THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE FOREIGN SITUATION.
THE assembling of the Peace Conference in London and the meeting of the Ambassadors of the Great Powers, which is also, it appears, to take place in this city, is a, triumph for Sir Edward Grey, or rather, let us say, for his policy, since Sir Edward Grey is not a man who would care to be congratulated on a personal triumph. Undoubtedly Sir Edward Grey is reaping the reward of the spirit in which he has for the last seven years conducted the foreign affairs of this country. He has made every Foreign Office and every Court in Europe believe not merely Undoubtedly Sir Edward Grey is reaping the reward of the spirit in which he has for the last seven years conducted the foreign affairs of this country. He has made every Foreign Office and every Court in Europe believe not merely that his word is to be relied upon when once it has been given, but that he is a man who can be trusted. implicitly not to fish in troubled waters, not to make mischief between Powers even in the interests of his own country, not to use any doubtful weapon, and not even to push a favourable point too hard. While they recognize that it is an essential part of his policy to stand steadfastly by our understandings with foreign Powers, and never to yield to the temptation of what Bismarck called " re-insurances " by means of secret agreements, or, to use another diplomatic metaphor once fashionable, to take "an extra turn" in the diplomatic ballroom with this or that Power, they recognize also that he will never take an advantage of anyone, honourable or dishonourable. It was once said of a great New York financier who was universally trusted, that it would be safe to put your finger in his mouth and go to sleep, for he would never bite it off. Foreign diplomatists have much the same feeling about Sir Edward Grey. Some people may think that he carries this Olympian attitude too far, and that it would.
be sometimes better if he did push an advantage further than he does, and occasionally took a stronger and more imperative line in international affairs. For example we confess that in the matter of Portuguese slavery we feel that he ought to have taken advantage of our defensive affiance with Portugal and in a good cause have squeezed Portugal to the utmost, that is, till she put an end, not merely in word but in fact, to slavery and slave-raiding in her dominions. That, however, is another story, and at any rate Sir Edward Grey is now reaping the advantage of the qualities of his defects. He would have had very much greater difficulty in bringing the Powers together if, as we have said, they had not been certain that he had no British fish to fry and would not use the Conference and the meeting of the Ambassadors for selfish national ends. As far as Sir Edward. Grey is concerned, the negotiations will take place in an atmosphere clear from all suspicion, and clear also from all local influences except those that work for the Christmas issue of peace and goodwill. Sir Edward Grey's head is not one which easily fits a crown of com- pliment, but surely no statesman ever had in reality a greater compliment paid him than that involved in his present diplomatic success.
It would obviously not be advisable to say much at present in regard to the details of peace. The most we dare do is to express the hope that Greece, Montenegro, and Servia will assert their claims in the same wise, dignified, and statesmanlike spirit in which it is clear that the Bulgarian claims will be asserted. There is no doubt that but for a limited area around. Constanti- nople Turkey's rule must end in Europe. At the same time as much care as possible must be taken to avoid the humiliation of the Sultan's Government. That Govern- ment will still be responsible for the vast Asiatic Empire of Turkey, and it is most important that those who control that Empire should not suffer in prestige. But though Ottoman rule must end in Europe, it is clear that there must still remain one State on our continent which will be largely Mohammedan in population and so in character. The highlands of Albania must remain an independent State. Again, some means must be discovered by which Servia will be able to secure her economic independence without coming into conflict with Austria-Hungary. Finally, it is very greatly to be hoped that the peace dele- gates will keep the claims and views of the Great Powers in mind during their negotiations. What would be most in the interests of peace would be that terms should be presented to the Ambassadors of the Great Powers to which they could assent without alteration. What is clearly undesirable is that the peace delegates should. merely consider what terms they can agree about among themselves and then leave it to the Powers to suggest modifications. The result of such a policy might be a struggle in which national susceptibilities would receive many wounds. Before we leave the subject of the foreign situation we desire to deal shortly with the renewal of the Triple Alliance. The news of that renewal has not in the least altered the view which we expressed last week, namely, that Italy is in the Triple Alliance during peace, but that in existing circumstances she could not for physical reasons remain in it during war. Her allies could not give her the naval guarantees without which her position would be absolutely intolerable. It is this fact, no doubt, which makes France, Russia, and Britain show so little anxiety in regard to Italy's position, and certainly no bitterness. They know that Italy's role in the Alliance is of a pacific nature, and that her influence will always be directed towards peace. As has been somewhat too frankly said, Italy's role is to cling round the legs of her allies if they appear to be inclined to march. Certainly that is a function which will never cause ill-feeling in London, Paris, or St. Petersburg. It will be said, perhaps, that this interpretation is too optimistic, and that Italy, once bound to the Alliance, may find it impossible, when her partners are really in earnest, to do anything in the nature of leg-clinging. If they really decide to march, she must march with them. This view rests, we believe, on a misunderstanding of the terms of the Alliance. It is true that those terms have never been published. But what does that portend ? They have not been published because they would not strengthen the Alliance. If the contrary had been the case and they were similar to the terms between Austria-Hungary and Germany, which have been published, there could have been no reason for secrecy. Undoubtedly they are secret because they are of a minimizing character. If we may hazard a guess, it is that the Italian terms depend upon the construction to be put upon the word " attack." Italy is to be sole judge of what that word means. Further, it seems admitted that the treaty of alliance does not refer to action in the Medi- terranean. If this is so, how tremendous is the gap in the embankment ! Italy is, above all things, a Mediterranean Power. To talk of a treaty to which Italy is a party in which the Mediterranean is left out is indeed a diplomatic drama of " Hamlet " with the part of the Prince of Denmark omitted !
Perhaps we shall be asked, if our interpretation of Italy's place in the Triple Alliance is the true one, why it is that Germany and Austria-Hungary trouble about the matter ? Why should they not prefer to let Italy go altogether rather than keep her in on terms so unsatisfying? A little reflection will, we think, make this matter plain. Germany is clearly a great believer in the value of inter- national prestige. But undoubtedly her prestige is increased by being at the head of an Alliance which stretches north and south from Sicily to Konigsberg, i e., from the Baltic to the mouth of the Adriatic, and east and west from the Stelvio to Cracow. Further, if Italy is only nominally in the Triple Alliance she is at any rate not making the Triple Entente into a Quadruple Entente. To put it at the worst, inclusion in the Triple Alliance may be considered to secure Italy's neutrality. But Italy's neutrality, whatever the disdainful German and Austro-Hungarian General Staffs may say about the quality of the Italian army, is of very vital importance to the Central European Powers. With Italy neutral, Austria-Hungary's anxieties in regard to the Trentino and Istria, though not absolutely over, are at any rate greatly reduced. Probably not more than 100,000 men in that case would be required to be kept in Tirol and in Styria. Italy hostile, and the Italian army reinforced by three French corps d'armge, and a joint French and British squadron in the Adriatic, is a very different matter. To put it concisely, the inclusion of Italy in the Triple Alliance in peace gives that combination a " much improved appearance," and in war has a passive if not an active advantage.
Let us say once more that Italy may feel sure that no one in this country will be in the least hurt or perturbed by her renewal of the Triple Alliance on existing lines. It is fully recognized here, not merely by our Foreign Office, but, what is more important, by public opinion, that the Italians intend nothing hostile or aggressive towards this country, or indeed towards France and Russia, by such renewal. We know that she remains in that Alliance in the interests of the peace of the world, interests which are in a very special degree at this moment her own. It is of vital Importance to her that peace should be maintained for the next ten years, while she is creating for herself that North African Empire of which she dreams and which all her friends hope will prove a success. If the hardy, thrifty, and good-hearted emigrants of Italy make Cyrenaica once more blossom like the rose, there will be none better pleased than the people of England.
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