But while General de Gaulle has only hinted at his long-term objectives, he has raised the tem- perature of the dispute so fast and so high that it seems impossible for him to back down now without intolerable loss of face. His partners, however, have so far remained resolute in their business-as-usual response to his boycott, refusing to allow the situation to be discussed outside the Community framework, as France was rumoured to want at one point, and letting the Commission draw up a compromise proposal in the normal manner. This goes as far as possible to accommo- date France without abandoning altogether the political ingredients in, the original package, and it was discussed in the usual way by the Five when they held the routine July Council meeting on their own.

It was with good reason, therefore, that some observers claimed that the balance of power in Europe was shifting when the Five first stood up to France early in the morning of July 1 : after years in the saddle kicking the Common Market which- ever way he wanted, General de Gaulle was facing revolt. For some of his partners the con- frontation had been brewing a long time, and the strength of their reaction reflected the count- less previous occasions when France had seemed to ride roughshod over their plans for the Com- munity's future. Undoubtedly the most signifi- cant fact of the crisis so far is that France has remained isolated.

But for how long? Beneath the surface the Five are not as united as their actions might suggest, and it is this consideration which may convince France she can win yet, because they will never accept the ultimate logic of their position and start taking decisions without her in the autumn. Two—Belgium and Luxembourg —have tried all along to prevent France being left out in the cold, and strongly opposed holding the Council meeting without her. When electoral pressures have subsided in October, the German government may turn out less firmly wedded to surpranational principles than it has shown itself so far.

In any event the testing point will come in the late autumn, when pressures from every direction will be greatest to get the Community function- ing normally again--either as five or six. For France's partners this will be the eleventh hour when they will finally have to decide how far they are prepared to go to meet her demands• whatever these may turn out to be. Of course it seems politically and economically impossible for France to leave the Community now, but everyone realises that de Gaulle is the only man who could attempt it. To push him to the point of trying would be to jeopardise nine years' effort uniting Europe on the basis of the Six, and to some of them it might seem an unacceptable confession of failure when there is still the possi- bility of buying time until he has passed into history. The squeeze is not yet firmly on France.