A MODERN ITALIAN JURIST.* WE are pleased to see that
this remarkable work of Pro- fessor Dioclato Lioy hae been introduced to the English public by so competent a scholar and so enthusiastic a believer as Mr. Hastie. Perhaps he is a trifle too enthu- siastic. Perhaps there is a little too much of Rienzi when in the tribune—at all events, the Rienzi of tradi- tion and Lord Lytton—in such outbursts of optimism as :— "Italy has again become the living and fruitful home of the Science of Law. The ancient spirit of the People of Right' was never dead, however it may have seemed to slumber ; and it is now breathing again with all the freshness and fullness of the new time Modern Italy has entered anew upon her special birthright, and is vindicating her claim to be not only the inheritor, but the continuator, of the jaral spirit of Ancient Rome." It is, indeed, con- tended that the modern spirit of Italy is to be preferred to "the jural spirit of Ancient Rome," because the latter never "essentially realised through its indefinite range the in- herent rights of humanity, or the spiritual essence of liberty." There is no doubt a good deal. of truth in Mr. Hastie's claim for the modern Italian school of jurists, although any one who interests himself too much in "the inherent rights of humanity," or even "the spiritual essence of liberty," is apt to wander from the straight road of practical politics into the region of morass haunted by crack-brained but yet dangerous revolutionists. Besides, it should never be forgotten how marvelously the Roman Law was modified and liberalised, as outside and, in the first instance, alien ideas began to affect the originally narrow Italian world. Pro- fessor Lioy himself shows, in his" Prolegomena," how "Philo- sophy made its beneficent influence felt," and reminds us that Cicero went so far as to declare, "Non erit alia lex Ronne, alia Athenis, sed omnes gentes una lex continebit." It is quite true that the Roman Law could not save the Empire, but that was because it was not sufficiently liberalised to include within it Christian ethics, or even the idea of personal responsibility or supremacy of conscience, which lies at the basis of Christian ethics. It seems, therefore, too much to say that not only did the Roman Law not save the Empire, but that it "rather precipitated its fate by the aggressive and outward ambitions which it stimulated." Even in Christianity a stimulus to " aggressive and outward ambition" has been found by in- dividuals, by classes, and even by races and nations. But this is the fault, not of Chrietiartity, but of those who have mis- interpreted and misapplied its teachings. An equal charity should be extended to the Roman Law, more especially by those who admit that in those ages, when, to quote the curious language of Mr. Hestia, "the modern world was spiritually begotten by Christianity upon the virgin life of the Germanic race," that Law "became the schoolmaster of the young peoples, and trained and disciplined their wild spirits into thee forms of a new social order."
But Professor Lioy is, in the first instance, not a jurist or a theorist on Right, but a philosopher. His "Prolegomena," although written, perhaps, too much from the standpoint of Gioberti, constitute a very good summary of the history of philosophy from the earliest period to the present time. Occasionally his writing is condensed even to epigram, as when he says :—" Descartes had said, I think, there- fore I am ;' Maine de Biran corrected him, saying, I will, therefore I " But condensation leads to question- able assertions when Professor Lioy says 1—" The funda- • Tho Philosophy of , with Special Roforencs to the Principles and Devaiop. mint of Law. By Dindato Noy, Professor in the TJnivereity of Nan'es.
• Translated from the Italian by W. Hutto, MA., B.D. 2 vole, London: Kogan Paul, Trench, Trilbuor, and Co., Limited. 1801.
mental precept of the Christian doctrine of morals is this : Love God above everything, and thy neighbour as thy- self. The love of God is generally inseparable from the love of our neighbour, which is charity ; but the true perfection lies in the contemplative life, in prayer, and in ecstasy." A religion, like a man, is known by its fruits, and the simple fact that Christianity is at the present moment the religion of all the most energetic and energising nations and races of the world, is some evidence that its tendency is not towards asceticism. On the whole, however, Professor Lioy is per- fectly fair in those passages of his " Prolegomena " in which he represents the views of the different schools of metaphysics
which have in turns influenced, though they have not domi- nated, the world of thought. Thus, although he says he has half his lifetime been combating Sensualism, he is quite just to the Sensualists. But what is Professor Lioy's own standpoint ? That he must explain (P) in his own words. " We have," he says, "no other means of defending knowledge and existence than the Platonic doctrine of ideas as carried to perfection by Gioberti." Here is the starting-point of this modern and " perfect " philosophy :— "This is the history of the soul. It is a prisoner here below, and by meditation it has to release itself from the bonds of the body in order to contemplate the ideas in themselves. 13y means of the senses we are enabled to understand that all equal things tend to an intelligible equality below which, however, they always remain. Whence can the idea of this equality come ? Certainly not from sensation, but from thought. It is one of the modes of thought, or something substantial. In order to reach it we must go out of ourselves and turn to an invisible point in which the object touches the subject and forms the unity of the synthesis of thought. This point, according to Gioberti, is the first intuitive judgment : Being creates the existent."
The Secret of Gioberti is not quite the same as the Secret of Hegel, but after this "going out of ourselves and turning to an invisible point," who will say that it is not quite as difficult to understand P Whoever wishes to plunge deeper into the
Serhonian bog of Giobertian metaphysics, may go on to the Three Methexes, the Initial Methexis, the Medial Methexis, and the Final Methexis, and then to the Mimesis, which is "essentially progressive, inasmuch as the Initial Methexis goes on actualising itself in order to become Final, and the more the Mimesis approaches the Final Methexis, the more does the intelligibility and unity of things increase."
But whatever may be thought of Professor Lioy's quid- quid inconcussum, however much we may differ from his estimates of Vico and Gioberti, there is no doubt that under
the title of The Philosophy of Right, he has written a most interesting—and from the historical point of view, eminently valuable—work which in one way or another deals with every- thing that concerns man in his social relations. It is divided into two parts,—the Objects of Right, which include Religion, Science, Art, Industry, Commerce, Morality, and Justice ;
and the Subjects of Right, which embrace the Individual, the Family, the Orders and Classes of Society, the Local Com- munity or Commune, the Province, the State, International Law, and Humanity. On the whole, Professor Lioy is con-
servative. Thus, speaking of the views put forward by John Stuart Mill in his Subjection of Women, he says :—" He ignores Nature and the ethical destiny of the beautiful half of the
human race, and if society were to follow his counsel, we would have the domestic hearth desecrated, and an always agitated public life." Revolutionary doctrines receive no countenance from a writer who holds that the family is the tissue of the social organism, who thinks that every one should be free to believe in his own way, but not to exhibit his religious opinions except within limits which will not injure the rights of others,
who says even at this time of day, "The electoral franchise cannot be assigned to all indiscriminately, but only to those who are in a position to use it well in the interest of the civil community," and who maintains that when the Stoics proclaimed the abolition of the idea of a father- land or special country, they did so "in a moment of philosophical prostration." Professor Lioy shows a marvellous acquaintance with the forms of constitutional procedure throughout the world-, and if he is not quite up to date as regards our own Parliamentary forms, the fact is not very surprising. His book will be found valuable, not only as a treatise on the Philosophy of Right, but as a digest of the treatises of previous writers of all ages and countries. Looked at from this standpoint, we know, indeed, no better or more compact work of the kind.
Previous page
