THE FRENCH AND THE NEW HEBRIDES.
T4ORD IDDESLEIGITS vacation is likely to be a short one. Not to mention- the immemorial Eastern Question, which is in that simmering stage in which, though nothing may happen for a long time, a good deal may happen very soon, or the Canadian Fishery Question, which, though it has remained unsettled for years, is now in a state that makes some permanent arrangement with the United States very desirable, the dispute about the New Hebrides seems assuming a more troublesome and urgent form. M. de Freycinet's assurances to Lord Rosebery were supposed to have been perfectly satisfactory ; indeed, supposing assurances to be all that is wanted, they were perfectly satisfac- tory. But if we are content with assurances, the Australians, who are very much nearer the spot, demand acts, and acts are not so easily extracted from M. de Freycinet. He is very good on the diplomatic side of foreign policy. He can delay saying an unpleasant thing till the last moment, and then say it as pleasantly as is possible under the circum- stances. But a dispute such as that of which the New Hebrides are the occasion, calls for something more than pleasant words. What looks like a breach of treaty engagements is actually going on ; and though it is in M. de Freycinet's power to give proof that it is not what it seems, affairs are in a position which makes it very important that this proof should be given promptly.
As M. de Freycinet states the case, the occupation of the New Hebrides by French troops is a purely provisional and temporary measure. Certain French subjects have been killed by the natives, and the French Government has landed some troops for the double purpose of obtaining redress and preventing a repetition of the offence. To this way of describing the act of the Government no exception can be taken, and the matter might be allowed to rest if only all con- cerned in it would say the same thing. But this is just what they will not do. The note sounded by the French commander who has been employed to carry out M. de Freycinet's instruc- tions differs greatly from that sounded by M. de Freycinet himself. Lieutenant Legrand announces, generally to the civilised world, and specially to the " residents of all nation- alities established in the New Hebrides," that a detachment of marines has been landed at Port Havannah for the purpose of establishing a military post there, and that a military post has accordingly been established and the
French flag raised. Later in the day, a second landing was effected at Malicolo, a second military post established, and a similar proclamation issued. Lieutenant Legrand does not, it is true, say in so many words that the establishment of these posts is the beginning of a permanent occupation of the islands. But neither does he say anything to repudiate this view of his action. There is nothing in his proceedings to imply that these posts are not to be permanent, or to indicate what it is that the natives must do before the French troops can be recalled. If the Lieutenant had been taking possession of newly discovered territory, he need have used no other formalities than those which he used in the New Hebrides on June 1st. Unfortunately, too, what Lieutenant Legrand says makes much more impression upon the Australians than any- thing that can be said by D.I. de Freycinet. Lieutenant Legrand is on the spot ; M. de Freycinet is far away. Lieu- tenant Legrand's acts are there to confirm and interpret his words, and these same acts of his determine for the Aus- tralians the light in which M. de Freycinet's words must be read. The Australians have no doubt what the establishment of these military posts means. They believe that if the French occupation is allowed to go on, it will go on ; • that it has been ordered by way of a feeler, to see how much England will bear; and that the decision whether it shall be temporary or permanent, depends upon the degree of resolution shown by the English Government in dealing with the facts.
No doubt M. de Freycinet can easily put all this to rights. He has only to assure Lord Iddesleigh that Lieutenant Legrand's assertion of sovereignty was too unqualified, and that orders have been sent out to him to make an equally public notification of the provisional nature of the occupation, and
of the means by which the natives can at any moment bring it to an end. The misfortune is that, though M. de Freycinet is probably quite as anxious to offer these assurances as we can be to receive them, he may have some difficulty in doing what he wishes. M. de Freycinet has but one rale of politiell action,—to keep on good terms with the majority that sup- ports him for the time being. Unfortunately for those who have to negotiate with him, it is not easy to say at any given moment what the determining element in this majority is. One day it is M. Ohlmenceau and the Radicals, the next it may be M. Ferry and the Opportunists. Now, supposing the latter to be in the ascendant—and, as the distribution of French parties changes like the patterns in a kaleidoscope, it may easily be in the ascendant to-morrow, if it is not to-day—M. de Freycinet will certainly be urged not to yield to English pressure. An article in the Re"publique Frangaise leaves no doubt as to the Opportunist attitude upon this question. It recites Lieutenant Legrand's achievement, and expresses a hope that it marks the end of the New Hebrides controversy. This " annex" of New Cale- donia, says the Ripublique Frangaise, at last belongs to France. There will be a great parade of diplomatic formulas, notes will be interchanged, and protocols reduced to form ; but all this time the French marines will hold the ground, and neither notes, nor protocols, nor formulas will dislodge them. This time France has got the start of England, and it is a very good thing for her that she has done so. It is quite time for France to show her neigh- bour that she too is a Colonial Power, has rights at sea, and knows, in case of need, how to assert them. If the French Government should ever speak in the tone of this article, the situation would at once become serious. There are two excel- lent reasons why England cannot acquiesce in a French occu- pation of the New Hebrides. She could not do it, even if the question had now arisen for the first time. The ownership of a few islands in the Pacific may not matter much to us ; but it matters a great deal to the young communities which have made Australia a second England. In that region we cannot recognise the right of the first occupant.. We can agree to leave unoccupied territory alone, but we cannot agree to see it occupied by another Power. But besides,—and this is much more important,—a direct treaty right would be over- ridden if the French Government were to occupy the New Hebrides. England and France have agreed that they shall belong to neither, and England cannot possibly consent to see a treaty right set aside to the detriment of her Australian subjects, Happily, therefore, Lord Iddesleigh has an unimpeachable case. He relies upon a right which M. de Freycinet cannot contest, and he has a motive for vindicating that right the force of which M. de Freycinet cannot but admit. On the whole, therefore, we think it probable that, in spite of the Re'publique Frangaise, French occupation will come to an end as soon as there has been time for M. de Freycinet to send a despatch to M. Legrand. At least, we find it hard to believe that M. de Freycinet will think the support of the Opportunists worth buying at the cost of a real rupture with England.
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