In theory, a monopoly has no competition...

true that British Rail operates the only national railway system in the country. By definition, that should make us a monopoly.

By implication, we should therefore enjoy a cosy existence, sheltered from competition, insensitive to customers' needs, complacent and unadventurous.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

COM I 'E' I TIION IN EVERY SECTOR

On the passenger side intense competition comes from over 19 million private and company cars owned in this country. Owners who use their cars on business benefit from tax relief. And company car owners (of which Britain has more than anywhere else in Europe) usually have only to find marginal costs, like petrol, out of their own pockets. Not surprisingly, the incentive to use the car is considerable.

Air services provide vigorous competition for British Rath Inter-City trains.

With the passing of the 1980 Transport Act, long-distance coaches now compete for our business much more actively than before.

In the freight sector, competition is similarly intense. We don't benefit, as road hauliers do, from the UK licensing laws — for example, there is no "quantity" licensing, as in Germany and France, to limit the amount of freight to travel by road. What's more, only now is taxation of heavy goods vehicles being increased to make the competitive framework fairer.

'INANCIAI . BURl)I NS —WI IAT ABOUT FINANCIAL Ft .EXIBILITY?

We have a statutory obligation to run services which are socially necessary but financially unviable.This is known as the Public Service Obligation — the basis of the annual "contract" between the Government and British Rail In real terms this has not increased since 1975 --leaving Britain with the least supported major railway in Europe.

If British Rail does not use up the whole of the contract payment in any year the residue cannot be "credited" to the next year.

Monopolies generally enjoy more financial flexibility—and muscle— than other business. But not British Rail. Instead British Rail is restricted by the rules and conventions which apply throughout the UK public sector where, for example, each industry has its External Financing Lunit. This represents the maximum sum in terms of "outside finance" that any public sector industry can call on each year. If the economic recession makes it impossible for British Rail to keep within its External Financing 'Until, the excess will be deducted from the next year's Limit.

"ITIE SERIOUS IMPLICAITONS

The direct consequence of financial inflexi

bility is on investment. British Raab investment per train/Km is lower than that of any other major railway in Western Europe. The railway network needs 30 per cent extra investment just to maintain the present standard of service.

If Britain wants a worthwhile railway system in future, people will have to appreciate the importance of railways, as they have done in other countries.

Investmeat in the railways is a sound and sensible use of money. This so-called monopoly can behave adventurously, can stand up to competition and can justify its role in the economy,

not forget that in 1979 British Rail's recorded passenger miles were acmally higher Man in 1961, when the rail network was thirty per cent larger and there were only half as many cars on the road

This is one of a series of advertisements designed to increase public awareness of the position of the railways in the national transport system and also in the life of the community as a whole. Whilst the facts andfigures contained in these advertisements are known and appreciated by those directly concerned in shaping the future, an industry as much in the limelight as ours has a duo) to address itself to a , wider audience, which needs to be well informed tilt is to play its part in helping to form public opinion.