TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE HOHENLOHE " REVELATION."
WE do not quite understand wby the German Emperor has reprimanded Prince Philip Hohenlohe so sharply for publishing his father's Memoirs—which, by the way, were published by his brother—for the revelations in those Memoirs redound, on the whole, greatly to the Emperor's credit. Perhaps his Majesty feared that the incident might establish a precedent, and so permit any German to publish accounts of himself or his policy without his previous permission. Power, on that theory, is dearer to the Emperor even than praise. The Kaiser, it appears, explained to Prince Hohenlohe, the late Chancellor of the Empire, in a speech of an hour's duration, delivered almost without stopping, the precise causes of his quarrel with Bismarck, and the consequent " dropping " of that great "Pilot." The" Iron Chancellor," it is clear from the narrative, had rendered himself impossible. He was determined to rule Germany, and forgot entirely that, whatever his services or his mental powers, lie was, as he himself had previously declared, only " a vassal of the Hohenzollerns.' Both as King of Prussia and as Emperor of Germany, William II. had a right, after asking advice, to control the foreign policy of his country. Prince Bismarck, on the contrary, aware that he had effected the work of consolidation, aware also of powers in himself far beyond those of any Emperor, and swelling with the reflection that in every contest with his former master, William I., his will had finally prevailed, considered that he had an indefeasible right to rule, and to rule in a rough and direct way which Princes even in Constitutional States rarely encounter without some lingering sense of having been insulted.
The first contest with his young Sovereign had arisen about the Emperor's treatment of the Socialists. Prince Bismarck had determined to reject all their requests, to dissolve if they persisted in them, and, if the Dissolution produced uproar, to put them down by force. The Emperor disapproved of that policy. He had not, he told Prince Hohenlohe, the prestige of his grand- father's wonderful career, and thought it unwise to com- mence his reign while still a young, and therefore untried, man by shooting down his subjects. He would try first of all to remove some grievances of the poor. Prince Bismarck persisted obstinately, even consulting foreign diplomatists as to the expediency of his master's idea of a Workmen's Conference ; but he could not of course take action without his master's consent, and after sulkily threatening resignation, he gave way. He still, however, claimed a position in the Empire and the Kingdom which constitutionally did not belong to him. Both Prussia and Germany are Monarchies in the true sense, even if not quite in the old sense, for the Emperor-King can dismiss any servant of the Empire or of the Kingdom without the consent of either the German or the Prussian Parliament. Prince Bismarck actually forbade any Minister to ask an audience of the Emperor-King without previously arranging for his own presence at the interview. He insisted, so to speak, on Cabinet government, with himself as dictator and mouth- piece of the Ministry. Indeed, on foreign policy lie went a step farther, and assumed the right of taking a line against his master's will. Russia, it seems, wished to occupy Bulgaria, and asked neutrality from the German Emperor. William II. refused, saying that in the con- tingency suggested Austria would declare war, and he must support his Austrian ally. Bismarck, who through- out his career never gave up the idea that Russia, as a representative of the absolutist principle, was the safest Power to rely on, was bitterly chagrined, so much so that he actually informed the military chiefs that the Kaiser had adopted an anti-Russian policy. This was, in effect, to inform the Court of St. Petersburg that the new Kaiser would not permit the occupation of Bulgaria, and concealed a pretension to guide the German Empire on a vital question on a lineto which the Hohenzollerns were opposed. Practi- cally it came to this, as the Grand Duke of Baden expressed it, that there was a contest whether Germany should be ruled by the Bismarck dynasty or that of Hohenzollern. A parting was therefore inevitable. The Emperor might, of course, have yielded ; but believing in himself as he did, it was certain that he would not yield, and we cannot say that in the circumstances we think him in the wrong. He was not an English Sovereign, bound by the Constitution to accept advice when seriously proffered, but a German Emperor, responsible, at all events in foreign policy, for his own decisions. That his decision was to keep his pledge to his ally is to his credit Why, then, should Prince Philip of Hohenlohe have been so severely wigged ? We have offered one suggestion ; but there is another as probable. Is it, perchance, because William II., though at heart determined to maintain the Triple Alliance if he can, and to fulfil the obligations imposed upon him by that great agreement, still likes to leave Russia doubtful, and therefore to enjoy the influence naturally accruing from the doubt ?
Germans appear to be a little dubious as to the precise effect of this revelation, possibly because, threatened as they are on two sides, they still dread any increase in the rift between Germany and Russia ; but Englishmen will notice with pleasure that the instinct of the Emperor, which must influence him, though it may be overborne by bad advice, is to avoid sanguinary violence within his own dominion, and to fulfil the obligation of a treaty, even if it be to his evil". hurt. Au impression of that kind is some- thing gained for the future peace of the world. The sort of suspicion felt in this country as to the policy'of Germany is based in the main upon a certain distrust of the character of her Emperor. William II. is supposed to be au fond a rash man, capable of sudden actions and decisions which might end in a. collision between Germany and Britain. Ho certainly is so capable, as witness the Kruger telegram, and the sinister menaces which caused the removal of M. Delca,sse from the Foreign Ministry of France. But he has also another side to his mind, which makes him more reflective, and which, as we think, comes out strongly in this Hohenlohe revelation. He undoubtedly sees conse- quences, and that insight is, after all, the greatest check on rashness. It would be most imprudent to rely upon hini as one who will never attack Great Britain ; but if he attacks, it will be for grave reason, and in pursuance of a well- weighed, though, it may be, over-ambitious, policy. We must not confuse ambition with rashness, or forget that the qual ity is not invariably unreasonable. That Germany should persistently increase her Fleet, which can in the end be used only against Great Britain or America, may be—. indeed is—most annoying, because it involves to both the threatened countries great additional expenditure, and arrests or checks many enterprises which might be for the benefit of the world. But it is not quite fair to forget, as the less responsible of our publicists sometimes do, that Germany has a full right to build any Fleet she pleases and can pay for ; that it is natural for her to desire, as her commerce increases, to establish naval stations all over the world; and that she is pressed by the huge growth of her population to wish for new territories which can contain and feed her annual overspill. It is scarcely a fault in a boy to grow too big for his clothing, nor can it be attributed to him as a crime that he tells everybody about him, sometimes in fretful accents, that he really must have a little more room. It is highly necessary to prevent his irri- tation inducing him to seek the gratification of his needs in irregular ways, or even in ways which, though regular, are inconvenient to his neighbours ; but the desire is not in itself criminal. Occasions of collision may yet arise, more especially if William II. is deliberately striving to secure an alliance with the Mussulman masses of the Eastern world ; but it will be wiser, if they arise, to deal with them without preoccupa- tions about the immorality of such ambitions or their special inconvenience to Great Britain as mistress of the seas. The hunt of Europe for fresh colonies and wider dependencies may cost this generation a good deal of unhappiness before a secure equilibrium is attained ; but we may as well try to see coolly what are the driving forces which are urging the nations on their path.
What we have got to do is to protect ourselves, and such protection will be quite as much needed if Germany's ambitions are natural and legitimate as if they were inspired by the most subtle and immoral Machiavellism. We greatly dislike to hear the necessity for making our- selves safe against the tremendous weight and imminence of Germany's strength on land and sea based on the asser- tion that Germany is an immoral Power. There is a serious danger that the public, when it realises that this is not true, may rush in a senseless reaction to the con- clusion that therefore we need take no precautions against Germany. The more natural and elemental the trend of Germany towards sea power, and towards a vast preponder- ance of strength in Europe, the more essential it is for us to maintain that absolute predominance at sea without which we lie completely at her mercy.
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