RUSSIA'S SUSPICIONS
By WALTER DURANTY
IT is idle to deny that the attitude of Soviet Russia towards Mr. Chamberlain—and for that matter towards Poland itself—is one of scepticism verging on distrust. It is true that Mr. Hudson's visit helped to allay some of Russia's acutest suspicions of British Government policy, and a favourable effect was produced here by the Chamberlain and Halifax statements in the two Houses. Nevertheless, as Russians view the situation, especially in the past but also somewhat in the present, they find little solid reason to abandon doubts—or worse—which they entertained about England. It is, I imagine, difficult for Englishmen to realise the profound indignation and humiliation felt in the U.S.S.R. during the so-called Munich crisis. Through its repre- sentatives in Paris and London the U.S.S.R. had repeatedly assured the French and British Governments of its intention to fulfil the obligations inherent in the pacts with Czecho- Slovakia and France. M. Litvinov said the same thing for all to hear at Geneva. Yet M. Bonnet permitted himself to express doubts both of Russia's willingness and her ability to perform what she had promised, and the French Foreign Minister's words found a ready echo in London.
Then take the Lindbergh incident—in Soviet opinion a deliberate and shabby manoeuvre. What aim Colonel Lind- bergh was pursuing the Russians don't care to guess, but they know that during his brief visit to Moscow last summer he had no opportunity to get first-hand information to justify the categorical statements he made later to his fellow- countrymen in Paris and London, from whom it rapidly leaked to the French and British Governments, and served what Russians believe their then purpose of further dis- crediting the U.S.S.R. Perhaps in the whole Munich business there was nothing which burnt Russian hearts so painfully as the Lindbergh affair. There was also the Russian offer to begin military consultations with a view to impending hos- tilities. It was simply and flatly ignored without even the courtesy of an answer. Such things are not easily forgotten, and Soviet Russia does not easily forget.
The U.S.S.R., moreover, found it difficult to believe that Mr. Chamberlain was so naive as to trust Hitler's word at Munich. From the outset of the Runciman mission, throughout the tortuous negotiations until the day of the Munich agreement, the Russians suspected that Chamber lain meant to sacrifice Czecho-Slovakia. And in the depths of the Russian mind there was a darker suspicion still—that one at least of England's purposes in razing the Czech bastion from Hitler's path was to facilitate his attainment of the goal so clearly announced in Mein Kampf—the conquest of Soviet Ukraine. I do not for a moment suggest that these Russian suspicions are warranted, but I say, and say it again, that that is what the Russians thought. Perhaps today they think it less, and might be willing to admit—although I doubt it—that their earlier suspicions were a trifle exagger- ated. But they have not forgotten what they thought, nor forgiven the British Government. On the other hand, Russians pride themselves most on realism m Weltpolitik. They will not allow animosity or memories ever so bitter to interfere with their conduct of affairs in new and different circumstances. And, as I said before, Mr. Hudson, whose success here was not wholly confined to winning Soviet consent to begin shortly negotiations in London for a new trade agreement, did much to present British policy sous um, lumiere moires pejorative.
No ; the Soviets' present reproach to England is not based on Munich shame or even ancient antagonism between the Lion and the Bear. Today there are two foundations upon which Russians build their edifice of scepticism. First, as lzvestia curtly remarked in a brilliant résumé of post- Munich Europe, " We are forced to a twofold conclusion— that all.Europe's troubles are the consequence of Munich and a proof of the complete failure of the Munich policy." In other words, they think Munich was a botch—and who will contradict that now? Secondly, Russians feel that Chamber- lain's declaration about Poland was not sufficiently clear for them to assume that it meant a decisive change in the policy of the British Government and the replacement of the so- called " Munich policy " or " Non-Intervention policy " or the " Policy of Appeasement " by a strong and united stand against any aggression anywhere. The Soviets' doubts on this point were reinforced by the editorial of April 1st in the London Times (which this country persists in regarding as the mouthpiece of Mr. Chamberlain), which was inevit- ably compared here with the editorial early last September recommending the cession of Sudetenland to Germany.
On Aptil 4th there was published in Moscow an authoritative editorial in the semi-official French weekly, Puma' de Moscou. The article brings into question not merely the dubious nature of Chamberlain's declaration, but the attitude of Poland itself. For the first time this " inside " Soviet organ asked straight out what lots of people here have been thinking. Where really does Poland stand- " Poland, which took part in September, 1938, in the dis- memberment of Czecho-Slovakia. The question now arises, is Poland really decided to change its policy ? Will it not continue in future despite its own interests and those of peace to wobble and balance, with an inclination towards the side of aggressive Germany ? " Thus speaks the journal de Moscou at the end of a sober review of Polish policy—including the 1934 agreement with Germany—dur- ing recent years. I suppose therefore that the Russians are not wholly convinced about the reality and intensity of the Germano-Polish " crisis " which appears the cause of such apprehension in London and Paris. In fact unless I guess wrong they suspect—have I said that Russians harbour sus- picions ?—the ingenious Colonel Beck of " slipping over a fast one " on the dignified City of London and nicking the said wealthy city for a nice fat loan in gold. (It must always be remembered that the Russians do not love the Polish Government and eye them askance, one might say by force of habit.) Furthermore, throughout this " crisis " the Poles have made no appeal for Russian assistance, even contingent, nor shown in conversations with Moscow any desperate dread of Germany. Nevertheless, Russians are not un- willing to admit that the British may have put the other side. Perhaps, the Russians are willing to admit, the British Government is slowly but surely deciding to change its policy and revert to the collective security it threw over- board with Mr. Eden. Perhaps Poland is really menaced by Hitler's iron hand. Perhaps and perhaps and perhaps— the Russians are willing to admit it, at least fcr argument's sake. But they remember—their hearts are full of memories—what recently happened about the " crisis " with Rumania, and the German " ultimatum." On that occasion England " made overtures " to Moscow, and Mos- cow—these Russians are full of suspicions—thought the English were trying to use them as a bogy to frighten Germany—without committing themselves. So the Russians proposed an immediate conference of interested Powers both for practical reasons and to get the British standpoint clear. To which the British promptly replied that the Russian proposal was premature. The result was that Rumania swallowed the German potion and the Rus- sians had a sneaking suspicion—another Russian suspicion— that they had guessed it right. So now, when it comes to Poland, the Soviets' attitude is one of scepticism and wait, and wait and see, and look before you leap.
But should England, France and Poland be honestly deter- mined in sober earnest to call a halt to German aggression or any Fascist aggression, then the Russians have a formula ready, which has been expressed in the Primal de Moscou, Izvestia, Pravda and the Army mouthpiece, Red Star, and undoubtedly represents Kremlin policy in this case. As the Puma! de Moscou puts it, " We must now recognise the indivisibility of aggression. Considering the extent of German aggression and the existence of the bloc, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Fascist Spain, recent measures, timid withal, to reinforce security in certain sectors are powerless to maintain peace." What the Russians propose therefore is a counterbloc of non-aggressive nations, for instance, Britain, France, Poland, Holland, Belgium, and U.S.S.R.- others might join it later—which pledge themselves jointly to resist with all their might and by every possible means any aggression anywhere that may occur against any one of them. In saying this, Russians dismiss " frontier incidents " and minor causes of squabble. They know what aggression means and think others know it too.
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