GENERAL LUDENDORFF'S LIE.

Hisroav varies in interest directly with the detail in which it is studied. The text-book is the dullest form ; original documents the most interesting. Hence the somewhat forbidding covers of this new volume issued by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace conceal one of the most

exciting and. valuable books on the War that we have yet had. The Preliminary History of the Armistice, compiled and issued by the German National Chancellery at the end of 1919, is a series of 110 official documents relating to the negotiations for an armistice in the autumn of 1918, taken from the German Archives. The object of the book was to

justify the first constitutional Government that the German Empire ever possessed—that of Prince Max of Baden, which was formed on October 2nd, 1918—in its dealings with the Supreme Army Command during the great disasters of the

autumn of that year. Germany after the War was full of Nation- alist propaganda which alleged that the army, never defeated in the field, had been betrayed by the cowardly surrender of the civil Government. This, of course, reflected on the present

Republican Administration, and the best answer to it was considered to be the publication of the official documents of

the time. As a matter of fact, this propaganda still goes on, and a most interesting example of it is contained in the article, " Germany, Never Defeated," which General Ludendorff contributes to the second volume of These Eventful Years, that great compilation of the Encyclopaedia Britannica Company which has just appeared. Ludendorff ends his article as follows :- " The retreat took the form of a well-planned operation, and was carried out splendidly. All attempts by the enemy to break through the German front and subdue the German army were frustrated. The strength of the army lasted several months longer, even though its Allies had collapsed. Then came the betrayal of the Fatherland—brought about by the disintegrating influence of enemy propaganda, by revolutionary agitation, and finally by the outbreak of the Revolution itself ; and all this made it impossible for the nation to put forth its full strength and therewith to support the army. This betrayal forced the army at length to conclude an ignominious armistice. After an honourable retreat to its own country this army was disarmed by the revolutionary authorities in Germany, at the same time that the fleet was surrendered. These were acting in accordance with that damnable precept of German social democracy, which runs as follows : ' It is our firm intention that Germany shall lower her banner once for all, without even bringing it home victorious- for the last time.' Thus they brought the German nation to its present pass. If before the War it had not enough land for its needs, now the words of Clemenceau, that there are twenty million too many Germans in the world,' would seem to be near the truth—but for the German will to live."

An examination of the official documents should determine once and for all whether these were indeed the facts.

The peace proceedings of Germany had their origin in the Imperial Conference at Spa on August 14th, 1918. At that Conference, General Ludendorff for the first time took up the position that victory by arms was impossible, and therefore peace by understanding was necessary. It was decided, however, that there was no need for haste, and that the negotiations should be initiated " after the next successes in the West." Nothing further occurred until September 21st. By that date, however, the military situation was considerably more serious, and in particular the collapse of Bulgaria was causing very great anxiety. At a conference between Von Hintze, the then Foreign Secretary, and the Supreme Army Command, it was agreed that a peace movement should be made through Switzerland. Before, however, anything could come of these negotiations the whole attitude of the Supreme Army Command suddenly changed, owing to a sudden military crisis. On October 1st a rapid series of messages arrived in Berlin from General Headquarters,. urging immediate negotiations. The first was from Ludendorff

himself, and asked Von Lersner, the representative of the civil Government at General Headquarters, to transmit to the Imperial Chancellor General Ludendorff's " urgent request that our peace proposals should be issued at once. To-day the troops are holding their own : what may happen to-morrow

cannot be foreseen." At the same moment negotiations were going on in Berlin for the formation of ' a new and more

democratic Government under the chancellorship of Prince Max of Baden (the German equivalent to Lord Lansdowne, in his attitude to the War).

At 2 o'clock Ludendorff telegraphed, via Griinau, "his urgent request to issue the peace proposal at once, and not to hold it back until the formation of the new Government, which might be delayed." Grfinau adds : " I get the im- pression that they have all lost their nerve here, and that, if things come to the worst, we can justify our action to the outside world by Bulgaria's behaviour."

The Kaiser himself, however, laid it down that the new Government must be the instrument to promote the peace

proposal, and Ludendorff was assured that it would be formed that night.

Late that night Ludendorff sent another message, again pressing for haste, and stating emphatically that " the army could not wait forty-eight hours longer." The Government was, in fact, formed that night, or early the next morning.

But Prince Max refused to be rushed, and did not, in fact, issue at once his Peace Note. Instead he sent a questionnaire to Ludendorff and the Supreme Army Command, asking, amongst other things :—

" Does the Supreme Army Command realize that the inaugura- tion of a peace move under the pressure of a critical military situa- tion might result in the lose of the German colonies and of German territory, such as Alsace-Lorraine and the purely Polish districts of the Eastern Provinces ?

To this Hindenburg replied :—

" The Supreme Army Command persists in its request of Sunday, September 29th, of •this year-, urging the immediate dispatch to our enemies of the peace proposaL"

Accordingly, on October 3rd, the first German Note to President Wilson, pledging the German Government to accept as a basis for peace negotiations Wilson's famous Fourteen Points, was dispatched.

Here, then, are the actual facts of the first German peace proposal. They put it beyond all shadow of doubt that Prince Max and the civil Government were opposed to the making of the proposal and only did so under extreme pressure from the Supreme Army Command itself.

Wilson's answer to this Note was, it will be remembered, somewhat vague and merely asked for further information. The Supreme Command still continued to press for further' peace moves. A German reply was drafted to Wilson's Note, with the collaboration of the Supreme Army Command. Then, on October 15th, President Wilson's second Note arrived. It fell like a bombshell upon the Government, the Army Command, and, indeed, the whole nation. For the first time it made clear that peace negotiations were

one thing and the granting of an armistice quite another, and that in the latter nothing could be done " unless terms should be agreed upon which would contain absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of the Allies in the field." It also stated that no armistice could be given if Germany continued her illegal and inhuman practices, i.e., devastation of the occupied regions ; and, lastly, it contained the first of those terrible hints about autocratic government in Germany, which were to cause such terrible heartburnings amongst the great ones of the land. Immediately the positions of the civil Government and the Army Command were reversed. Instead of the Army Com- mand pressing negotiations on the civil Government, it now

wished to retract, and to make one last supreme struggle. It appeared that the military situation had distinctly eased.

The great Allied attacks of the first weeks of October had not succeeded in disintegrating the German army, although they had pushed it back fairly rapidly. The danger of a break-through was now not so great, and the Supreme Command thought that the army, after all, might be saved from disaster until the winter. But the civil Government was now deeply committed to negotiations, the Press had been full. of them, the longing for peace had been given expression, and a wave of anti-war feeling was beginning to rise amongst the civil population, and also in some parts of the army.

Then followed the interminable series of conferences between Ludendorff and Hindenburg, on the one hand, and the -Central Government on the other. The Wilson Note

had, in fact, made it obvious that the alternatives were what amounted to surrender or a fight to the bitter end. In innu- merable questionnaires and repeated inquiries at conferences, Prince Max sought to get a clear and concrete answer from the Generals as to whether further resistance was (1) possible, and (2) useful—that is, whether it could improve the position of the German negotiators. To the first question they did on the whole, though hesitatingly and guardedly, return an affirmative answer, but on the second point they would say nothing. They merely reiterated their demands that resist- ance to the end should be made, but could give no tangible hope that it had the least chance of success, or would improve the peace conditions one jot. All along the Cabinet had wished to call on the other army chiefs in order to see whether they agreed with Ludendorff and Hindenburg. But the former had insisted on regarding this as showing want of confidence in himself, and threatened to resign if it was done. At last, however, the Cabinet made up its mind, and on October 28th called on General von Mudra and General von Gallwitz. They took up, as a matter of fact, much the same position as their chiefs. At the very moment when they were expressing their confident opinions, the news of Austria's demand for a separate peace was announced. Lastly, the Lansing Note arrived, giving the acceptance of the Allied Governments, with two exceptions, to the Wilson Points as a basis for peace. Armistice Commissions were appointed on both sides, and the Allied terms were announced to Germany. Ludendorff, as he had threatened, resigned. So Hindenburg was the responsible military authority to whom the Allied conditions were submitted. On November 10th he sent a telegram to the Ministry of War giving a long list of points on which the German delegation should attempt to procure a modification of the terms. He ends his message, however, " if it is impossible to gain these points, it would nevertheless be advisable to conclude the agreement." Accordingly the Armistice Commission was empowered to sign, and the Armistice cache into force at 11.55 on November llth.

This, in brief, is the whole story of the collapse of the greatest military and autocratic machine in the history cf the modern world. It clearly shows that there is not the faintest foundation for Ludendorff's allegation of betrayal. The original peace proposal of October 3rd, which was the initial and irrevocable step that led to the Armistice, was undertaken at his personal instigation, and in opposition to the wishes of the civil Government. The Supreme Army Command itself, in the person of Hindenburg, gave its consent to the signing of the Armistice conditions. It is extremely important that these facts should be widely and clearly realized, and that General Ludendorff's lie should be pinned down. It is true that the Allies, by their treatment of a helpless Germany, have done all in their power to strengthen the position of Ludendorff and the Nationalists and discredit that of the new Republic. But this cannot alter the fact that the old regime in Germany was smashed by the pressure of the Allies and not by betrayal from within.

E. J. S.