ITALY'S REAL OBJECTIVE
By JOSEPH SW1RE
Itheir heroic struggle to preserve their independence 1 through the centuries the Albanian people have been handicapped by one grave disadvantage. It is that their country is of great strategic importance. In 1921 Great Britain, France and Japan recognised that the maintenance of Albania's territorial integrity and independence was vital to the strategic security of Italy. That conclusion was reached because the Bay of Valona, a magnificent deep-water harbour with a bottle-neck entrance commanded by the rocky little Island of Saseno, which lies at the narrow entrance to the Adriatic Sea and only 47 miles from the Italian coast. Since Italy possesses no corresponding naval harbour upon her coast a hostile fleet based in Valona Bay could close the Adriatic and control the whole eastern seaboard of Italy. In 192o Italy attempted to annex Valona and its neighbourhood, but Albanian irregulars from all parts poured down upon the war-weary Italian troops and drove them out. However, the Italians retained Saseno Island, which they turned into an impregnable fortress, thus ensuring that no hostile fleet should suddenly occupy the bay.
But a Power hostile to Italy might be in alliance with Yugoslavia, Albania's eastern neighbour, and Yugoslav troops might pour into Albania to open the Albanian ports. To guard against this possibility Italy concluded a defensive affiance with Albania, sent a large staff of officers to train the Albanian Army, and prepared lines of defence in the interior which it was intended that the Albanians should hold against any Yugoslav invading force until Italian support should arrive.
Why, therefore, has Italy made this treacherous attack upon her ally? The answer is not far to seek. The Italian invasion of Albania is a preliminary to the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and Greece and the domination of the Balkans by the Axis Powers. For this dismemberment and domina- tion Italy and Germany have been preparing for years.
When the World War ended, Italy, wishing to turn the Adriatic Sea into an exclusively Italian lake, claimed the Dalmatian coast, but the principle of self-determination was applied and this coastline was incorporated in Yugoslavia. To Italy Yugoslavia at once became a hated rival, a young and virile State barring her penetration into the Balkans and threatening to unite with her Slav neighbour Bulgaria in one powerful South Slav Federation or Kingdom. Italy strove, therefore, to prevent the consolidation of Yugoslavia by on the one hand sowing discord between Serbs and Croats and Slovenes and Macedonians who composed the new King- dom, and on the other by encouraging the chauvinist ele- ments in Bulgaria in their dream of a Great Bulgaria which should incorporate parts of Macedonia and Serbia. In Bul- garia Tsar Boris, who married the King of Italy's daughter and is a true son of his German father Tsar Ferdinand, headed the chauvinist elements, sharing their dream of a great South Slav Kingdom in which his dynasty (springing from Germany, Hungary and Italy), and not the rival native Karageorgevitch dynasty of Yugoslavia, should rule.
Both in Yugoslavia and in Bulgaria the peasants favoured some form of union; but in Bulgaria the peasant movement was cleverly misrepresented as Communist and then ruth- lessly crushed while the Western Powers, scared of the Red Bogey in Europe, applauded. Then, to prevent any revival of the peasant movement in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian High Command, working in dose collaboration with Italy (and latterly with Germany too) skilfully gained control of the world-famous Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation, employing a gang of assassins who murdered the old revolutionary leaders and usurped their places; then this gang was employed, on the one hand to cause constant friction between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia by terrorist acts, and on the other to menace or murder any democratic Bulgarians who raised their voices in favour of South Slav friendship and Federation.
This state of affairs in Bulgaria was abruptly interrupted by a coup d'etat on May 19th, 1934—which led General Goering to postpone a visit to Sofia which had been arranged. Under the leadership of the retired Colonel Damian Veltchev the Army revolted against its Italophile High Command and suppressed the terrorists who masquer- aded as Macedonian revolutionaries; then the leaders of this revolt established friendly relations with Yugoslavia, indi- cated that they would lean in foreign policy • towards Great Britain and France, and prepared to establish a more truly democratic Government in Bulgaria. But royal intrigue soon led to the downfall of Veltchev, General Goering paid his deferred visit to Tsar Boris in Sofia, and Bulgaria became the Apex of the Axis Powers' triangular thrust towards the Black Sea.
But Yugoslavia lay in the way of this thrust. In October, 1934, she had lost her " Unifier," King Alexander, who was assassinated at Marseilles by a Bulgarian terrorist who had been lent to another terrorist organisation, the Ustacha, which had its headquarters in Hungary. Like the terrorist organisation in Bulgaria the Ustacha, supposed to be Croatian and formed to commit outrages in northern Yugo- slavia, had been supported and financed by Italy and Hungary. The removal of King Alexander, staunch friend of France and Great Britain, had been planned for many years by the brain-centre in Rome which directed the Balkan terrorists. With King Alexander's death the way was clearer for German and Italian intrigues in Yugoslavia. Under the dictatorial Prime Minister Stoyadinovitch Yugoslavia was gradually lured into the Axis spider's parlour ; therefore, Tsar Boris, now dictator in Bulgaria, who has muzzled his people by one of the worst censorships in Europe, reversed his policy of enmity towards Yugoslavia and concluded with her a treaty of perpetual friendship. But that friendship is very restrained and does not deceive the Yugoslays.
" Italy might let Yugoslavia take Salonika from Greece, provided Yugoslavia acknowledged Italian supremacy in the Adriatic Sea," said an Italian Minister to me early in 1934. " Italy would prefer a strong Bulgaria to a weak Greece upon the Dardanelles," he added.
If one may accept this frank statement—and I think one may, for the best diplomats are often frank—it is evident that Italy and Germany engineered an uneasy friendship between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia by offering advantages to both at the expense of Greece and Turkey. Yugoslavia would ulti- mately take from Greece a free outlet upon the Aegean Sea at Salonika, and therefore Italy's dominance of the Adriatic Sea would be of less concern to her ; while Bulgaria would seize from Greece Dedeagatch, and from Turkey (Greece's ally) Rodosto and possibly even Constantinople. (Later, according to plans which have been maturing for years, there would be another reshuffle at the expense of Yugoslavia and Rumania.) But- the appetite of the Axis Powers has grown with eating and their plans have been unfolded. Yugoslavia now shares Greek apprehension of them. Germany has now reached Yugoslavia's northern border through Austria ; meanwhile, Mussolini plans to re-establish the Roman Via Aegnatia, the ancient route from Durazzo in Albania, past Lake Okhrida, to Salonika, and to paralyse Greece so that Greek harbours shall not shelter any but Italian warships.
By occupying Albania the Italians are able to approach dangerously near to the landlocked harbour of Kotor (or Cattaro), the most secure naval base upon the Yugoslav coast ; it is impregnable from the sea, but the Italians now threaten it from the land. In the south of Albania, too, they occupy positions overlooking the Greek roadstead of Corfu.
An Italian advance from Albania eastward into Macedonia (southern Yugoslavia and northern Greece) would drive a wedge between Greece and Yugoslavia ; while a Bulgarian advance westward into Macedonia would immediately cut Yugoslavia's only main line of communication with the out- side world at Salonika—nor should it be forgotten that for more than a year before Bulgaria entered the World War bands from Bulgarian territory repeatedly attacked and in- terrupted this vital life-line while Bulgaria professed neutrality. Once Bulgarians and Italians joined hands, a swift thrust by Bulgaria to Rodosto and Gallipoli would close the Dardanelles ; then we could send little beyond good wishes to Rumania and Poland.
During the World War we had Italy with us, Turkey against us. Bulgaria, innocently pretending neutrality while secretly committed to the Central Powers from the beginning, threw her weight into the scales at a well-judged moment, completing the rout of Serbia, linking Turkey with Germany, and completing the encirclement of Rumania—and thus, ac- cording to experts, she prolonged the war by two years. The Bulgarian people do not want war—they did not want war in 1915 ; but now, as in 1915, their rulers control them with an iron hand. History has a habit of repeating itself, and the invasion of Albania is the danger-signal.
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