THE FRENCH IN TUNIS.
-IT is difficult for Liberals who are heartily friendly to the II French Republic to keep their tempers, in presences of its recent proceedings. The conquest of Tunis will, as we contend, distinctly benefit the world, by fUrther limiting the evil and destructive Turkish dominion, and will not be in- jurious to any civilised Power ; but the method by which the Government of Paris is pursuing that object is simply detest- able, and may be turned into a most dangerous precedent. The duty of the French statesmen, if they deemed the con- quest pf Tunis necessary or desirable, was to say so frankly, to ask Europe for permission to annex, and having obtained it, to offer the Bey the alternatives of quiet submission or open war. Instead of this, they have exaggerated a just pretext for a small expedition into a reason for collecting forces sufficient to conquer half Africa, have used them, without declaring war, to occupy the places within Tenisian territory most valuable to themselves, have marched on Tunis itself without stating a reason, and are now offering the Boy the alternatives of complete vassalage or deposition. While pursuing this crafty plan steadily and energetically, Illey have given to the world, day by day, assurances which their next proceedings have directly contradicted. At first they were only going to chastise the Kroumirs, and then they seized treabarca, an island which the Kroumirs do not hold, but a valuable position, said to be one of the largest deposits of iron in the world. Then they declared that though they must ask certain terms from the Bey, they were entirely his friends; that he had nothing to fear for his independence, and that all the rights of all nations would be scrupulously respected. A few hours after they seized Biserta, a position the neutrality of which, is jealously watched by Italy ; and within a week, they were in full march for the city of Tunis itself. Their assur- ances had restrained the Bey from action, and had paralysed the resistance of the Kroumirs, so that General Briard reached a point within six miles of Tunis without a pitched battle or a serious skirmish, and then the mask was dropped. The Bey was offered an ultimatum, to be accepted within five hours; and a circular was issued from the Foreign Office, explaining, or professing to explain, what this ultimatum. would contain. In that Circular it is admitted that the Bey of Tunis must pass under "the protection of France," and obey her orders as to all matters of finance, justice, legislation, and public works. French agents, native or European, must raise and distribute taxes, make, and therefore control, all inland roads, open, and therefore occupy, all harbours, prevent all insur- reetions, and, in fact, control all administration, the Bey be- coming a mere vassal. France, in short, carries out the annexation she has been pledging herself not to carry out, with this:difference, that while she assumes all power, she does not swept responsibility for good government, does not grant to 'Pone the rights of a French colony, and does not incorporate tile' African State within her own territory. France, while taising all ultimate authority, will only use it, as M. St. Melte almost openly admits in his circular, to secure French bondholders, and to foster French enterprise in harbours, mines, and African explorations, and will leave the Tunisians to be governed as well as the Bey, discredited and rendered powerless, can do it. This is a detestable method of action,—a faithless method, and one which must decrease the confidence felt in France all over the world. It is dictated, we suppose, by a desire to avoid any overt interference from Italy or England, and to facilitate the march of the troops, against whom the Bey might otherwise have raised a religious war ; but it will raise everywhere the impression that the Republic is utterly selfish, that it uses civilisation only as an excuse, and that when any groat gain is in view, especially a great pecuniary grille, its assurances are no longer to be trusted. That is a loss to France, and to the world, for which no addition to the merely material resources of Europe, not even the magnificent project of cutting the Isthmus of Cabes and turning Lae Fitroun into an inland sea—a project said to be fully accepted —will in any degree compensate. The Republic will have fisted as cunningly as the Empire, and with as little real care
for the good of suffering populations, or even for the preven- tion of unnecessary bloodshed. If France intended to seize Tunis, nothing but her cunning prevented her from sending her Fleet to Tunis itself, and so making war impossible by the occupation of the capital.
There is, of course, no chance of active resistance, even from the Bey, for Italy cannot fight alone, and would be mad to join Germany for an invasion, even if that course were not prohibited by the open declaration of the Italian Republicans that they will not break their alliance with the Republican people of France. England, again, has little interest in the matter, and no means of effective action. The people would not endure a breach with France, except for most serious menace to their own interests, and there is no such menace apparent. France cannot enter Egypt via Tunis, and as for her control of the Mediterranean, of which so much is said, it will be as against this country no greater when she reigns in Tunis than it was before. Once in possession of Biserta, and still more of Lake Faroun turned into an inland sea or vast dock, she can, no doubt, at pleasure bar our nearest route to India ; but she can
do it just as easily now from Toulon, Marseilles, and the ports of Corsica. In other words, she can do it when she
pleases, at the cost of a great naval war, in which her chances would be frightfully diminished by the possession of Tunis. England, not France, would in such a war have the assistance of the Italian Fleet ; and if the French Fleet were beaten, a third of her Army and a vast colonial possession would lie at our mercy. Her risk from war with England is almost indefinitely increased. Our resources for invasion re- main just what they were, while France, in taking Tunis, increases the importance of maritime supremacy,—that is, increases the importance of the element on which England can fight best. There is, therefore, no reason of material interest for throwing the world out of gear or stopping its progress, as it would be stopped, by any collision between England and France, or still more, by any threat of war. The language of the Conservative Party upon that subject is the language of irresponsible men, whose theories about the route to India would logically compel England to wage war with the whole world, ex- cept, perhaps, Germany and Sweden. But we think the Foreign Office should declare that the method of attack on Tunis makes England distrustful of her partnership with France in Egypt, and should urge strongly, in the general interest of humanity, that as France claims all power in the Regency, she must assume, also, all responsibility. She ought to be urged to annex, and lus to give the Tunisians the settled and durable civilised government, the order, the equal justice, and the means of enlightenment which are the compensations for loss of independence. As matters stand, France will be able to veto any treaty the Bey may make, or any industrial conces- sion he may grant, or any law he may wish to proclaim, without being able to order him to tolerate converts, or set up schools, or establish Courts which shall regard all Christian evidence as equal to that of Mahommedans. She will, in fact, be able to secure everything except enlightened progress —a monstrous position, which destroys the only solid justifica- tion for her aggression.
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