14 AUGUST 1886, Page 4

THE LESSON OF THE BELFAST RIOTS.

WHILE one section of the Press is using the Belfast riots as political capital with which to assail the reputation of Mr. Morley, and another section is using them as political capital with which to assail the reputation of Lord Randolph Churchill, we hold that they really point to the infinite harm which has been done by even suggesting to the Irish people the probability that Ireland might very soon become the battle- ground between the party which looks up to Mr. Morley as its champion, and the party which looks up to Lord Ran- dolph Churchill as its champion. For our own parts, we cannot help seeing in this anarchical condition of the com- mercial capital of Ireland, one more confirmation of our view that a Government identified neither with Mr. Motley nor with Lord Randolph Churchill, ought now to be in office, a Government that would have aided neither with the Nationalists nor with the Orangemen, but that would have been presided over by Lord Hartington, who has never betrayed the smallest wish either to sacrifice the Orangemen to the Nationalists, or the Nationalists to the Orangemen. But as that is past wishing for,—had it been otherwise, we think it very possible that these miserable and melancholy displays of passion might have been avoided,—we may at least draw from these displays of un- controllable rage the inference that had any Home-rule scheme been adopted, not only must riots of this kind have broken out with even greater fury, but that nothing could well have pre- vented them from expanding till they had become civil war on a large scale. If the mere fact that a Government was in power in May and June which was supposed to sympathise with the Nationalists produced these riots, and the fact that it was succeeded in July by a Government which is supposed to sympathise with the Orangemen has renewed them on a scale of still greater bitterness, it is not difficult to imagine what would have happened if a decisive victory had been gained by either section of the Irish people, and the hopes of the opposite section had been rudely crushed. We should have had a weak Nationalist Executive boldly defied by these violent Belfast mobs ; then, when the soldiers were called in, as they have just been called in by the Dublin authorities, we should have had officer after officer throwing up his commis- sion rather than act against those whom he deemed to be exercising their just right of refusing to submit to an authority to which they had never pledged their loyalty ; the soldiers would hardly have acted with any firmness under circumstances so novel and so demoralising ; and finally, the Orangemen would have seen their opportunity, and turned a town riot into a declaration of civil war. England would have been rent in two between those who apologised for the action of the soldiers in refusing to serve, and those who condemned it ; and where the end of these troubles would have been, no one could have foreseen. That is, we say, the legitimate inference from what is now taking place in Belfast,—namely, a very serious and prolonged riot, but not a movement which, under present circumstances, can extend beyond the dimensions of a serious and prolonged riot. The only reason, however, why it cannot do so is that the soldiers when called upon to quell the rioting, and to quell it in the name of the Queen of the United Kingdom, do not for a moment hesitate about their duty,—whereas they would certainly have hesitated most seriously if they had been called upon to act against bodies of men whom they would have looked upon as no mere rioters. but rather as loyal subjects of the Queen whose allegiance had been cynically transferred without their consent, from a Government to which they bad all their lives been accustomed to give their adhesion, to a new Government which they could not trust, did not honour, and were not bound to obey. Bad as affairs are in Belfast,—and, so far as local order goes, they could not well be worse,—we have every reason to be thank- ful that, for the present at least, Home-rule has been defeated, and that the Queen's troops still recognise in the Government on behalf of which they interfere, a Government raised above party, and bound to do justice to Nationalists and Orangemen alike.

It would seem that the party which has, on the whole, been most to blame,—in other words, which has begun rioting most frequently, and persevered in it most obstinately,—is the party on the side of the Union, and not that on the side of Home- rule ; in other words, the party on the side of the political victors in the General Election, and not the party which was worsted. That is doubtless true, and is very explicable on the principles of ordinary human nature. The party which is lifted up with pride, and believes itself to be in the ascendant, is usually the most quarrelsome ; and we do not doubt that it has.been so in Belfast. But how would it have been if the victory had gone the other way ? In that case, it is very likely that the Nationalists would have more frequently taken the initiative, and would in the first instance have been more pro- vocative and irritating than the Orangemen, though the Orange- men would undoubtedly have accepted the battle, and,—since

they would have been much more alarmed for the ultimate result,—would have taken their measures with more delibera- tion, and organised their resistance to the authorities with much greater care and prudence. Instead of merely expressing with violence as they have done their anger at what they thought the partisan spirit of the police, which is apparently the chief cause of the recent riots, they would have felt that they must organise their own police, that they must act on the defensive, that they must take every precaution which befits a minority at the outbreak of a great civil feud, and that they must put themselves in communication with their friends throughout Ireland and outside of Ireland, and avoid any premature disclosure of their intent. Bad as the situation is now, we can only infer from it, that had the political victory gone the other way, the situation in Ulster would at present be far more serious, though perhaps not for the moment so riotous and bloody. These bold, hard Orangemen who brave the fire-arms of the police almost as the Soudanese braved our soldiers when they precipitated themselves against our hollow squares, would have been far more prudent and formidable, had they been bent on war, than now when they are only bent on expressing their hatred and scorn for what they choose to regard as the constabulary of the enemy. If now they freely hazard their lives just to gratify their passions, they would have been both far more formidable and far cooler, when they believed them- selves to be fighting for their hearths and altars,—as they certainly would have believed, if the cause of Home-rule had triumphed. Say what we will of the self-will of these Orange- men, and perhaps, even, of the Orangemen among the police by whom, according to one account, the Orange mobs have been for the most part fired upon,—they do at least show of what very hard metal the Irish minority are made, and how impos- sible it would have been to inspire in them docility to an authority on which they would have looked with something like loathing. They are not very easy to deal with, even when they are only expressing their resentment at what they look upon as the partiality of the police. What they would have been if they had been intent on repudiating a national arrange- ment which they detested from the bottom of their hearts, we think it is not very hard to discern.

It is, however, much to be regretted that the Government which has just come into office should be represented in the House of Commons by a statesman who has identified himself so foolishly with one party to the controversy as Lord Randolph Churchill. Ireland can never be well governed by partisans ; and if Sir Michael Hicks-Beach is to succeed in appeasing the furious passions which this Home-rule controversy has ex- cited, he must take up at once a position which will distinguish him from his political leader, and will encourage the Irish to expect from him equal-handed justice. We have no doubt that he can do this if he will, and that Lord Salisbury, who has every reason to desire that he should take up such a position, will support him in doing so. It is unfortunate enough that, as a consequence of the very nature of the recent struggle, all the worst features of Irish feuds should have been reproduced in Belfast. But it would be still more unfor- tunate that any man should bear rule in Ireland who could. not show himself entirely above these feuds. This is what Sir Michael Hicks-Beach must do. He has the most difficult of duties before him. He must not only do his best to still the- passions which have been excited, but to convince the Irish that Lord Randolph Churchill, though his leader is the House of Commons, cannot determine the Irish policy of the Government, but would have to persuade Lord Salisbury to ask for the resignation of the Irish Secretary, if he would overrule Sir Michael's policy in the sense of his own foolish Orange boasts. Perhaps Sir Michael Hicks-Beach may not be sorry to have the chance of making it evident that it is he who is entrusted with the government of Ireland, and not the mischievous col- league who has pushed him from his leadership in the House• of Commons. He cannot do better than make this con- spicuously evident, if he would really regain the lost ground in Ireland, and restore there that respect for the Union which, partly by the endeavours of wilful theorists, and partly by the endeavours of more wilful intriguers, has for some months back been so nearly lost.