TOPICS OF THE DAY.
AIR RAIDS.
IF people would remember (what they can scarcely dispute) that the methods of defending ourselves against air raids are purely a military problem, they would find that their thoughts would arrange themselves more easily. Once recognize that aerial defence is a matter to be solved on the same primary strategical principles that govern our defences by land and sea, and certain conclusions follow inevitably and in proper sequence. Most of the muddled thinking and clamorous reproaches would soon come to an end. Civilians would no longer shout for what are vaguely spoken of as " reprisals," as though there could be some special and magical means of beating the enemy in the air that does not apply to any other form of fighting. The whole truth of the matter is this : that if the Germans are held to the ground at the points from which they launch their raids they can never reach this country by air. And even if thev cannot be pinned to the ground, the further they are driven backfrom the coast-line of Belgium the less will he the likelihood of their covering in safety the increased distance between their aerodromes and the British coast. If we can drive the Germans out of Belgium we shall have virtually solved the air problem so far as it concerns people here. It is at present much easier for the German airmen to attack English towns than to attack French towns. In coming over the sea they fly across what may be compared with empty country. They may meet British patrols in the aii and they may be fired on occasionally from ships, but the risks cannot be compared with those they encounter in flying over land occupied by troops and bristling with guns. A raid on Paris would mean that from the time of starting to the time of returning they would be fired on by anti- aircraft guns and harried by clouds of British and French machines.
The true strategy of defence is offence, in the air as on the land and on the sea. How the offensive is to be conducted is a matter for our duly appointed advisers to decide. There can be no more reason for going outside their advice than there is in the management of battles on the land or by sea. Laymen do not prescribe an entirely new order of ideas for Sir Douglas Haig or Sir David Beatty to follow. But in this comparatively new affair of war in the air a great many civilians appear to think that they are competent to judge, and their advice generally takes the form of insisting that the best kind of strategy is to drop bombs on open towns in Germany. If this advice is given with the mere object of making German women and children suffer what British women and children have suffered—with the sole object of punishing non-combatants and not of advancing our military schemes—it may be dis- missed as not worth thinking about. It is the trumpery impulse of a low grade of intelligence and of morals. But if the intention is to divert and distract the German military leaders, by creating around them such an atmosphere of alarm and revolt and such an outcry for protection as they cannot afford to ignore, then we must admit that the proposal belongs to the category of military ideas. For this reason it cannot be dismissed summarily, as a purely non-military idea can safely be. It is at least entitled to be discussed on its merits. We may dislike it intensely, but if the military value of the idea is very great we may not be justified in ruling it out permanently or unreservedly. In this war we have been compelled to use against the Germans many instruments and devices which they themselves introduced. We should never have thought of using them of our own volition, but when the enemy had resorted to them we could not possibly allow him to enjoy a monopoly of the military advantages they brought to him. Of course even in this case there is a marked distinction between methods used against combatants and those which it is proposed to use against non-combatants ; still, on the whole we agree that if a military argument were urged for " reprisals " by our military advisers it would not be easy to resist it. But it is precisely at this point that the case stated by the supporters of reprisals always ends in vacant air. If Sir William Robertson and those who direct the Royal Flying Corps or the Royal Naval Air Service have ever expressed the opinion that the dropping of bombs on open German towns would serve a definite military purpose, we have not heard of it. We imagine that in their view it is much more important to employ our machines and our bombs —since we could never have enough for every purpose—for destroying German depots and railway stations and munition
works. Some people who talk of " reprisals " seem to mean no more than that we should bomb such places as these (adver- fsing each raid as a definite.' reprisal ") as a regular tit-for-Mt' immediately after any open town here has been raided. But of course reprisals in that sense are the most ordinary military' operations. The only difference would be that a special label would be put on 'the operations ; nor would they have' any particular value unless they happened to fit in in every case with our principal military objects. If our experts should decide that reprisals against non-combatant populations' in German towns would really divert the attention of the German Great General Staff from the main current of military affairs they might think it necessary, on the balance of usefulness (since, as we have said, our machines cannot be everywhere), to recommend such reprisals. For our part, we do not believe that they have come to any such conclusion, or are likely to do so. And we must add that we earnestly hope they never will conclude that such reprisals are, in a military sense, advisable or necessary.
The habit of regarding aerial defence as a purely military question would help people. enormously also in considering the safety of London and other towns. If 'only they would remember that the primary principles of strategy apply,. they could not continue to join in the truly ridiculous demand for London to be guarded as though it had a detached existence and stood in no sort of relation to other towns and other events of the war. The German aerodromes in Belgium, or places not far from them, are the true defensive lines of London. From that cluster of aerodromes radiating lines of possible attack by German aeroplanes spread out like the spokes of a wheel from the hub. It is obvious that the further away from the hub we place our defensive patrols the more ground, or rather the more air, we shall have to cover. Suppose that instead of grappling with the Germans near the hub we kept so many machines round London that it actually became not worth while for the Germans to tempt fate in the London skies. Such a situation is' conceivable. We imagine that the next step would be that the Germans would leave London severely alone and would turn their attention to other towns' until the' same effect was produced in each of them. At each perfectly secured town the brave boys who fly would have to spend their time between a sterile practice of defensive operations and smoking cigarettes. If this idiotic process were allowed to go on far enough, or oven only part of the way towards its culmination of futility, the Germans would have gained all that they hoped for in their wildest dreams. They would have rescued German soldiers at the front from the attentions of our aircraft by the happy expedient of frightening British citizens. We have only been picturing what we know is an utter impossibility. The Germans have misread our " psychology " if they think they can induce us to keep aeroplanes at home which ought to he at the front. They are trying to provoke us into playing their game, but we must not play it.
Whatever degree of German power to strike British towns from the air remains wheli our defence has been interpreted' in terms of offence, and our counter-blows have been delivered near the hub, must be endured patiently. After all, there is not much to endure compared with the sufferings of those who hold the tortured and blood-soaked ground on the fighting fronts, and this remains true even when we have deplored' the truly poignant horrors which the Germans have created in some London streets. Air raids cannot be entirely pre- vented. The direction of the flight of machines which rise to 1,500 feet before they start cannot generally be detected. It is largely, we should think, a matter of chance whether they can be reported in time for aeroplanes to climb to the necessary height to be able to engage them before they release their bombs. As every flying man knows, in the rarefied atmosphere above 10,000 feet climbing is a very slow business even for very powerful machines, and it is. only machines with the best " performance," as the current, slang phrase is, that can climb to such heights at all. Hence, we see that what may be called " scattered defence " is madness in aerial fighting as elsewhere. A concentration of strength is the only sound strategical principle. And our concentration must be as near the enemy's lines as possible.' Thus we shall use our strength to the best purpose. And• that strength is continually growing, for the Americans are taking to flying like ducks to water. There is nothing to fear if people here are prepared to bear their irreducible share of the risks of the war without repining and without. the exaggerated expressions of self-pity in which some news- papers have indulged.
Previous page
