MR. RHODES'S EVIDENCE.
MR. RHODES'S evidence in regard to the Raid has come to an end, and Mr. Rhodes himself has left England. Under these circumstances it may serve a useful public purpose to say something as to the general effect of his evidence in regard to the chief points on which enlightenment was required. We do not desire to pass judgment upon that evidence—that duty belongs to the 'Committee and not to us--or to insist upon any conclusions being derived therefrom. All we want to do is to put together what Mr. Rhodes had to say on certain points, and to leave the inferences, if any, to the public. Admitting, as he has himself fully admitted, that Mr. Rhodes stimulated and helped to organise the revolutionary movement in Johannesburg, and that he placed an armed force on the border to be ready in case of eventualities, the -following are the questions on which enlightenment is required :—(1) Did Mr. Rhodes, directly or indirectly, by message or by the silence which gives consent, permit or .allow Dr. Jameson to "go in "? (2) What were Mr. Rhodes's reasons and motives for taking part in and helping to organise the movement in Johannesburg ? (3) Did Mr. Rhodes withhold information as to his actions .and intentions from persons to whom it was his duty to -disclose them? (4) Were there certain persons in England ,:to whom Mr. Rhodes communicated his schemes ?
Let us take first the question,—Did Mr. Rhodes, -directly or indirectly, by message or by the silence which _gives consent, permit or allow Dr. Jameson to " go in " ? Mr. Rhodes has told us that he did not authorise Dr. Jameson to " go in,"—" Dr. Jameson went on without my authority" is Mr. Rhodes's actual phrase. Some people will no doubt consider this statement sufficient, and will require no further discussion of the matter. Others will -note that the phrase "without my authority" is a neutral ,phrase, and may merely mean that no actual message *.iving the order to start was ever sent. Persons who, for this and other reasons, take this view will require to test the validity of Mr. Rhodes's assertion. How can this be done ? By considering in what way Mr. Rhodes acted (1) before the actual incursion, (2) after he was aware that the incursion had taken place. That, we presume, will be admitted to be a fair test. When a man's -agent does something which turns out ill, and is said to have done it without authority, we ask,—Had this particular act any, and, if so, what, previous sanc- tion, and was it immediately and actively, or only perfunctorily, disavowed the moment it came to the -ears of the principal ? It is common knowledge that there are and always have been plenty of actions elaken in this world through agents and intermediaries in which disavowal, under certain eventualities, is elabo- rately and systematically arranged for. We do not desire to declare that the actual incursion of Dr. Jameson was an act of this kind. That would be to pronounce judgment, which is not our function. All we intend to do is to advise the testing of this possibility by Mr. Rhodes's action previous to and after the Raid. The first point in regard to Mr. Rhodes's responsi- bility for the actual incursion is the fact that he, or rather his agent (Dr. Harris), telegraphed from Cape Town on December 23rd to Dr. Jameson, fixing as the time for the Raid the evening before the day on which he actually did start. The telegram is as follows :— " Company will be floated next Saturday 12 o'clock at night. They are very anxious you must not start before 8 o'clock and secure telegraph office silence. We suspect Transvaal is getting aware slightly." In regard to this telegram a very important piece of examination by Sir William Harcourt followed. A part of this we must give verbatim, as to summarise it without also giving the text might be unfair to Mr. Rhodes :- " Sir W. Harcourt : That was an order, was it not, from you to Dr. Jameson to start on Saturday at 8 o'clock at night 2—No. I do not want to shirk any responsibility, but I do not think you will find any sense like that.—' Company is to be floated next Saturday.' That is, you said,' Insurrection will take place on Saturday ? '—Yes, but in subsequent telegrams to this you will see there was a change.—I want to get at this particular date. You informed Dr. Jameson that the Company would be floated— that is to say, the insurrection would take place—on Saturday at 12 o'clock at night.—Mr. Chamberlain : I understood Mr. Rhodes to say that he did not send that telegram.—Mr. Rhodes : Yes, it was sent by Harris. He will be able to give you the reason for it. I knew generally that he was sending telegrams, but I did not see them all.—Sir William Harcourt : You sent an order to Dr. Jameson to start at 8 o'clock ?—I do not think you will find that. I think it was a prohibition.—Surely when you say to a man You must not start before 8 o'clock,' you mean to say that he is to start afterwards ?—Quite so. Dr. Jameson was very anxious to start, and if you take the whole tone of the telegrams of the last week, you will find they were really sent with the object of preventing him. You must read four or five other telegrams with the one you have read.—The words ' secure telegraph office silence' were an order to cut the telegraph wire P—No.—What does this mean—that Dr. Jameson was to secure the silence of the telegraph office P—I do not know what it means. It seems absurd, does it not P—It is not absurd, because it was the thing that was done. The reason you were not able to communicate on December 29th with Dr. Jameson was that the silence of the telegraph office had been secured ? "
This examination seems to establish the fact that on December 23rd Dr. Jameson had authority to go in after 8 o'clock on Saturday. Mr. Rhodes declares, however, that the effect of the subsequent telegrams was to revoke that order. In regard to the point that this important telegram was not from him, but from Dr. Harris, the following question and answer must be quoted :—" Sir William Harcourt: I need not ask you, Mr. Rhodes, Mr. Rutherfoord Harris would not send a telegram of that character, thing a date for the insurrection and giving instructions to Dr. Jameson, without instructions from you ?—Oh, I am not evading any responsibility." Fol- lowing on the telegram of January 23rd comes the telegram of January 24th,also from Harris to Jameson, which says:— " You must not move before Saturday night. We are feeling confident it will take place on Saturday night. Since Dr. Wolff left the feeling of our subscribers greatly improved." Thus, up till December 24th, the instructions sent from Cape Town authorised an incursion after 8 on the Saturday night. Saturday was December 28th. Mr. Rhodes, however, asserted that the telegram sent by him to Dr. Jameson on December 27th, suggesting an explana- tion for the presence of a force on the border if incon- venient questions were asked, was meant " to postpone Dr. Jameson's action," and it certainly is capable of bear- ing that construction. On December 27th—i.e., on the Friday—there is a telegram from Jameson to Harris: —"I am afraid of Bechuanaland Police for cutting wire. They have now all gone forward, but will endeavour to put a stop to it. Therefore expect to receive telegram from you 9 to-morrow morning authorising movements. Surely Colonel F. W. Rhodes advisable to come to terms at once. Give guarantee, or you can telegraph before Charles Leonard arrived." This, no doubt, seems to show that Dr. Jameson expected some form of authorisation and was not inclined to move without. Next day, how- ever—i.e., on December 28th, the Saturday—he did not receive the expected wire before 9 a.m., and at 9.25 a.m. he sent an impatient telegram to Harr* in which he uses the words, "You had better go as quickly as possible and report fully or tell the Right Hon. C. J. Rhodes to allow me." The answer to this telegram, sent also on Saturday, December 28th, forty-six minutes after the receipt of the " tell Rhodes to allow me " telegram, cannot be quoted on either side of the case. It does not authorise movement, but it also does not peremptorily forbid the incursion. Its terms are :—" Harris to Jameson. It is all right if you will only wait. Captain Maurice Heany comes to you from Colonel F. W. Rhodes by special train to-day." That afternoon, however, comes a telegram from Harris to Jameson which is somewhat more in favour of postponement, though here again the arrival of Captain Heany is to be waited for :—" Goold Adams arrives Mafeking Monday, and Heany, I think, arrives to- night. After seeing him you and we must judge regarding flotation, but all our foreign friends are now dead against it, and say public will not subscribe one penny towards it, even with you as a director.—Iemaion." In regard to these telegrams it is evident that if "foreign friends " was meant to include Mr. Rhodes, the telegram amounts to a half prohibition of the Raid by Mr. Rhodes. Accordingly Sir William Harcourt asked as follows :— "Do you put it tome that you are speaking of yourself when you say' All our foreign friends are now dead against it, and say the public will not subscribe one penny towards it, even with you as a director' ? Do you put it to me that that is a description of yourself P—In this case it is the Johannesburg people.—Yes ?- This clearly does mean the Johannesburg people.—Yes, I thought so. Now then, Mr. Rhodes, you really do in that telegram make the question of Jameson's movement—that is, on the Saturday —depend upon what Captain Heany said. Heany had been sent on there from Johannesburg by Mr. Hammond and others to deprecate Dr. Jameson's moving P—That is how I understand it."
The narrative of what happened may be continued in another quotation from Mr. Rhodes's evidence :— " Now there comes this important message from Jameson, Piteani. This is on the Saturday also : Received your tele- gram Icbabod re Captain Maurice Heany. Have no further news. I require to know. Unless I hear definitely to the contrary, shall leave to-morrow evening and carry into effect my second telegram of yesterday to you, and it will be all right.' Then there is the other telegram [December 27th] which I read before : They have then two days for flotation. If they do not, we will make our own flotation with help of letter (or letters) which I will publish.' He says be means to carry out the matter unless he hears definitely to the contrary. I must ask you whether that does not convey to your mind that he con- siders that at that time, on Saturday afternoon, he had not re- ceived definite instructions from you not to go, for he then asks that he may know definitely to the contrary ?—Yes ; I think, if I am right, you will get that from Dr. Harris. That telegram did not come till Sunday, when the later one came, and then the wires were cut. I think you should gather that from Dr. Harris and Dr. Jameson himself."
It will be seen from these telegrams that though there is no telegram authorising the Raid, there is also no telegram forbidding it. The nearest is the telegram insisting that Dr. Jameson must wait to see Heany. It has, there- fore, been suggested that the peremptory order from Mr. Rhodes to stop Dr. Jameson, which was certainly required by the impatience to " go in " evinced by Dr. Jameson, was to have been given by Captain Heany. This, however, was not the case. Mr. Rhodes stated most emphatically that Captain Heany never came to Cape Town. " I never saw him and had no communication with him." He was purely a Johannesburg emissary. The telegrams in regard to Heany's visit, then, come to this. Dr. Jameson says, Tell Rhodes to allow me,' and the answer is, ' Wait till you have seen Heany.' Finally comes the telegram of Sunday, December 29th, the day on which Dr. Jameson started. Dr. Jameson telegraphs:—" Shall leave to-night for the Transvaal. My reason is the final arrangement with writers of letters was that, without further refer- ence to them, in case I should hear at some future time that suspicions had been aroused as to their intentions amongst the Transvaal [authorities], I was to start immediately to prevent loss of lives as letters state." Now this telegram was sent by Dr. Jameson, not before, but after he had seen Heany. Heany arrived early on the Sunday morning several hours before Dr. Jameson sent off the telegram of December 29th, —the telegram just quoted. This fact seems to show that Dr. Jameson acted with remarkable correctness throughout. (1) He originally arranged to start on the Saturday evening as permitted. (2) In obedience to the telegram to wait till he had seen Heany he waited. (3) After he had seen Heany he came to his decision and' started. (4) He secured telegraph's silence as originally arranged. We leave it to our readers to say how far this evidence as to Mr. Rhodes's behaviour before the incursion took place bears out the notion that he did not authorise Dr. Jameson to go in, by direct or indirect means, or by the silence which gives consent. The next thing to inquire- is whether Mr. Rhodes's action after the Raid is consistent, with the theory that he had not in any way authorised it. It may, we think, be presumed that in such a case Mr. Rhodes, directly he knew what had happened, would have- done his very best to recall Dr. Jameson. That is a fair supposition, because Mr. Rhodes says he did do all he could. Let us ask how far his account of what he did bears out this allegation. Space will not allow us to quote the whole of Mr. Rhodes's account of how he behaved after he knew of the incursion. We must, however, note the fact that he made no effort to send a message by such means as were used by the High Commissioner.. Asked his reasons for this inaction, Mr. Rhodes said that he was not asked to send a message, and that he thought it was impossible to reach Dr. Jameson. Then followed the following highly important piece of evidence :— " Sir William Harcourt : If you desired that Dr. Jameson should not go on was it necessary that any one should ask you?' —I did not think it was possible to get to Dr. Jameson.—I must ask you, Mr. Rhodes, because Mr. Schreiner has told us in his evidence that you would not stop him ?—I think not, if you will read the papers. What I said was, 'But I cannot go and pull. him back.'—Mr. Labouchere : This, I think, is the passage:— 'He was absolutely broken down in spirit; ruined. I said," Why do you not stop him ? Although he has ridden in you can still stop him." He said, "Poor old Jameson. Twenty years we have' been friends, and now he goes in and ruins me. I cannot hinder him. I cannot go and destroy him." '—Mr. Rhodes : I should reply that naturally I was very much upset at the time. The practical idea acting in my mind was that it was too late to send after him."
Here, again, we can only point out that it is necessary to consider whether the conduct here described and that connected with the issue of the Proclamation, to the issue of which Mr. Rhodes objected, is consistent with the notion that Mr. Rhodes did not, directly or indirectly, or in any way, authorise the actual " going in " of Dr. Jameson.
What were Mr. Rhodes's reasons and motives for• taking part in and helping to organise the movement in Johannesburg ? Mr. Rhodes alleged his sympathy with his countrymen. He did not, however, confine. himself to this, but made an additional statement. Asked why he chose the autumn of 1895 to change- the policy of observation for the policy of active inter- vention, Mr. Rhodes stated, among other things, "I felt„ for instance, with reference to the gold industry, that owing to the huge charges the poorer reefs were non- payable. I think the present charges come to about 6s. per ton, which really renders the poorer reefs non-payable. That was causing great trouble among the capitalists or those representing the mines, and they were determined— but we shall hear it all from themselves—to have a change." In reference to the question,—Did Mr. Rhodes withhold information as to his actions and intentions from persons to whom it was his duty to disclose them ?- it must be pointed out (1) that he did not inform the High Commissioner except by putting to him a hypo- thetical case as to a possible rising in Johannesburg,. though under the Charter he had as a director a special duty to communicate freely with that officer; (2) that though he informed the Imperial Secretary, Sir Graham. Bower, he bound him on his honour to mention the in formation to no one ; (3) that he did not tell his Cabinet ; (4) that he did not communicate with his brother-directors even after the Raid had taken place. Here, again, we only state the result of the evidence and attempt to draw no conclusion.
Next we must ask,—Were there certain persons in England to whom Mr. Rhodes communicated his schemes ? Some information in regard to this point is contained in the following piece of evidence :—" Sir William Harcourt:: I must ask you, with reference to these preparations con- nected with the promotion of an insurrection in Johannes- burg, did you ever make any communication to any persons in London ?—I have had my communications on, the question, but I consider that this affects the question of third parties." Mr. Rhodes was also asked whether he had communicated with the Chartered Company. His reply was that he had not done so, and that he had only held communication with his agent, Dr. Harris. Asked separately as to individuals, he replied " No " to the names of the Duke of Abercorn, the Duke of Fife, Lord Grey, Lord Gifford, and Sir Horace Farquhar. After this last name had been put to him, Mr. Rhodes replied : " No ; I have told you I made no communication to any one but Dr. Harris in London." When, however, Mr. Rhodes was asked, " Had you no communication with Mr. Rochefort Maguire?" he replied, "I cannot reply to that question." On being pressed, however, Mr. Rhodes ultimately answered " No " to the question. Asked as to telegrams which had passed between the Cape and London, Mr. Rhodes declared that they were of a con- fidential nature, and that he objected to their being put in.
We will say no more in regard to the evidence to which we have here drawn attention, as our object is not, as we have said, to pass judgment, but merely to arrange, and as it were codify, a portion of that evidence.
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