13 JULY 1872, Page 13

BOOKS.

THE LATE BARON STOCKHAR.*

[FIRST NOTICE.]

'ruts volume presents some portraiture of one who, though scarcely known to the public, was amongst the most remarkable and actively influential men of our time—the very embodiment of wise counsel and large-minded statesmanship—a man who through a long life was the confidential friend and adviser of princes without con- tracting a taint of courtiership, or ever being lured by a vain combination out of the seclusion of unostentatious intimacies into the invidious glare of paraded favouritism. What heightens the sin- gularity of this existence is, that Stockmar was wholly without advantages of birth, and that he maintained his exceptional footing of unrestricted intimacy with Sovereigns in countries where he was a foreigner without awakening the easily kindled jealousies of native circles. We cannot recall a parallel figure to that of this unobserved friend and counsellor—the familiar inmate of royal households and absolute confidant of princes—who for fifty years was admitted without reserve to the inner consultation of the world's State affairs, without ever obtruding himself visibly on the public notice. It is, however, the fate of such a man—who lived "more for others than himself "—to vanish from the world without leaving monuments that can preserve for posterity the memory of his merits. The only adequate record of a life of this nature may be found in letters, which alone can preserve in some degree the manner of the counsel spoken and a measure of the wisdom which inspired it. We therefore feel under special obligations for the skill with which in this volume the son has put together a collection of his father's papers,—a collection which, though necessarily a mere gleaning, as is required by delicate circumstances of time and rela- tions that can be easily understood, yet gives a view of Stockmar not as depicted from without, but Stockmar as embodied in his own utterances. The volume thus composed is one that abounds in so much matter of the highest interest, that our difficulty is how to compress a notice within reasonable space.

Christian Frederick Stockmar was born in 1787 in Coburg, where his father filled an inferior magisterial appointment. The son embraced the medical profession, and as a military surgeon accompanied the German forces into France. On this occasion he came under the notice of Prince Leopold, who, on his engagement with Princess Charlotte, offered to make Stockmar his private phy- sician, and he cause accordingly to England in March, 1816. This special selection is proof that Leopold already entertained a particu- lar respect for its object, but the exceptional intimacy which ulti- • mately subsisted was the result of subsequent events. At the Prin- cess's death-bed the seal was set on the union between the two when, in the transport of grief, Leopold threw himself on his friend, asking and obtaining a promise that he would ever stay with him. Much has been written on that melancholy episode in English history, the life of Princess Charlotte, and Miss Knight's memoir is specially devoted to it. This volume, however, contains a narrative exceed- ing in fullness and in authenticity all that has yet appeared concern- ing the incidents connected with the Princess's engagement with the Prince of Orange, her marriage, and her death. The materials in regard to the two former are drawn from a manuscript volume— since Stockmar's death in Queen Victoria's possession—in which are copies of all correspondence exchanged in reference to the break- ing off of the engagement, together with a connecting narrative in Princess Charlotte's own handwriting. It tallies with Miss Knight's account in the main, but the summary of the letters in this volume gives much new detail of a story of domestic unhappiness which we do not cars to dwell on here. Stockmar quickly acquired a more intimate position in the royal circle than would have necessarily followed from his rank, but with the characteristic discretion of his nature he persistently declined interfering in any way in the medical treatment of the Princess during her pregnancy, for he felt the tremendous responsibility that would rest on him, an unknown foreign physician, if he die- agreed from the treatment recommended by eminent English practitioners. All that he did was to draw confidentially the Prince's attention to what Stockmar believed to be a wrong system that was being applied. It was only in her last moments that he attended the Princess. At midnight, Croft came to his bedside, and announcing an unexpected change for the worse, begged Stockmar (whom previously he had rather snubbed) to come. After a moment's hesitation, on a renewed call from Dr. Baillie, he hastened to the patient. The Princess was tossing herself in

* Dentwiirdigkeiten sue den Papitren des Freiherren Christian Friedrich von Stochntar. Braunschweig. 1872.

pain from side to side. Baillie was applying stimulants, and said to her, "Here is an old friend coming to you." The Princess recognised Stockmar—called him by the familiar name of" Stocky "—complained of having been made tipsy—then grew quieter, and in a few minutes expired. It was Stockmar's medical opinion that death resulted from previous wrong treat- ment during pregnancy. Some hours after the catastrophe, the formerly self-confident Croft wrote to Stockmar, "God grant that neither you nor any one dear to you may ever suffer what I am now undergoing," and a few weeks later the great practitioner committed suicide. So sudden had been the demise that the Prince was not present, and Stockmar had to inform him. It was when kneeling by his dead wife's bedside that Leopold said, "I am now forlorn ; will you promise always to stay with me ?" and that Stockmar pledged himself to do so, "so long as I saw he con- fided in me and I could be useful." From that day he entered on a new position. He ceased to be the Prince's physician, to become, as comptroller of his household, his intimate attendant. As such, his first action was to induce Leopold not to go to the Continent. "In England," he wrote, "he must mourn, where a whole people is mourning with him, after having shown toward him so much good-will and confidence." The advice was undeniably sound, and contributed greatly to the Prince's popularity in this country.

Still Leopold's position in England was necessarily anomalous, and not to the taste of a naturally active and ambitious tempera- ment. It is not strange, therefore, that when the crown of Greece seemed within reach, he should have snatched at it with an im- patience not approved of by his wise friend. The first overtures reached Leopold in 1829 at Naples, and we have here the report of Stoc.kmar's brother, sent to confer confidentially with Capodistrias, who seems throughout to have acted ambiguously. The difficulty from the first was that the three Powers circumscribed Greece within too narrow territorial boundaries, and that the Prince wished for a distinct and public invitation. Stockmar earnestly urged Leopold to avoid committing himself in any manner before having obtained the positive concession of preliminary con- ditions. Unfortunately, his impatience was enticed into un- guarded acceptances, whereupon he found himself confronted by difficulties—the indispensable material means for coping with which he was no longer able to exact. On February 11, 1830, Leopold addressed a communication to the Conference, stipulating five points as conditional to his acceptance,—amongst them a loan, and the presence of a foreign military force until a Greek army could be formed. This document he was induced to withdraw by Lord Aberdeen, substituting a paper of mere observa- tions. The fact is, the prospect of a career lured on Leopold, in the hope of ultimately obtaining the assent of the Powers to indispensable modifications in the original terms, until he found himself in a cruel dilemma between his own acceptance, the impracticable temper of diplomacy, and the equally impossible conditions of Greece. Then his shrewdness got the better of ambition, and on the 21st July, Leopold declared that he defini- tively declined to go to Greece, a step which exposed him to much obloquy. The Russian Matuszewicz said, that after so much bad faith and vacillation, it must be a subject of gratification not to see on the throne one "who would have betrayed the confidence of the Powers," and Stein wrote these bitter words :—" What do you say of the Marquis Peu-à-pen's conduct? A man of such irresolute character is wholly unfit to grapple vigorously with life. He has no colour." A few months, and this contemptuously dis- missed aspirant became the wise King of the Belgians; but then he shaped his course by the light of this Greek experience, and in entire conformity with the counsels of his wise friend. Although proclaimed by the Belgian Congress, and openly encouraged by the Ministers in Conference, Leopold steadily declined to hold any communication with the Belgian deputation until after signature by the Conference of Articles acceptable to Belgium, and their ratification by a vote in Congress. Leopold had doubts also as to the possibility of working the very demo- cratic constitution. He referred it to Stockmar, who, after mature consideration, counselled the acceptance of it, and he never modi- fied his opinion on this head during the many severe trials the King's Government had to undergo. Stockmar accompanied Leo- pold to Brussels. As is well known, the new King's actual entry was the signal for an advance of the Dutch, who overran the country, the Belgian Army dissolving like snow. Then followed, on Leopold's summons, the French occupation. This measure, adopted on Stockmar's advice, was full of risk, for jealousy of French designs was keen amongst the Powers, while the ignominious break- down of the Belgian forces altogether made the infant country look like a thing of straw. Talleyrand throughout aimed at insidiously bringing about a state of things resulting in the partition of Bel- gium between France and Holland, while, on the other hand, the Belgians, notwithstanding their crushing defeat in the field,. showed themselves unreasonably unwilling to consent to sucb modifications of terms as were due to the present position of the Dutch. Under these circumstances, Stockmar was sent to. London in the delicate character of the King's confidential agent, by the tide of the accredited representatives of Belgium. A position more liable to wound susceptibilities in any direction cannot be conceived ; nevertheless, Stockmar preserved the inti- mate confidence of all parties concerned, and while treating direct. with the English and other Ministers, he never gave umbrage to the- distinguished men who officially represented Belgium. There is am immense mass of most interesting matter ranging over the three years- of critical activity spent in this service in London. The problem. was to achieve some diplomatic settlement which should dissi- pate the diplomatic dread of French aggrandisement, and compass some practical protection against contumacious Holland. It is very striking with what calmness of mind and steadiness of purpose Stockmar bore himself throughout moments when the kingdom of Belgium seemed to hang on a thread. LordPalmerston threatened that if the Belgians did not yield a point the Conference would wash its hands of the matter, and let. them take their own chances with the Dutch. "I replied not a- word to this threat, but said to myself, that though four of the Conference Powers might wish such an event, France never could, tolerate the conquest of Belgium by Holland." The entry of French officers into the Belgian Army was a special subject of jealousy, especially to King William IV., and the following in- terview with him is characteristic:—" King William gave me am audience. I knew he meant to lecture me, and therefore, on coming in, I made a very serious face, which put out uncommonly his kindly nature, even to throwing him into embarrassment. He- was long before he could find the right text. At last he found it. It was that as a neutral State we wa nted no army, and our policy

should be equally neutral, neither French nor English He said much which was good on this, which I praised greatly,. whereupon he at once again resumed his usual good-humour. He said the appointment of French- officers was particularly disagree- able to him. I replied what I had already said to Palmerston. about getting English officers, when he answered eagerly, Oa this matter I will talk to you another time, for anyhow I desire you not to leave without coming to see me again.'" The position of affairs was intensely critical. The Belgians, notwithstanding their declared inability to cope in the field with the Dutch, would not abate from the points accorded by the eighteen articles of the original London Protocol, while the obstinacy of the- King of Holland was abetted by the ambiguous attitude of the Northern Powers and the prevailing jealousy of France.. The London Conference at last evolved a new basis of agreement, known as the Twenty-four Articles. In framing them Stockinet-. testifies "that Palmerston alone vigorously defended the Belgian, interests," while " Talleyrand did nothing but yield all points of pure Belgian interests, to insist only on what mainly affected those- of France." Throughout these perplexing negotiations Stockmar incessantly urged the King to firmness of action. "I call on your Majesty," he wrote on September 10, "(1) never to lose heart (2) never to lose activity, which is what your enemies hope; (3) not to neglect the civil organisation for the military one. The nation. must see that in the very height of the storm the work of peace is being promoted." Stockmar as earnestly insisted on the King's- forcing on the country acceptance of the Twenty-four Articles. In a long letter he stated all the arguments in favour of such a course- and against abdication, which Leopold meditated. "No doubt. theKing is exposed to temporary disadvantages from the Twenty- four Articles, that is, he can for a while become less popular witll an unreasonable, inconstant mass. Against this there is a sove- reign remedy. Let him show himself a quiet, firm, active,. sensible King, and we will see if in a short time he is not again, the most popular King in Europe. Abdication, on the other

hand, would ruin him in the eyes of Europe The King went to Belgium to preserve the peace of Europe, and to save there the cause of constitutional monarchy. That is the mission he is under an engagement towards Europe, the Powers, and Belgium to exe- cute. The King's task is a fine one ; let him show himself worthy of it." To add force to these words, Stockmar went himself over to Brussels. The King acted as he counselled. The Twenty-four Articles were presented and were voted by the Chambers, not a little probably under a sense that in the event of their rejection the King was resolved on abdicating, which he

then would have done, with full justification. These Articles were then embodied in the London Treaty, the 25th clause of which -contains the well-known guarantee of the Five Powers for their execution, whereby Stockmar's structure was, so to say, got under roof. Not but that still negotiations were protracted, and many -delicate questions still open, owing to Dutch stiffneckedness, French ambiguousness, and Russian mysteriousness. The point about razing fortresses on the French frontier proved especially thorny. In all these matters Stockmar took the same active part as before ; and throughout the marked influence he exerted, without any official position beyond that of agent for the winding-up of Leopold's annuity affairs, gave umbrage to none. The part taken by him- self in the creation of the Belgian kingdom Stockunar never re- gretted. In this volume are many most interesting letters in re- gard to Belgian affairs, prospects, and parties, down to the time of his death in 1863. Without being blind to the peculiar dangers to which it was exposed, Stockmar had nevertheless faith in the 'vitality of Belgium nurtured in a course of constitutional govern- ment. He believed it to be as sure of its existence as any other second-rate power in Europe ; for, as he wrote in the critical period of 1850, "What I have long believed I now believe more than ever, namely, that Belgium can lose itself as an independent State only through the errors of its own government and popular representa- tives. But king, government, and representation have, since 1848, given evidence before Europe, the former that they can govern, the -other that they know how to adapt themselves to the part allotted them in a truly representative constitution." To secure, however, the advantages of the position, Stockmar insisted on the necessity of Belgium keeping up her power to make a stand on emergency in behalf of that neutrality which by the concurrence of diplomacy had been accorded to her territory. So when the project was mooted of a Belgian-French customs' union, Stockmar disapproved of it, as perilous to that country's independence, which, under all circum- stances, he continued to believe, could be cemented only by the legitimate developments of the constitutional process. It is known to every one how fierce a struggle has been waged there between the Catholic and the Liberal parties. Stockmar calmly looked on these incidents in the conviction that they were mere momentary sipheavings, and that the ultimate outcome would be constitutional progress. It will be remembered that in 1857 serious disturbances occurred on the occasion of the so-called Loi des Couvents, brought forward by an Ultramontane Cabinet, when the King at one time spoke of putting himself at the head of the troops, and eventually -did interfere by a letter which was a manifesto. Stockmar, in letters which are the quintessence of calm, clear counsel, followed these events from afar. "Because the Liberals have had recourse to the mob," he writes, "it does not follow that the Belgian Constitu- tion is dead. It will die only the day when one party alone is in the ab- -solute ascendancy, and has usurped all authority. You know the stress I lay on the success of that which I call the Belgian experiment. The great experimentator on whom success depends is the King himself. Now is really the capital moment of his reign, and now it is he must show that those were right who confided in his wisdom, justice, and honesty. The King has said to me often, The Catholic party alone has consistency with us, the Liberal is like a rope of sand.' Abstractedly 1 agree in the truth and accuracy of this opinion. But as soon as it is applied to practice, its general -correctness will be reduced into a merely relative and conditional one. For in practice the doctrine which constitutes the essence of the Catholic party will give it the consistency on which an Executive could confidently rely, only so long as an intelligent and energetic opposition stands over against it, which circumscribes by that fact the doctrine, and through such limitation lends con- sistency and discipline to the Catholics." And he ends, after further argument,—" My firm conviction therefore is, that the Belgian experiment can be considered a failure only when political power is vested in the hands of the Catholics, and the force of the Liberals is reduced to nothing." Such was one of Stockmar's last utterances on the prospect attending one of the great problems of his life. But this Belgian creation was far from being the sole work in which he was actively interested, and in a subsequent notice we shall give some account of the many striking points connected with his long intimacy with Prince Albert and the Queen.