THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FRENCH CHAMBER.
THERE are just three living forces left in Fra:ice, the Chamber, the Army, and the Mob of Paris ; and of the three, the Chamber is, for the moment, the one which governs. Its power, as we have repeatedly pointed out, is absolute, and is used absolutely. It overturns Ministries when it will, dis- misses individual Ministers at discretion, and would without difficulty, as is believed in Paris, compel even the President to resign. He could not remain after a hostile address, and he
would not remain after a distinctly hostile vote. The Chamber, however, though irresistible, has never been severely tested, and its conduct, now that a test is at hand, is matter of unusual interest, both to those who believe that govern- ment by an unfettered Chamber is impossible, and to those who think that, if it is impossible, democracy stands self- condemned. All who could think have perceived that the diffi- culty of a Chamber which should attempt direct govern- ment as the French Chamber has done would be in questions of foreign policy, and it is with many such questions, all urgent, all complicated, and all new, that the Chamber, when it meets on the 22nd inst., will have to deal. Every difficulty has been left for its decision, and the Deputies between October 22nd and November 3rd must declare whether they held Paris right in insulting the King of Spain, whether they intend to accept a war with China, and whether they will or will not reject the suggestions of the British Government in the matter of Mr. Shaw. It may be doubted if the Ministry will even suggest a definite course ; but in any case it will rest, as the Radicals clearly see, with the Chamber to decide. Its Members must exercise, for the first time, the Kingship they have assumed, and prove not only that they can lay down principles of action, but apply them to the actual affairs of life as a strong Executive would. The circumstances will make of their action an almost supreme test of their competence to rule. The Spanish Government, it is clear, though anxious to spare the dignity of France, is asking for redress for the insult put upon its King ; while the populace of Paris, which surrounds the Assembly, is vehement that no redress whatever should be granted, and talks of those who consent to an apology as indifferent to the honour of France. The Government of Great Britain asks compensation for Mr. Shaw, while not only the populace of Paris, but even leaders of French thought like M. John Lemoinne, deny emphatically and with ridicule that Mr. Shaw is entitled to anything beyond commiseration for unavoidable suffering caused by a mistake. And the Chinese Government calmly awaits a decision which means peace or war ; while the official class in France is averse to any solution except a compromise already rejected and far too favourable to France. If the Chamber is able to cope with such difficulties it will prove that it is competent to govern, that the future of France, even in matters of foreign politics, may safely be trusted to its hands, and this, too, when it is not under the dominance of any single or commanding mind. Its strength, if it displays any, will come from its own representa- tive character. If, on the other hand, it is not competent, even devoted friends of Republicanism will doubt whether it is possible any longer to do without an Executive which the Chamber cannot remove.
We confess we look forward to the prospect with some dis- may. A Chamber acting as Sovereign in such affairs is a novel phenomenon in politics, and the signs that this Chamber will go right are not many. There is, it is true, little doubt what a wise King placed in such a position would do. He would refuse absolutely to quarrel with Spain, and implicitly with Germany, upon a question rather of courtesy than of principle, would declare that Paris had been misled into
a natural though ignorant irritation, and would offer, in the name of the nation, an apology sufficient to satisfy the sensi- tive pride of Spain. He would treat the Shaw affair as a pure misfortune, due to the neglect by a deceased and very sick officer of precise and unmistakeable instructions ; and he would thus, freed from European annoyances, concentrate his will upon the dispute with China. If Tonquin, in his deliberate judgment, were worth a war, he would reject Chinese interference with dis- dain, send ten thousand men to Hanoi, and calmly accept the consequences ; and if it were not, he would sign the proposed agreement, by which France cedes all claims in Tonquin, in consideration of sovereignty over the rest of Anam. There would be no loss of honour in such decisions, and none of prestige, for the world would recognise at once that a strong man was deliberately ridding himself of weight in order to attain more rapidly his true ends. We fear, however, that the Chamber, though in the main anxious for peace, will take no such dignified course. It would, if the Deputies believed in war with China upon the Tonquin affair ; but they are so ignorant, that if M. Challemel-Lacour asserts that the Government of Pekin is quailing, and only threatens under British influence, they may accept the continuance of the situation, in which, as French- men believe, the Black Flags are always evacuating Sontay, and the "Chinese Regulars" are steadily defeated, without any consequences whatever. The Deputies may, in fact, allow the Government to drift. As to compensation to Mr. Shaw, they will allow it to be made, if the Government choose, amid speeches which will take all the grace out of reparation ; and as to the in- sult to Spain, they may refuse all but the most meagre apology. The Radicals are already defending General Thibaudin, who approved the insult, and M. Cl6inenceau, usually the least un- reasoning of Reds, has published an article in La Justice in which he attributes the overthrow of that Minister to the Orleanists, and declares that if France is to respect others, she must be respected. In fact, the whole Extreme Left is dis- posed to consider that " patriotism " justified the hooting of King Alfonso. The majority of Deputies may be better advised, but it is evident that the extreme irritability visible in all the foreign politics of France—an irritability scarcely to. be explained—has extended far upwards, and that men who do not usually vote with the Reds may take the opportunity to destroy the Ferry Government, with no thought of ulterior consequences. If the Chamber censures the apology, it becomes, of course, of no value, and even Spanish Liberals will believe that the French Republic has shown itself con- temptuous of the Spanish nation. Worse diplomacy could. not be conceived, and it will be the diplomacy of the only Power which even claims sovereign attributes in France, and which represents in a special degree the Republican principle. The very objection of all Royalists to the Republic is that it provides no Executive strong enough to carry out any policy without bending to the momentary and, perhaps, ignorant wish of the majority of electors.
We do not fear enormous or irretrievable disasters, even if the Chamber should go wrong. Germany is not interfering,.
England is patient if not insulted, and the Spanish Government will, at worst, only withdraw its Embassy with a certain éclat..
But we should greatly fear the deepening of the feeling in France that the Republic, however good in principle, does not give sufficient security in foreign affairs, and may lead the nation into a catastrophe. The dread of war has enormous weight in all countries—for instance, it protects the present Government of Germany—and in France, where all men think the world plotting against them and invasion always a possi-
bility, it is nearly irresistible. It is fear which is making the French people so fractious, and if anything occurred to ac-
centuate the fear, the peasantry might take refuge once more in a Dictatorship, which would, as they might think, strengthen them to resist external attack. Such a Dictatorship would almost certainly be created in war-time, and the expectancy of war harasses Frenchmen more than a campaign.
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