13 JANUARY 1950, Page 5

Return of the Shah

By A. L. B. PHILIP THE Shah of Persia's return home from his six weeks' visit to the United States of America a week ago was the occasion for an official welcome in Tehran. Popular ovations of this kind are usually more organised than spontaneous, for however useful Persia may find her monarchs are, experience has led her to regard them with sufficient dubiety to make the organisation of a claque necessary ; more than once in the past silent and dour crowds have broken into faint but organised ripples

of attenuated clappings and huzzas as royal carriages or motor- cars have carried the latest King of Kings back from a foreign tour to the imperial palace, loan in pocket or not. Today the most that can be read into any enthusiasm slightly out of the normal is the existence in Tehran of a very qualified hope that something will now be done about the sorry condition of economic and domestic affairs into which Persia is still drifting.

Mohammed Reza Shah's accession to the Persian throne was not on account of any personal popularity, nor was it due to any signs of outstanding ability. As successor to Reza Shah Pahlevi, who was forced to abdicate in 1941, there seemed no alternative to his eldest son, Mohammed Reza, a rather slight young man of twenty-two. Nor at that time did there seem any reason to suppose that the new king would either wish or be required to deviate from the paths proper to a strictly constitutional sovereign ; the most that was expected of him was an example of quiet consti- tutional behaviour and family life. There were some indeed who looked upon him with a certain compassion, for not only had the young man to listen to a constant recital of his father's wrong- doings (they were certainly difficult enough to exaggerate) but it seemed, too, as if he would find himself one of the world's poorer monarchs, for it was understood that the vast fortune that his father had accumulated was to be sequestrated.

The reasons that have disturbed Persia's advance along the paths of constitutional progress since then are many, and though they cannot be laid at the Shah's feet, it is safe to say that his name began early to be associated with some of the disagreeable features of his country's position as it started to develop during the war years. The use of the country then as an important line of supply to Russia and the presence of occupying troops necessarily inter- fered gravely with its economy and brought considerable personal hardship to most of its thirteen million inhabitants. It was observed, however, that the court seemed still to be enjoying the greater part of the riches which the former Shah had accumulated. Other disquieting features became discernible. Private fortunes that had been made under the dictatorship in the most questionable manner and which, it was supposed, would at least be heavily taxed, were left untouched and were often greatly increased by profitable adventures in the commerce of war, while a series of new and very considerable fortunes were accumulated in other hands. It was after the withdrawal of foreign troops that the real contrast between the great riches of the few and the scarcely improved conditions of the main body of the country became more obviously apparent. It was then that it became noticeable that the royal fortunes themselves had not deteriorated, the court having made it its business not only to have the greater part of the astonishing riches acquired by the late Shah 'confirmed in his son's name (these provided an annual income of some one million pounds sterling at present rates of exchange), but to establish a dvil list greatly increasing the incomes of the royal family. It was this move, and the fact that the court was also proposing to curtail the influence of Parliament by setting up a Senate to be filled largely by royal nominees, and by which government might be carried on without reference to the lower chamber, that led the public mind to associate the court conclusively with the small caucus of wealthy politicians handling public affairs to their own personal advantage. These men were responsible indirectly, by intrigue and counter intrigue, for the spread of a habit of peculation, corruption and patronage throughout the country which would have been envied in the days of Hajji Baba. It seemed that constitutional government was moribund once more, and as a sort of seal to its death certificate came the official

recognition of the late Shah as Reza Shah Pahlevi The Great.

The posthumous title, sponsored of course by the court, was granted at a moment when many Persians were witnessing their second

opportunity for parliamentary government slip away while they were still able to remember that it was Reza Shah Pahlevi, now The Great, who had ruined any chance of the first opportunity succeeding shortly after the First World War. History must have seemed to them to be repeating itself remarkably quickly.

What is likely to be the outcome of the kind of political disinte- gration that is visiting Persia ? For a nation that is not subject to outside influences it is presumably stagnation and decay. But Persia is subject to outside influences, and her oil resources and geographical position vis-a-vis Russia and the whole of the Middle East make it inevitable that these influences should react on her internal position. She needs help, she has asked for help, and she has also been promised that this help will be forthcoming. It the manner in which this help is given that will account for a gooti deal of what is to happen to the Persian political fabric over the next ten years. The Persian Government has already tabled a seven-year plan for economic reconstruction. It involves the expenditure of £225 million to be provided partly by oil royalties and partly by the Bank for World Reconstruction and Development and the United States Import Bank. It has already been suggested that the American corporation, "Overseas Consultants Inc.," should act in an advisory capacity over the expenditure of these funds, and teams of as many as four thousand foreign experts and specialists have been mentioned.

However and whenever the money is obtained there can be no doubt that the expenditure of anything like this sum over a period of seven years will have a very powerful effect on shaping Persia's internal political future. Two alternatives face those who will be responsible for the final opening of the money-bags. The funds could be handled through those centres of power and influence which have developed since the abdication of the late Shah. This would undoubtedly strengthen the hands of the small group of individuals who have already begun to lead the country into an anarchy of frustration and would appreciably lessen the chance of some form of constitutional progress developing in Persia. The second alternative is less easy, and calls on those who are releasing the funds to insist on the control and audit of the expenditure being subject to some form of constitutional supervision favourable to the development of democratic institutions.

It is against this background that the Shah's visit to America is especially interesting. That he was accorded "number one" honours and entertainment can partly be accounted for by the fact that his was the first journey ever made by a Shah to the New World. Even allowing for this, there seems to have been an extra margin of enthusiasm in which may indicate that American big business and finance see through him and his court the most convenient machinery for the control of the capital investment necessary for Persia's seven-year plan. The point of view is under- standable. One can almost here the argument: "Build up a strong Shah and a small group of business-men and financiers who have something to lose as well as something to gain. The country is not ripe for democratic institutions, could never work them, &c."

But this is a specious line of reasoning. Since the beginning of the century Persia has been trying to make parliamentary govern- ment a reality. That she has not succeeded does not mean that she cannot succeed. It may, for instance, be very irritating to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company that the revised terms for its oil concession, agreed on in July, 1949, after prolonged negotiation, should have been talked out in the Persian Parliament in August, promised reconsideration in October and then, once more, shelved on the score of devaluation. But this does not mean that a simpler way out is to be found by dealing with one man or a few men who have been influenced to amass predominant powers. Fortunately the oil company has a very clean record in these matters. It has never dabbled in politics and never will, and, busy enough with its own problems of construction and supply, it patiently negotiates

with whatever forms of government exist without trying to influence their nature. It is to be hoped that Amefican financiers are not thinking along other lines. However hackneyed the word democracy may have become, it still has a meaning which is very clear against the rival background of totalitarianism lying behind Persia's long northern frontiers. That meaning must be underlined. It is not enough to play with the idea of some veiled form of dictatorship, which has already proved itself a failure during one Persian reign and which might well, with the expanding influence of Persia's northern neighbour, prove itself a disaster in a second.