"ACTION—ACTION—ACTION !"
WILL the Congress assemble or not ? The Governments which should be parties to it seem alternately to propose such a meet- ing, and to shrink from it. Almost each one in turn, except Aus- tria, always oppugnant, has been the advocate and the opponent of a Congress. The very latest rumour is a contradiction of the latest but one—that a Congress was to assemble in London on the subject of Switzerland ; that state being no more than one cardinal point of the great European question. Each one of the Powers appears, until very recently, to have been absorbed in the contemplation of topics chiefly interesting to itself. It is within a comparatively short time that France and England have en- larged the scope of their sympathy and deeds, so far as to act in common with each other and with the progress of the Italian peo- ple. Councils have differed between St. James's and the Tuileries ; there have been points of doubt and discussion between the Tuile- ries and Turin, between Turin and St. James's ; and the public mind in this country, as in most others, is fairly perplexed by the cross questions and sometimes the unexpected results. We shall understand the past and present, as well as the future, the more distinctly if we review the actual situation of the several Powers, and recall to memory how it was that they arrived where they are. We find each one of them appealing to treaties which are in the main contemned ; preparing for arms, yet deprecating recourse to violence; holding back from the great opportunities of the European peoples, yet acquiescing when either Government takes' up a course chivalrously identified with the broad interests of any one European nation. These seeming inconsistencies perplex us while we are content to look upon the surface ; if we pene- trate but a little deeper,—and every English reader can do so for himself,—the whole is as clear as any piece of mechanism made by human hands.
The appeal to treaties must constantly fail of effect, because there is no tribunal to adjudicate upon the cause, and to issue ex- ecution. The only court consists of the parties 4 the action, and they must themselves provide the officers for execution of any order. The suitors or defendants before such a court must neces- sarily be in the habit of anticipating the decrees of execution where they themselves have some show of a right to assume the judgment and the decree. This single fact suffices to, explain the other great chroni c fact before Europe,—th at the treaties of 1815, the foundation statutes of so many states, have been set aside by those who were both to obey and to enforce them. The same parties to the suit are also, to a great extent, the legislature, and they are in the habit of legislating separately., each legislator in his own behalf. This is a practice inevitable in the present semi- organized state of the civilized world ; but it has its inconveni- ences. The remainder of the community does not always accept the statute in such way made and provided. In this condition of the Powers that profess to constitute the ruling jurisdiction of Europe, it follows as a matter of course that that state must take the lead in Europe which accepts a policy most consistent with contemporary circumstances, and which is prepared to carry out its policy by a line of active prosecution. Other states may complain if one amongst their number thus takes the initiative ; but they must put up with the consequences unless they are prepared to do the like. In 1853, certain ques- tions had arisen in the east, and France took a position which did not greatly interest any other power save Russia. On her side, Russia proceeded to act in a manner diametrically opposed even more to the judgment and feelings than to the interests of Europe. England joined France ; the Western Powers entered upon a course of positive action, and so far as they had distinctly formed their intentions with a resolve to carry out those intentions, they succeeded in dictating to the rest of the continent. Ever since 1848, King Victor Emmanuel's Government had been prose- cuting in Italy a course of active politics highly suited to the existing circumstances of the Peninsula ; in 1855, the same state stood forward to take a vigorous share in the Eastern campaign,—a step even more important politically than stra- tegically. Although the proposition drafted by d'Azeglio and admirably sustained by Cavour in the Congress of 1856, was well adapted to the condition of Italy at the time, its necessity was not recognized with sufficient positiveness by the other members of the Conference; and France and Austria deferred any attempt to realize that programme unti11859 at Villafranca,—when they were too late. In 1857, Cavour proposed to England a course of positive action, which, taking Italy as the standing-point, would probably have enabled England, without aggression or action detrimental to any other power save Austria, to dictate a course of European policy. England abstained from action, waived the opportunity, and it passed to France and Russia. Russia used it in a very slight degree, retired to the background, and proportionately lost the exercise of active influence over the course of events in Europe. In 1859, however, France entered upon her armed championship of the Italian cause ; and from that date France may be said to have led' the slowly maturing policy of Europe. Later' in the same year Lord Palmerston's Government launched into a distinct and positive course of action in thenffairs of Italy, and England at once assumed her full' share with Frattee in the dictation of Europe. " The Western Powers" being thus ones more engaged in a joint action upon a field prepared for them by
the course of anterior events, they have succeeded precisely in proportion as they have adapted their action to the circumstances of that ground and of the present time. If the reader will look back for himself to the sequence of events, he will observe that wherever the counsel of either the French or English Government has been constructed upon a direct reference to the actual condi- tion of Italy, the contemporary state of its administration, and the feelings and convictions of its populations, that one of the allies, France or England, has prevailed. It might almost be said that the policy growing out of the combination between the Piedmontese Government and the two Western Powers has been stronger than either one of those three Governments separately; while each one Government has been potent and influential in the exact proportion to the distinctness of its purpose and the posi- tiveness of its action.
From the same point of view, by the same rule, we may esti- mate the actual position of the other great Governments in Eu- rope, and the available power which at present they wield. Be- fore 1854, Russia was pursuing an exclusively selfish policy ; she drew upon herself the combination of the other great States ; her available power declined, and she bad to go to school to adversity. In 1857, the passiveness of England left to Russia an opportunity, which she did not neglect ; and it was Russia who appeared al- most as the patron saint of Piedmont,—Russia, who seemed likely to take the lead in a European Congress, and thus generously to avenge the Conference of 1856,—where she did not take the lead. It is quite possible that the Government of the Emperor Alexander may not have departed from the principles in which it was pro- ceeding when it was more prominently active ; but to all appear- ance the Russian Government has retracted : it is said to have de- clined any share in the proposed Congress on the subject of Switzerland ; and, for the moment, the Northern Power seems to have waned in its influence. We are free, however, to surmise that Russia is waiting on events not with any sleepy eye to cer- tain Sclavonian states.
Under the Government of Prince William, the conduct of Prussia has been vacillating in the extreme. Early last year, the Prince Regent appeared as the ardent supporter of Austria and the antagonist of Napoleon, even threatening to aid in keeping down the nascent liberties of Italy. And many German Liberals were madly bent on an anti-Italian crusade. The outrage in- flicted upon the Duke of Saxe-Coburg Gotha, and the pressure put upon Hesse, appeared to have provoked the Prussian Govern- ment to such au extent, that Prince Frederick William was fain to withdraw from his proclivity towards an Austrian alliance. More recently, in the curious action of the German Diet, we seem to find. Prussia re-approaching Austria with an eye to joint action against France ; but the recent dismissal of the Austrian Cabinet in Baden implies a new decline of Austrian influence, and a re- newal of more purely German national feeling. Such are the latest phenomena. Should the progress of events greatly abate or extinguish the power of Austria in Germany, it is evident that, without any encroachment on the minor states, Prussia would acquire the opportunity of becoming a more important Power than she has ever yet been. In the Conference of 1856, Prussia was neutral, and did not cut either a very dignified or important figure ; fate now seems to offer her a new chance of promotion. In the events of the last twelve years, then, we have found her faithfully illustrating the rule which we have pointed out—that the power and influence of each European state in turn have depended upon the positive and active character of her policy. The position and conduct of Austria have rendered any such subserviency as Prince Frederick William appears to have con- templated, even recently, impossible. Her position is before the world ; in every respect it is one of decline, of debasement, and of desperation. She has forfeited her opportunities all round. If we do but enumerate the most signal of the mistakes perpetrated by her sovereign and statesmen, we sum up what look like the proofs of approaching doom. Every reader will remember the at- tempt of Count Leo Thun to impose Ultramontane doctrines, with most oppressive measures, upon the mixed or Protestant provinces of the Austrian empire. The attempt last year to redress that mistake, by reforming the law turned out to be an equivocal evasion ; and the Hungarian people have never since ceased to be in a state of prepared insurrection. Bohemia maintains a discon- tent scarcely smothered. Turning to Italy, it is understood, we know, that "Austria will not act beyond her frontiers." But she has given to the Governments of Rome and Naples a beggarly licence to recruit with incapables those armies which Naples dares not use ; and which Rome has placed under the Orleanist exile, Lamoriciere. Austria, therefore, shows her teeth in Italy, and avows that she dares not bite. She talked of a separate adminis- tration and Reforms for Venetia,—not given; while oppression enrages the Venetians more and more daily. Her creditors throughout the world, exasperated if they are not ruined,—the great capitalists who have assisted her,—are quaking for securi- ties which she cannot guarantee, though she braves destruction by the extravagance of her policy. Unable to pay her way, she is raising the wind by a loan, partly forced, partly helped on with the stimulus of lottery prizes for the bondholders ; thus recklessly a bearing" the market for all her past securities, while asking help on such terms as confess the utter desperation of the borrower. It is just at this point that frauds are discovered in the Austrian departments. This reminds us that the Austrian Chancellor of the Exchequer has been guilty towards the con- tributors to the late loan of an " irregularity," as astounding as any of the frauds now denounced, since he took money in ex- cess of the amount asked without informing the contributors that they were paying in more than he bad authority to accept. In- solvent in her finance, corrupt in her administration, defeated in her arms—hated in her rule, and now despised, Austria seems to await only that rebellion which is to relieve Europe of the de- cayed and depraved empire that offends and disgraces it.
The position of France in Italy must necessarily depend upon the position and action of the other Governments present on that field. So long as Romer Naples, and Austria remain passive, it is probable that she will prepare for that withdrawal of troops which the Emperor Napoleon has always contemplated, and which the Pope is said to have more than sanctioned. So much, however, must depend upon the subsequent proceedings of Austria, that be- fore the Emperor Napoleon finally withdraws his troops, we pre- sume, the Government at Vienna will be invited to give a more explicit pledge than it has yet given, of perseverance in the pas- sive attitude which is now professed. Should Austria give that pledge, it will be a confession of weakness which, coupled with the rapid development in political consolidation and military strength of the Northern Kingdom, must materially alter the balance of power in that part of Europe. Should Austria not give the pledge—should she equivocate or menace, we must fully ex- pect to see the alliance between France and Piedmont renewed in a more active form; and then a problem will be laid before the councils of the Emperor Francis Joseph, involving the very ex- istence of his empire.
It seems possible, though barely possible, that Austria might pursue a middle course, and seek safety in a sort of deferred policy. In that case, matters might remain, for a time, much as they are. But already the year has seen a vast change in the political distribution of the European map, almost inevitably to be followed by further changes. Let us see the net result left by the transactions of the spring of 1860. The territorial extent of France is very slightly augmented ; Italy is restored to Europe, or rather, for the first time, we see erected in Europe a genuine indigenous kingdom of Italy, whose influence, power, and posses- sions must enlarge, by drawing to it other portions of the Italian people, and must exercise the growing influence of an intelligent and civilizing kind upon the tribunal of Europe, such as it is.
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