THE OLD AND THE NEW GERMANY.
TO-DAY the future of Europe is dependent upon the German internal situation. This is the ironic result of French policy.
The so-called French stranglehold is making the continuance of a German constitutional Republic im- possible. So much is obvious, but it is by no means obvious what political system is going to supersede the present one. It cannot be too often repeated that Germany is a country whose internal organization is completely unlike, and much more complicated than, that of any other European State. Her federalism, so loose in theory, so recent in formationt is balanced by a racial and historic unity as great as that of any other State. She and America are the most modernly organized industrial States in the world. The interests of her industrial classes are preponderant in her politics, yet by tradition she is a State of aristocratic landowners. To-day her landowners are fallen, after having led their country by their criminal blindness into one of the greatest disasters that any people have suffered in the history of the world. Still, they arc a vigorous class with unsapped energies whose influence cannot be dis- regarded. The cross-currents of Germany's complex organization are flowing strongly. It is impossible for us in England to judge the daily turn and twist of events ; to know whether the new Stresemann Govern- ment is indeed in the hands of the industrialists ; whether middle-German Socialism or Bavarian reaction is the stronger ; whether the democratic idea has any real hold on the industrial classes ; or whether the old monarchy or a new monarchy has any chance of being established. We will merely attempt to summarize the events of the last few days, and try to discern some general tendency beneath them. It will be remembered that some ten days ago the Cabinet of Dr. Stresemann, who had suc- ceeded the great industrialist, Dr. Cuno, seven weeks before, was overturned by a break-up of the coali- tion of parties which supported him in the Reichstag. His Cabinet Was a complex affair, which in- cluded representatives of the industrial trusts and rigid Socialists.
It was, of course, this Cabinet which carried out the " surrender " to France, and stopped passive resistance in the Ruhr. To meet the disturbed internal situation which the surrender caused, Dr. Stresemann asked for an "Extraordinary Powers Bill" which would enable him to take emergency action without first consulting the Reichstag. But the great industrialists had become dissatisfied with the Cabinet and considered that it could be replaced by one more favourable to their own interests. Accordingly, they introduced a clause in the "Extraordinary Powers Bill" abolishing the eight-hours' day, which forms a part of the fundamental Constitution of the German Republic. This, as they calculated, was unacceptable to the Socialist members of the Cabinet, which consequently broke up.
After a week's negotiations, and contrary to expecta- tions, Dr. Stresemann was able to form a new Cabinet, which again included the Socialist element necessary to secure him a majority in the Reichstag. In other words, it appears that the industrialists' attempt to secure a Government more under their thumb than the first Stresemann Administration has been partly, but only partly, successful. The new Cabinet is perceptibly more to the Right than the last. Dr. Hilferding and Herr von Raumer, the two Ministers who were parti- cularly objectionable to the industrialists, have been dropped. On the other hand, the eight-hours' day clause, having served its purpose in dislodging them, has been taken out of the "Extraordinary Powers Bill," which in a short general form was passed by the Reichsrat on Monday. Incidentally, the great industrialists' dislike of Herr von Raumer is a fine illustration of the com- plexity of present-day German affairs. Herr von Raume was Minister for Economic Affairs, and was originally a nominee of the industrialists. He was, however, intimately connected with the " finishing" industries, and so was opposed to Herr Stinnes's great Trust, the Coal Syndicate, and attempted to put a stop to its "usurious exploitation of the public interest." Hence, apparently, even big business in Germany is not united.
Since the formation of the new Government there has been a perceptible rally of the Socialist parties. The Socialists feel that they have narrowly escaped being jockeyed out of the Government and being faced with an industrial dictatorship which would claim their adherence in a national emergency. As it is, their influence in the Berlin Government has been considerably diminished. Bavaria, under its Dictator, Herr von Khar, is obviously monarchist though not separatist. The Socialists are predominant in only Saxony and Thuringia.
The French are every day supplying the Nationalists with more powerful arguments, and the Nationalists arc every day becoming more closely associated with the great industrialists. Hence, the prospect for German Socialism, unless it is willing to ally itself with Com- munism and to risk immediate civil war, is becoming decidedly poor. This, then, is the tendency that may be perceived under the apparent confusion. Germany is slowly, hesitatingly, but unmistakably, swinging towards the Right.
The one thing that the French stranglehold is strangling is all chance of a peaceful and democratic Germany that can take her place in a sanely managed Europe. It is, of course, too early to say whether a new and nationalistic Germany will be forged by the blows of the French hammer. The Neueste Nachriehten of Munich says :— " Our duty towards the corning generation can never he fulfilled under the domination of Socialism II nd pacifist internationalism. This duty can be briefly described as follows : To regain our freedom and to imbue in the nation the desire for armed resistance. But freedom must be obtained by fighting, not by negotiating. Only a nation fit for military service can carry on its fight for existence. The policy of Socialism is entirely at variance with this duty, and the new Coalition therefore must fall."
Class hatreds may prove too strong for this policy and complete disruption may yet take place. But the Nationalistic menace seems grave. Indeed, one eventu- ality seems in the long run about as fatal for France and Europe as the other. We can well leave it for M. Poineare to decide whether he will prefer a Communist Germany in alliance with Soviet Russia, or a Junker Germany, thinking only of a war of liberation. He is manifestly determined to produce one or the other.
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