TOPICS OF THE DAY. .
THE POSITION OF CANADA IN THE EVENT OF WAR.
ENGLISHMEN are a. little too apt to speak of an American war as if it would be confined to the sea, as if the fleet could accomplish everything, and the only diffi- culty would be to make our blockades complete. They forget that a. frontier as much ours as the Tweed marches for fifteen hundred miles with that of the Federal States, that two inland seas on which we have not a gunboat demand pro- tection, that three millions of people whom we are bound to defend are exposed to attack by land, \and that we may have to stand on the defensive against masses qf American volunteers. The evil rubbish talked in the New York Herald about the 'half- million of men who are to " flood the Canadas," and com- pensate the Union by conquests in the North for the injuries she has sustained in the South is, of course, mere bragga- docio. The North cannot without patching up. peace move a man from the Potomac without unminent risk of attack from the South, and she has no other army to move. We much mistake both the ability and the unscrupulousness of Mr. Jefferson Davis if lie consent to make peace, with the prize of war just in his grasp, without Maryland, Kentucky, and the left bank of the Mississippi,—concessions to which, whatever the politicians may do, the West will never consent. Sudden peace is impossible, if only on account of the border war now raging in three of the states, and which compels both parties either to go on fighting, or settle after long negotiation a fair boundary line, or desert three half-states which have periled life, property, and civilization in their attachment to one or the other side. That rush of an armed population into Canada with which Mr. Seward threatened us is out of the question, but the danger to be encountered is, nevertheless, a serious one. Canada could endure the invasion of armed bands of guerillas as little as that of a regular army, and such an invasion seems, to all who com- prehend American border-life, almost a certainty. Even if the Federal Government, anxious to keep open the door for early negotiations, were to restrict their own movements within the limits of regular war, the population of Western New York and the half-savage classes, like the lumbermen, who live by trades which the war-will close, would not hold themselves bound by any such restriction. They will invade if they dare, and the most practical way to estimate the posi- tion of Canada is to consider the means by which bands of armed volunteers, pouring from the States into Canada, could be resisted.
The prospect is not at first sight a pleasant one, the enor- mous length of the frontier offering inconceivable advantages to an invading force. It is true the extent of territory really accessible is modified by some important considerations. Canada, for military purposes, may be defined as the northern side of a vast valley, at the bottom of which flows the St. Lawrence, one of the few rivers which sea-going ships can as- cend for nearly a thousand miles but which is inaccessible throughout the winter months. This river, too, forms, in some sense, the military boundary, for though extensive counties lie on the American side, they do not contain great cities, and can scarcely be considered defensible, except along the Grand Trunk Railway, which passes through the centre of them, and will be, on the southern bank, the centre both of attack and defence. These counties must be held by the people, assisted by such soldiers as can be spared from Quebec, and will, we fear, find themselves for a few months compelled to endure the first brunt of the war. Lower Canada, on the northern bank, is far more happily situated. Between Que- bec and the sea invasion is scarcely possible, for the invaders must not only cross the St. Lawrence, there a mighty estuary, but the mountain range which strengthens and overshadows the northern bank. *Quebec itself is strongly fortified, and is by nature a place almost unassailable, except by a superior and regular army. It is above Quebec that the attack on Lower Canada must be made, if at all, and be- tween that city and the Lakes the facilities for attack are not. quite so unlimited as they appear on the map. Crossing the St. Lawrence with the ice piled, as it is near Montreal, in heavy racks, is a most difficult and dangerous task, and would, in the face of an armed enemy, be an almost impossible one. Montreal itself, though unfortified and garrisoned by only 1500 men, stands on an island, like a fortress surrounded by a moat, and is completely commanded by The Mountain, a natural fortress, 600 feet high, which must be occupied before either river or city could be entered in. safety. From thence to Lake Ontario the invaders would find no point worth a military demonstration, as a plunge into the woods, or the "temporary occupation" of a virgin forest, exposed to attack from backwoodsmen, would be a more exciting than profit- able amusement. On the Lake itself the Americans would have at first a decided advantage. Neither Power possesses armed vessels, which were prohibited by the treaty of 1814, but the Americans have an immense preponderance in trading vessels and steamers, which they could equip with light can- non, and, as the Lakes are never frozen, use during the winter to annoy all the settlements on the shore. After the winter, this advantage will be lost, as England could fill the Lakes with new heavily-armed iron gun-boats, with which no vessels the Americans possess could hope to contend. Intermedi- ately, however, the danger to towns like Toronto, which are quite unfortifled, and very poorly supplied, we suspect, with the means of extemporizing batteries, would be most menac- ing, and must have been a subject of anxious thought to the Canadian Government. Between Lake Ontario and Lake Erie, too, along the thirty-mile strip of water in the centre of which the falls of Niagara are situate, the frontier may be said to lie almost open. It was over Niagara that the Americans always crossed in 1813-1814, and it is the counties on this section of the frontier—the richest counties in Upper Canada—which it will be most necessary and most diffi- cult to defend. In practice, this narrow teritory will be, we suspect, the .pivot of land operations, and to carry troops there during winter will be a work of exceeding difficulty and expense. There are but 5000 regulars in the colony,—a political opposition to which we regret to say we lent our humble support, having prevented the despatch of an additional 3000 men last autumn. These troops will be immediately increased by 11,000 more now under orders, but the obstacles to introducing them into the province are very considerable. The usual route is the St. Lawrence, but it is only available in summer, and the nearest way still open is via Portland across Maine, of course closed as a peaceable road. It might certainly be opened by force, but to march through Maine with the certainty of the popu- lation, thin though it be, rising in arms on our approach, would be no light addition to the difficulties of our task. Even when arrived, the troops are required for the defence of the great cities, and though, holding those posts, the frontier eanbe main- tained till the St. Lawrence is again open, the suffering in- flicted in the interim may be very considerable. There are no fortified places west of Quebec except Kingston, com- manding the entrance to Lake Ontario, and this post, though priceless in summer, is comparatively useless when the St. Lawrence is closed.
This is the gloomy side of the picture, which we have pur posely put first, for nothing is gained by the inflated vapour- ing in which our rivals across the St. Lawrence are always so apt to indulge. But there is a pleasanter side nevertheless. We have spoken of Canada as if it must be defended exclu- sively by regular troops, but necessary as they are, it is on' the population we must in the end rely. Upper Canada, the province most in danger, now possesses a million of souls, or say two hundred thousand arm-bearing men. Most of these are of the very finest class for military pur- poses—hardy, brave, and determined, with a curiously large proportion of retired officers and soldiers among them, and a thorough knowledge of their country and its resources. They are not, we regret to say, trained to arms. Despite the various statements circulated, no one can read the Canadian accounts, or the Blue-book on colonial military expenditure, without perceiving that the colonial militia is a mere name, useless except as preserving the tradition of military crgauization. We doubt if the Duke of Newcastle's estimate of 4400 effectives be not too much for the militia, and the volunteer movement in the colony is but beginning. The Canadians, however, are of the stuff of which fighting volunteers are made. Accustomed to forest life, they are filled with a bitter dislike of their Ya,sil(ee neighbours, which, strangely enough, has of late years taken the aspect of a savage, and, what appears to Englishmen, unreasoning contempt. We ourselves heard intelligent Canadians six years ago predict Bull's Run, and a thorough scorn of Yankee prowess shines out in all their anticipations. During the whole of the recent contest, their feeling has been that of the English aristocracy, not pro-Southern, but anti-Northern to the verge of injustice; and this feeling the Northerners have diligently exasperated. From Mr. Seward downward every speaker has steadily menaced Ca- nada with absorption ; the Press has promised invasions and the American dealers in the Canadian cities have va- poured of the certainty that they would next year teach the " slow" colonists how to improve their property. The French settlers, in particular, threatened with a tenure which would destroy their social organization, and anxious for their church property, regard their impertinent neigh. hours with the most active antipathy. Since the affair of the San Jacinto they have expressed in every way open to them their hope that the Government would avenge the insult, and their readiness to share in the danger and the responsibility. The long quarrels with the Colonial Office have ceafied since Canada became free, and the old irritation has been succeeded by a hearty recognition of the value of English protection, and the exhibition of a spirit of loyalty, which, despite the Orange demonstrations, rises in many classes into a strong sentiment. Their most powerful impulse, however, is undoubtedly their detestation of the Yankees, and the first whisper of actual war will call whole classes into the ranks of the volunteers. Arms are being sent out in profusion, good officers are plentiful, and though six weeks will not make the Canadians soldiers, it will make them the equals of the hastily organized bands by which alone they can be attacked. These bands cannot be very enormous. Carrying° commissariat in winter in Canada is not the lightest of tasks, and any attempt to plunder on system will rouse a hatred which will turn the whole country, naturally a most defensible one, into a fortress. The volun- teers should be able to maintain themselves till the spring, and the ice once removed, the British Government is quite competent to send them sufficient aid, to fill the Lakes with gun-boats, and the fortifications with men, to supply arms and artillery to the whole population, and, if necessary, to hold the western half of Maine securely enough to allow of uninterrupted transit. There is suffering in store for Canada, enough and to spare, but if the population is once aroused, there is, we believe, little danger of any serious military disaster.
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