TOPICS OF THE DAY.
PRINCE BISMARCK'S REVELATIONS.
THE revelations which Prince Bismarck and others are making as to the secret agreement by which Austria acquired Bosnia and the Herzegovina, are of twofold interest to the people of this country. They prove, in the first place, that the House of Hapsburg is still seeking, as it has always sought, its dynastic interest first of all ; that it regards accession of territory as the supreme dynastic interest ; and that con- sequently, so far as Austria is concerned, the Czars can reach Constantinople whenever they are prepared to pay a sufficient price. Up to the very latest moment of the Russo-Turkish War, it was asserted that Germany and Austria could and would prevent the occupation of Constantinople by a Russian army. They clearly could ; for if Austria, with a Russian General at Adrianople, occupied the line of the Danube in force, the Russian army would be left in the air, with a desperate enemy in front, and no means of land communication with its base, while, again, the Austrian and Turkish fleets could stop its escape by sea ; and it was held, for this-and-that national and strategic reason, that they would. Indeed, it was asserted with much reiteration that they did; and England was subjected to much ridicule, especially from Englishmen, for believing that she, with her insignificant Army, had succeeded in arresting the Russian onward march. It is now, however, alleged by Prince Bis- marck, and virtually admitted by the diplomatists of Vienna, that Alexander IL had provided against this contingency, and had purchased at the expense of Turkey the neutrality of Austria. Aware of the growing enthusiasm for war in his own dominions, and resolved, if it were possible, finally to crush Turkey, he in 1876 promised the Emperor Francis Joseph that if he would allow the Russian advance to be unimpeded and unmenaced, he would, in his turn, allow the Austrian absorption of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Austrian Emperor, who was at the time dominated by a desire to recoup his Honae for its great losses in Italy, and was by no means anxious for a great war with Russia, readily accepted the terms, which promised his family a magnificent province, and secured to himself relief from a responsibility which, to a man who had never succeeded in war, seemed heavier even than it was. Whether the agree- ment was reduced to writing, and signed by the two Emperors in a railway-carriage near Reichstadt, as a correspondent of the Times affirms, or, as the Hungarian statesmen will probably assert, was only an understanding never embodied in words, matters little to the historian. The agree- ment was made between the dynasts, and was kept. The Austrians looked on quietly throughout the campaign, and even when General Gourko's desperate march over the Balkans—a march which could not have been attempted without the consent of Vienna—placed Constantinople itself in danger, the Austrian Army was never mobilised. It was, in fact, too late for Austria to interfere, and we see little reason to doubt that if Alexander II. had persevered in his original intention, and entered the " City of the Czars," Austria would have accepted the situation, and have contented herself with claiming, sword in hand, her share of the spoil. Prince Bismarck has never been unwilling that Austria should go South ; England could not have been ready in time ; and whatever the ultimate settlement, the Saltanet in Europe would have fallen for ever. Alexander, however, stopped. According to the Paris correspondent of the Times, who vouches for his statement as " absolutely authentic," the Czar, after issuing the order to storm Constantinople, received intelligence that the British Government would instantly declare war, and revoked his decision, which the Turks had intermediately contrived to intercept. That is possible, and it is more possible still that General Gourko, whose army had suffered frightfully, warned his Imperial master that without reinforcements, entrance into Constanti- nople was an impossibility. At all events, the order to halt was not enforced by Austria, who was contented with her share, and during the subsequent negotiations contrived, with the direct help of Lord Beaconsfield and the general protection of Prince Bismarck, to secure it and a little more. That is to say, she obtained the assent of Europe to the " occupation," and with it what, according to modern practice, is a legal basis for her claim.
That is a profoundly interesting narrative for Englishmen, for it proves that any reliance upon Austria to stop a Russian aggression upon Turkey without definite and written pledges, is worse than futile. All the motives which should induce Austria to atop the Russian march—her concern for the freedom of the Danube, her anxiety for the Southern Slays, her fear of an attack from two sides at once—existed then as strongly as they exist now, and were all overborne by the hope of terri- torial booty. It is said that Turkey is an ally of Austria ; but Turkey was an ally then, and her province was nevertheless accepted as a gift. It is said that the Hungarians are most unwilling either to injure Turkey, or to expand the Empire by more Slav subjects ; but they were equally unwilling then, and the Hapsburgs, with provinces to acquire, risked the results of their indignation. The Emperor went into a grand " transaction " over the heads of his Parliaments, and when it. was once accomplished, there was nothing for the governing minority in Hungary to do, except to accept the facts. They must do the same if their King, under another agreement, advances to Salonica ; and Europe is, therefore, face to face with the fact which we have been repeating for eight years,—that in the Balkans Austria has two possible policies, she can resist Russia or she can share with Russia, and that the Imperial House, which in foreign politics is Austria, inclines to the latter alternative. Ostensibly, of course, it is for the former course ; but when the hour arrives, a Minister may fall as Count Andrassy fell, and for the rest,—the Army will obey its orders.
The second concern of Englishmen in these revelations, is Prince Bismarck's interest in making them. What is he doing it for ? They cannot be pleasant for the Hapsburgs, or for the Hungarian statesmen, or for the House of Romanoff, which, though baffled, no doubt, by circumstances—the main cue being General Gourko's losses—appears in the story to have been partly jockeyed out of the profit of a great war. The Hapsburgs, in fact, gained a province from them, though not, at their expense ; and though Russia gained an equivalent in Austrian neutrality, she never received the price tacitly under- stood. Prince Bismarck is not the man to make revelations an annoying without an adequate object. He is not a mischief- maker, or a man intent on causing newspaper comment, or even a man much interested in securing that history shall be rightly understood. He is a serious statesman, thinking mainly of the present, and profoundly impressed with the danger in which Germany stands, or may stand if France and Russia join hands. He is acting, we may be sure, first of all to pre- vent that, and the real point for discussion is how these revelations can help him in that design. Clearly in one way only. They are intended, as we conceive, to convince the Panslavists who are agitating against Germany that they are on the wrong tack ; that they had much better resume their secular policy, which is to menace Constantinople ; and that if they do, Germany, and therefore Austria, will compromise rather than resist. Austria may be bargained with, and Germany, as her Chancellor keeps ostentatiously repeating, has no interests in the Balkans. In other words, if Russia chooses to spread southwards, and give up all idea of aiding or shielding France, Central Europe will not oppose, will perhaps take that opportunity of carrying out her own plans. The drift of the whole manceuvre is to suggest a bargain to Russia, and to remind the Hapsburgs that they are free, as far as Germany is concerned, to make one at their own discretion. Germans will think this a cynical explanation, and it may be energetically repudiated from Berlin ; but what other is there which fits the facts? The usual one, that Prince Bismarck is trying to soothe the Panslavists by showing that he did not help to aggrandise Austria as against Russia, is worthless, unless he also means that this is still his purpose. The Panslavists are not historical students, but desire to gain certain concrete ends, and the assurance they want is that Germany will not prevent their gaining them. That assurance, as we conceive, the German Chancellor is giving them, though in so curiously indirect yet public a way, as to set all diplomatists aflame with curiosity. Prince Bismarck could not, however, address a despatch to M. Katkoff, and to convince a whole party, perhaps an offer made through a demi-official newspaper is as good a way as any.
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