Call off the Co
• ary d VirgrEMENUMNOMIUMMINIONNEMIX In the British confrontation with Iceland over North Sea _ fishing there are strategic, economic and legal.considerations at issue; and in each area the burden of the argument favours the Icelanders. Now that,: the Corn-. munists are no longer members of the Reykjavik government there is less propensity on the part of Iceland to threaten NATO's tenancy of the military base at Keflavik; but the temptation remains, if only: because such a threat is the one way in which pressure can be brought to bear on a doggedly stubborn and insensitive British government. From Keflavik—where th_ere is both a sophisticated underwater detection system and two squadrons of reconnaissance aircraft— NATO can supervise the passage of the USSR's largest fleet from its home bases through the Iceland-Faroes gap on its way to menace the East coast of the United States. The base is a vital link in the Western chain of defence, and to put it at risk is an act of irresponsibility. Neither economically nor legally does Great Britain have a strong case. The cod fisheries are considerably less important to the British than to the Icelandic economy; and though cod has a very substantial British market, it is not one of vital significance. This fact has, indeed, been obscured by the failure of successive iBritish governments either to prepare the British fishing ndustry for development of other resources, or to adopt an enlightened cod conservation policy: since the cod does not breed for the first five years of its life the danger that. over-fishing will destroy, not just simply reduce, the stock is greater than in the case of other varieties of fish. Moreove{, since Great Britain, like most of the major fishing nations, has agreed in principle to the establishment of two hundred mile territorial water limits the establishment.of Iceland's claim can only be a matter of time.
Over and above all this it should be said that the tone and character of British diplomacy in this affair have been unseemly. More than once Great Britain, having taken a strong line in argument with her EEC partners, has, at the crunch, given way. It seems, however, that in the case of Iceland Mr Wilson and his ministers feel they can safely play the degrading role of bully. Mr Wilson's own part in negotiations with the Icelandic Prime Minister was marked both by displeasing selfassertion and inconsistency, as his contradictory instructions to our trawler fleet showed : he could with advantage displayed instead some of that timidity and humility he showed in his last confrontation with France and Germany in Rome. Unfortunately, the Conservative Opposition is in little better case : if they have a policy on the matter—which is doubtful—it seems to be to support the Government. It would be better by far, for Britain and Iceland alike, if they advocated both generosity and concession in our transactions with Reykjavik.
