LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.
SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.
[TO THE EDITOR OF THE "SPECTATOR.']
Bra,—Sir G. Wolseley's ability has always been acknowledged, but there have been those who looked on him with a species of distrust, and who were ready to attribute his successes to luck, or to the brains of his Staff Officers, in the selection of whom he was admitted to show great powers of discrimination. He was known to have written to some extent, was believed to have -written more, and, in what the daily papers' term " military circles," the truth of Don Quixote's saying, " The sword hath never blunted the pen, nor the pen the sword," is not generally allowed. Moreover, he was regarded as the champion of a new, and among officers, unpopular system. He dared to believe in the capabilities of the " boy soldier," and to hint that the causes of our military failures were to be sought in directions other than that of short-service. The brief campaign just ended will, perhaps, convince the doubters. It is easy to make light of the difficulties, to point to the large force and liberal equipment, to depreciate the fighting qualities of the Egyptian troops. But for all that, an incompetent General—and England has pro- duced such—had before him great possibilities of vast expendi- ture, delay, and even disaster. It was on all grounds desirable that the campaign should be " short, sharp, and decisive." Delay meant increased probabilities of political complication, of trouble with Turkey, and of a genuine Arab rising. It was only necessary for Arabi to win a few partial successes, or td show that he could hold English troops in check for a time, and the power of the movement he headed would have been enormously increased.The time of year, too, was unfavourable, and the physical difficulties great. On the whole, therefore, the croakers had something to go upon, so that the very people who a short time ago would have had us light-heartedly declare war with Russia, were ready to hint that in undertaking to put-down a rebellion in Egypt, the Government was embarking on an enter- prise of unknown magnitude and danger. On the other hand, the most sanguine hardly expected success so rapid and so complete.
When the extent of the works at Tel-el -Kebir and the force accumulated there were known, it was generally believed that
here the stand would be made. Arabi or his military advisers did not, however, by any means confine themselves to a pure defensive, and the successive attempts to overwhelm by superior numbers the small force by which it was inevitable that the general advance should be headed, shored boldness and correct military instinct, When, after overcoming the transport difficulties and undergoing some real hardship, our troops were massed at Kassassin, the critical point was reached. The General had to decide whether he would assault the works at once, shell and then assault, or turn them. The decision to be taken was of the utmost moment. In front was a continuous line of earthworks, nearly five miles long, with the right rest- ing on the Canal. It was impossible to make out by recon- naissance what lay behind this line, and the information gleaned from spies or deserters was, probably, very incomplete. The Egyptians had shown more fight than was expected, and the Soudan troops especially might, behind earthworks, prove as formidable as the Turks. There were all the disastrous ex- periences of the Russians to induce over-caution. The attack- ing force was almost wholly composed of the boy soldiers whom it has been the fashion to disparage. It is true that Skobeleff had stormed the Shenovo lines without artil- lery ; but Plevua had then fallen, and the Turks had suffered many great defeats. Moreover, the garrisons were undergoing privations of all kinds ; while Arabi's men, with a canal and a railway in their rear, were well off for supplies. A doctrinaire General would have begun the attack with artillery fire, which would probably have produced DO effect, beyond ensuring the alertness of the garrison. A timid General would, perhaps, have avoided a direct attack, and sought to turn a flank by tedious and difficult movements. In electing for an assault with the bayonet, delivered as a surprise, Sir G. Wolseley showed military genius of a high order. There was the self-reliance which is willing for an adequate result to face a risk, the judgment which forms a perfectly correct idea of the resistance to be met, the confidence in the troops to be employed which induces reciprocal confidence. But much more was needed. It was no slight task to march out a con- siderable force some eight miles over ground destitute of land- marks of any kind, and to steer them by the stars into the exact position from which it was proposed to attack. And delay, or-disorder, brought about by any of the small mistakes so likely, under the circumstances, to occur, meant a heavy sacrifice of life, if not failure. If the Egyptians had organised a proper outpost system, if they had placed obstacles in front of' their trenches, if they had sloped their parapets properly, and merely laid their rifles on them, the losses would have been immensely greater. The impetus of the first rush once broken, successive waves of men might have been thrown against the lineS in vain. But the moment chosen for the rush was exactly right, the distance to be crossed was not excessive, and the storm of lead mostly passed over the heads of our men. Once the ditch was reached, the chance of the Egyptians was gone. Even then, they made as good a stand as could have been expected, and many of the Soudan troops were tilled behind the parapets from which they had not retreated.
There is no true comparison between the lines of Tel-el-Kebir and those of Plevna. The physical difficulties presented by the latter were much greater, while the principle of defence adopted by the Turks in building strong redoubts, supplemented by open trenches, was far superior. The long, continuous line may have seemed to the imaginations of semi-civilised troops to confer greater protection, and may have been adopted for that very reason; but the continuous line proved itself open to the objec- tions which have always been urged against it. When once it was penetrated, the position was lost. There were no fixed rallying-points, no fresh troops left intact behind earth-cover, nothing to restore order and confidence to the defenders. With the same amount of labour, there. is no doubt that a much stronger position might have been created.
It is almost certain that good, modern, coast batteries cannot be successfully attacked in the way our Fleet engaged those of Alexandria ; and it by no means follows, from the experience of Tel-el-Kebir, that, under other conditions, an entrenched posi- tion can be oarried by the bayonet. But the completeness of the results that both Sir Beauchamp Seymour and Sir Garnet Wolseley have obtained, proves the correctness of their judg- ment, and the entire fitness to the circumstances of the measures they adopted.—I am, Sir, &c., C.
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