God, Not Mr. Wilson By MALCOLM RUTHERFORD T HE story of
the drought in Rhodesia seems first to have appeared in the New York Times on Wednesday, January 5. Lawrence Fellows, the paper's man in Salisbury, began his report like this: Drought is looming as a greater threat to Rhodesia than all the trade sanctions that have been applied . . .
The correspondent of the London Times in Salisbury caught up with it on Friday and wrote substantially the same piece, adding the follow- ing dramatic quote from a Rhodesian farmer:
You can tell Mr. Wilson we don't give a damn about his sanctions. It is God who is against Rhodesia now.
Mr. Wilson, who as the Times's political correspondent reminded us on Saturday follows newspaper reports most carefully, was clearly impressed. The Times's leading story that day was headlined 'MR. WILSON ORGANISES DROUGHT RELIEF ... CANADA AND AUSTRALIA ANSWER EMER- GENCY APPEAL: The Prime Minister had evidently been expounding another of his initiatives to the lobby. With the Lagos conference coming up in a few days' time, with visiting British MPs to Salisbury daily reporting that they saw no sign of an early collapse of the Smith regime, it was imperative to appear to be getting some- thing moving. Here then was an instant idea. The Governor would approach the Smith admin- istration asking for an assessment of its needs and, though it would all be done on strictly humanitarian grounds and not affect the UDI quarrel one little bit, there would be some chance of a dialogue beginning. After all, the Rhodesians could say. it was God. not Mr. Wilson, who intervened. The fact that if Mr. Smith were to accept the offer, which he probably would, this would be of some benefit to him and perhaps the opposite to Britain. does not seem to have been considered.
But there was no need. The very next day it was clear that neither Canada nor Australia had agreed to do anything more than consider the request, and that Australia at least had made a number of reservations. It had also begun to rain in Mashonaland. so that it was being said that the relief might not be needed anyway. Mr. Wilson's kite had hardly left the ground, and God was back in his very own country.
The story is retold at some length because it serves to emphasise how little idea anyone in Britain seems to have of how the Rhodesian rebellion is going to end. It shows something, too, of Mr. Wilson's power of persuading the press that he is in charge of events. At the same time as he was retailing the drought relief story, the name of Mr. Evan Campbell, the ex- Rhodesian Commissioner in London. which has been bandied around ever since UDI, was ap- pearing in print as a possible successor to Smith who would be acceptable to Britain. Yet only a few months ago Mr. Campbell appeared to differ from Mr. Smith and his colleagues in no more than that he saw no point in UN. Mr. Campbell is not a soft man. He thinks majority rule so far away that he might almost not believe in it. It would clearly be small victory for Britain for the rebellion to end with the accession a Mr. Campbell.
It is, however, generally agreed that the eco- mimic sanctions are now biting hard, largely bough the oil embargo. There are even auth-
oritative reports in London that Rhodesia has sufficient oil to carry on only for another two or three months, even on the strictest ration- ing. It is thought possible, but not at all likely, that she will succeed in getting fresh supplies of any quantity. The economy it seems is head- ing for breakdown, perhaps by April. The present British plan then is clear even down to a time-limit, although Mr. Wilson has con- sistently denied that there is any such thing.
There are two sets of British sanctions still held in reserve: the banning of the remaining 5 per cent of Rhodesia's former exports to Britain and the complete suspension of Britain's exports to Rhodesia. These are the ones Mr. Wilson had up Mr. Bottomley's sleeve for pro- duction if necessary at the Lagos conference. After that Britain admittedly has nothing left, but it is hoped that Zambia will be prevailed upon to stop her Rhodesian imports at the optimum moment as the final coup de grace. This would include, of course, cutting off the Rhodesian coal supplies on which the copper mines are dependent. But it is reckoned with optimistic precision that Britain could ride the loss in production for the three or four weeks required to bring Rhodesia finally to heel.
This is the plan, but what are the prospects? Economically the sanctions are biting, as they were bound to do, but are they working politic- ally? And it is here that the political and diplo- matic sources begin to tell quite different stories. The fact is that it is difficult to find a single non- political source who can advance any con- vincing evidence that sanctions are having their intended effect of producing an alternative Rhodesian government, and few who are pre- pared TO try.
It is true that Britain has never made it at all clear what she does want to happen when and if the rebellion comes to an end. One naturally assumes that Mr. Wilson is not serious when he talks of holding up majority rule for a further ten years but is only attempting temporarily to placate the 'hard line' whites. Possibly he has plans to treat Rhodesia as a Crown Colony or even to revive the idea of the Central African Federation, but it incenses more than the African Commonwealth that such plans have never been heard of. It is even tempting to think that Mr. Wilson is waiting for what he considers to be the right moment to announce that Britain can use force after all.
Nevertheless, the ideas which have been canvassed so far go no further than that a number of Rhodesians should gradually gather around the Governor and one day find themselves acknowledged as. under Britain, the effective (not just loyal, but effective) government of Rhodesia. And as the schedule goes at the moment, this ought to be by about April, before the economy seizes up completely. Yet it is precisely this which no responsible source can show any sign of happening. The vaunted radio station in Francistown has been functioning properly for no more than three weeks and no one will say with any certainty that it is having any effect. For present British policy to work, therefore, there has to be a race against time in which Rhodesian opinion must taken an about-turn before the sanctions have their maximum effect: that is, by March or April.
The official expectation then is that something
dramatic should happen in Rhodesia in about three months' time. No responsible source is prepared to say what. and indeed no one can. It is just possible that it will be Mr. Wilson's dream of the Governor pulling it off, but it requires a great act of faith to believe this. There might be chaos and bloodshed, nobody knows. Nobody seems to be in control. En the meantime there is a golden opportunity for any one of Mr. Stnith's lieutenants who wants to take his place (Mr. Harper is the favourite) to stage a coup in the Rhodesia Front and come to terms with Britain in what would largely be Rhodesia's favour: that is, the restoration of something very like the pre- UDI situation. Was it, one wonders, all for this? But it is either towards this or utter chaos that we seem to be heading. And if it is chaos, there can be little doubt that, despite all the protesta- tions, this will lead to British military inter- vention.
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