Political Commentary
Mrs Thatcher's poodle?
John Grigg
Last week's by-election results were certainly very good for the Conservatives, as they could hardly fail to be at a time of almost unmitigated adversity for the Government and against the background of the party conferences—the Tories' so successful, Labour's so disastrous. But it is important not to get too excited about by-election victories, however sensational. The swing last week at Walsall was much the same as that at Dudley in March 1968. when a Labour majority of 10,000 was turned into a Tory majority of 11,600. Yet at the general election two years later Dudley reverted to Labour (though admittedly only just).
Workington was more solidly encouraging than Walsall, despite a less dramatic swing, because in Lord Peart's old seat the only special factor was the loss of whatever personal vote he may have commanded as MP there for over thirty years. Whereas at Walsall the Labour vote v'as split by the intervention of a local candidate, and presumably also in some degree affected by the Stonehouse affair, at Workington there were no such complications. Above all, whereas the turn-out at Walsall was only 51.5 per cent (compared with 66.6 at the last general election), at Workington it was 74.2 per cent.
But victory even on such a high poll at a by-election is no safe guide to what would happen at a general election in the near future, let alone in eighteen months' time. The Tories will probably win more seats than any other party at the next 'election whenever it occurs, but their ability to secure an overall working majority must still be regarded as doubtful, granted the number of small parties and, more especially, the likely strength of the SNP in the next Parliament. Moreover, in present circumstances even a party with a working majority would not necessarily be able to run an effective government. It would be worse than useless for the present administration to be brought down if the Tory administration that took its place were not allowed to govern.
Such reflections should not be dismissed as cowardly or defeatist. It is essential to realise that our parliamentary democracy, which has never been perfect, is now subject to the new qualification or distortion of trade union power. In the past it was only the Tory Party that had an unfair advantage, through the power of the second chamber which it controlled. Today Labour has the more formidable advantage of an industrial wing whose political consciousness is fully developed and whose partisanship is instinctive. The Lords' veto was undemocratic but constitutional; the trade unions' is unconstitutional but relatively democratic. Yet the crucial similarity is that in each case power has been exploited for the benefit of a single party.
The Lords, of course, are still with us and attention will be focused upon them during the coming week. Since 1911 their absolute legal right to veto all legislation. has been transformed into a limited power to delay non-money Bills, first for two years and now only for one year or less. But in practice even this modest delaying power has been held in check by the fear of abolition, because despite tinkering changes membership of the House has remained largely hereditary and predominantly Tory.
The question now is, should the Lords in their unregenerate state either reject, or insist upon wrecking amendments to, Bills that have been passed by the House of Commons? To do so would be a breach of custom, just as it was a breach of custom for them to reject the 1909 Finance Bill. It had then been accepted for many years past that the hereditary chamber should not obstruct the annual Finance Bill, whatever it might do to other legislation sent up from the Commons. And in recent times it has become a scarcely less strong convention that the residual power of the Lords should not be used to frustrate the deliberate and firmly expressed will of the elected House.
The decision to reject Lloyd George's budget at the end of 1909 was taken in collusion with Arthur Balfour, the Tory leader in the Commons, and on a rational calculation that in the resulting appeal to the country the Tories would be returned to power. Lloyd George made much of the 'peers versus people' issue and described the House of Lords as Mr Balfour's `poodle'. But he was handicapped by the fact that a large section of the people was still not enfranchised (only 60 per cent of adult males then had the vote), and by the fact that his was not the only radicalism in the field, since the Tories as well as defending privilege were also advocating tariff reform, a radical programme with considerable popular appeal.
At all events the Tory gamble nearly came off. The huge Liberal majority of 1906 was destroyed and after 1910 the Liberals only had a majority in Parliament with the support of the Irish Nationalists, for which they had to pay the price of an inflexible commitment to Irish Home Rule.
Historically-minded members of the shadow cabinet may now be calculating that, if the 1909 gamble so nearly succeeded, a similar gamble today would be almost foolproof. The present Labour government has nothing like the moral authority that the Liberal government had in 1909, nor has the legislation that might now be wrecked the
untouchable status of a Finance Bill. The House of Lords, moreover, is less flagrantly partisan than it used to be, and its social composition more varied. If Mr Callaghan were to decide to take the issue to the country, the electorate would be grateful for the opportunity to turn the Labour government out, and diversionary attacks on the House of Lords would no more save Mr Callaghan than attacks on the governorgeneral of Australia saved Mr Whitlarn.
But Mrs Thatcher and her colleagues should not be misled by apparent historical precedents or contemporary analogies In other countries. Each situation has to be judged on its own merits in relation to the peculiar circumstances of time and place. According to that test, would it be sensible to use the House of Lords to sabotage the present government's legislative programme. and would it be sensible of the Lords to allow themselves to be so used ?
On three ot the measures in question it would quite certainly be madness for the Lords' suspensory power to be exercised. The prevalent social character of the Tory majority in the Lords is still such that paYbeds, the tied cottage or comprehensive education would be highly inappropriate issues for a showdown between Lords and Commons, as nobody knows better than the very intelligent leader of the Tory peers. Lord Carrington. The practical dilemma, therefore, i 5. whether or not to insist upon wrecking amendments to the Dock Work Regulation Bill and the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Bill. Both are measures against which a verY strong case can be made and on which trade union opinion is divided. All the same, if the Government refuses to offer any compromise, it would seem to me wiser in the last resort to let the Bills through in the forrn demanded by the present Commons major" ty. Odium would thus accrue to that majority and to the outside forces which imposed the Bills upon a largely unwilling public. Mrs Thatcher and Lord Carrington would be able to claim that they had scrupulouslY refrained :from using undemocratic power to override the will of the popularly elected chamber, even though they had good reason to believe that wrecking action would be popular. They would place themselves in an unassailable moral position for arguing against the trade unions' partisan veto, which is the only one that now matters. They would prove that they really cared about parliamentary democracy and national unity, so that on returning to power they would have a fair chance of gaining the cooperation of the unions.
By taking the militant course they might get an early election and win it, only to find that they had lost the longer and more serious game, which is to wean the trade unions from their partisanship and convert them to the principles of a mixed economY. If the present government is to die, the fatal blow should be struck by the House of Commons or by its own `supporters'.
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