14 MARCH 1931, Page 5

Unionists and Liberals rI1HE attack on Mr. Baldwin's leadership, the

1 shrinkage of the Liberal Party and the revolts inside the Labour Party—revolts by the professional Trade Unionists, the Mosleyites and the Independent Labour Party—combine to make the political situation at home as profoundly anxious as it is interesting. Among the historical Party splits we can think_ of none in which the issues were so confused as they are now.

The split which most closely resembled what is happening now in the relations of the two older Parties was that which caused the transference of a considerable part of the 'Liberal Party to the Unionists when Mr. Gladstone introduced Home Rule. In that case, however, the division of opinion was direct and simple. Now there are opposing tides, cross-currents and eddies of every sort. Still, there is a strong possibility of a good many Liberals changing their camp. In his speech at Newton 'Abbot on Friday, March 6th, -Mr. Baldwin made a definite appeal for a National Policy. That can mean nothing except that the present Liberal swing from Free Trade to Protection (as well as the disillusion with the Government of many people who voted for Labour at the last General-Election) encouraged him to make a bid far outside his own Party. It must. be remembered, however, that a National Policy, precisely because it embraces many grades of thought, is necessarily a policy of adjustrqent and compromise. Can Mr. Baldwin compromise on Protection without alienating too many Unionists ? When he originally proposed a National Policy he was a little out of love with Protection and lie offered the Chancellorship of the Exchequer to Mr. McKenna, who, though he may indeed have gone some way towards Protection, was by no means such a Protectionist as would satisfy the present Unionist tests. A new alliance of Liberals with Unionists would certainly cramp Mr. Baldwin's Protectionist style. Although it is true that the neo-Liberals have become Protectionists, they are cautious 'Protectionists.

None the Jess, the conversion of Liberals is very striking. It is a brutal fact that no Party in a democracy can afford to quarrel indefinitely with the voters who may be expected to put it in power. The Liberal Party k just now _in an agony of disappointment ; Mr. Lloyd George supposed that his tactics , of keeping the Labour Government in power by standing on the middle of a see-saw _and. tilting it in favour. of the Government whenever the ,Government seethed to . be in danger and loudly abusing_them. when they seem to be in no danger, would be smiled upon by the great majority of Liberals. lie was, palpably wrong. There has been a revolt against a jugglery. which seemed to his more simple- minded followers a little too clever. If S. good many Liberals should be tempted to come over to Mr. Baldwin's side there ..would= be _in" any case a -.transition stage in fiscal duringwhich the unwillingness of the neo-Liberals • to ro too- -far --wonld not be -a great inconvenience. For, as we all know, the Unionist policy is' an " emergency tariff " to begin with—it would be clapped on immediately the Unionists took office-- which would only gradually be changed into a " scientific tariff." The Liberals who might ally themselves with Mr. Baldwin would mostly desire to call a halt in tariff making when the flat-rate emergency tariff had been achieved. They' would want the tariff for revenue, and in certain cases to stop ruthless dumping, but for no other purposes.

It may be said that Mr. Baldwin could not possibly deal with the Liberals on such terms—that he would have to preach Protection for its own sake and that they would .not stand it. But the point is that the Liberals who are tired of Mr. Lloyd George's tactics and who believe -that circumstances have so changed that some measure of Protection is at last inevitable cannot be choosers. Events have proved to many of them that they must travel 'along the road with the Unioni4s for an appreciable distance. Meanwhile they would retain their right to try to exercise restraint upon any Unionist leader who wished to pursue the journey too far. Mr. Baldwin 'was not perhaps crippling himself nearly so much as some people may have thought when he once again appealed to the Liberalifor it was to them he appealed, though he did not name them—to join him in a National Policy. No doubt he recognizes that the by-election in the St. George's division is critical for him. The issue is his leadership. He cannot afford to ignore such wavering Liberals as are already half prepared to follow him. After all, the total Liberal vote in the country amounted at the last General Election to more than five millions.

The most interesting fiscal proposal put forward for a long time by any Liberal is that of Mr. Maynard Keynes which was published in the New Statesman and Nation last week. This is agitating the whole Liberal Party. It is a call to a decision. Mr. Keynes is for what he calls an expansionist policy—as contrasted with what he calls a contractionist, or restrictionist, policy. He wants to avoid cuts in wages and in the Social Services, but he admits that nothing more can be spent upon anything but productive policies until prices have recovered to the 1929 level. He recognizes that any expansionist policy has certain dangers, and he proposes to provide against these not only by ending the abuses of the " dole " and by postponing further 'expenditure on the Social Services, but by an all-round revenue tariff. He thinks that the original Liberal policy of a huge loan courts too many dangers, and he is satisfied that his own expansionist policy is the safest yet invented. Rebates on the revenue tariff would be allowed for imported materials entering into exports, and raw materials such as wool and cotton would be exempt. He suggests that the- amount' of revenue to be aimed at should be substantial—not less than £50,000,000, and, if possible, 175,000,000. There might, he says, be duties of fifteen per cent. on all manufactured and semi- manufactured goods and duties of five per cent. on all foodstuffs and certain raw materials. He is convinced that the effect of such duties on the cost of living would not be greater than the existing fluctuations between one month and another.

He flatters himself that when the revenue tariff had performed its function it would be possible to remove it. We very much doubt that. Tariffs are amazingly tenacious. All the same, we entirely agree with him that if, as seems to be inevitable, a very large deficit has to be met in the Budget, a revenue tariff is the best solution. Direct taxation is already so high that more of it would strangle several trades and might actually bring in less instead of more money than the Treasury gets now.

- Mr. Baldwin, then, has a distinct opportunity for bringing in new recruits if he can satisfy both his old and new followers that a transition stage lasting forperhaps two or three years must be passed through before he can hope to set up his " scientific tariff."- Another leader— though we do not know who he might be—might be able to convince all non-Socialists that the danger to the nation is so great that there must be sacrifices and accommodations among all -Who -wish to- bring "-their country into - safety.' Can Mr; Baldwin himself do that ? We feel that the revolt inside ' the Unionist Party against his leadership is -caused not so-inueh by his fiscal policy (which is more advanced than Lord Beaverbrook and Lord Rothermere admit) 'as. by -the absence in him of- the personal- art -of 'leadership. Everybody admires him for his sterling character,- his cultivated mind and his love of everything which is noble and of good repute ; but it must 'be admitted that he either does not know how to cast a spell • upon his followers or does not trouble to do it. He is not accessible. He does not often give personal encourage- ment where it is due or try to be a good companion to those younger men who will have', he future of the Unionist Party in their keeping. -- The neo-Liberals are making him a present. If he is a real leader he will descend upon St. George's and with immense powers of persuasion- rope in every Unionist and every wavering Liberal on an agreed policy for the preliminary tariff stage. He would by that means give such a lesson to the- Press -Plutocrats- as they would not forget and would scarcely survive. But we fear that all this is a dream.