TOPICS OF THE DAY • T HOUGH M. Delcasses denials that
he is in any way responsible for the revelations of the Main are not as completely satisfactory as could be wished, we do not intend to follow a section of the French Press in regarding them as merely "formal." Yet even if we accept his denial, and assume that these disclosures of what took place at the Cabinet which received his resignation are as much reprobated by him as by the rest of the world, the fact remains that a great indiscretion has been com- mitted, immediately and directly by the Matin, and ultimately by some member of the Cabinet, whether M. Delcass4 or another, who, instead of guarding the secrets which it was his duty to guard, incautiously betrayed them to the world. But though we shall not attempt to decide whether it was or was not M. Delca,sse who originally informed the Matin—the Matin declares that it received its information four months ago, and when M. Delcasse's resignation actually took place— it is impossible not to note that the intention of the revelations was to vindicate the position of the ex- Foreign Minister. While, however, we cannot attempt to apportion the blame till the facts become clearer, it is an obvious duty to condemn the levity with which the disclosures have been made, and to protest against Ministers allowing State secrets to become public pro- perty. It may be that M. Deleassd himself was guilty of no indiscretion, even though the facts are supposed to have been published in his interests ; but one thing is certain, unless the whole story is a fabrication, and that is that some member of the Cabinet must have talked, and talked to those who were not to be trusted. We shall have something to say further on as to the increasing dangers to the world of irresponsible journalism ; but it would be unfair not to join with such a condemnation an even stronger protest against irresponsible statesmen.
Even if the Matte's revelations are true in their general outline, as seems to be almost universally admitted in Paris, they are certainly incorrect in one particular. Whatever else is true, it is not true that the British Government made the ridiculous offer to land an army of a hundred thousand men in Schleswig-Holstein, or disclosed some opera-bouffe plan to seize the Kiel Canal. That is not the way in which great States offer to lend each other aid while peace is still undisturbed. But while, in common with every sane person, we must refuse to credit any such wild talk, it is no doubt true that assurances were given of British friendship, and even of aid if France were wantonly invaded. To stand by France to the last if she were made the victim of an unprovoked attack was no doubt the almost instinctive decision of the British Government, as of the British people. But though this was so, it is equally certain that we did nothing whatever to spur the French on to a quarrel with Germany. Any assurances that were given were given in the way least likely to act as a provocative or to inflame the situation, for the last thing in the world desired by the British Government or British people is a war between Germany and France.
In other words, we are convinced that what happened was something of this kind. Our Government did its best to smooth, and not to inflame, the situation. But while it most scrupulously avoided taking the line of "Don't trouble to pacify the Germans ; we will back you up in any case," it did not pretend, if France were wantonly attacked by Germany because in the last resort she had become our friend, that we should not come to her assistance. No British Government in the circumstances could have created the impression that the danger to France of a sudden attack was nothing to them, for they must have been aware that the British people would never have seen France so assailed without doing all in their power to aid her. No specific offers of aid were made in the case named, because they might have been misinterpreted in France (as apparently M. Jaures would have misinterpreted them) as being incentives to war. But though this is so, the fact remains that we should have aided France with all our strength had she needed that aid, and that we rightly made no effort to conceal that essential fact in the situation. To pretend otherwise because of the violence of the German Press campaign, and in order to soothe ruffled feelings, as is being done, we regret to see, in some quarters, is the greatest possible mistake. In circum- stances like the present the only wise thing is to face the truth, and the truth is that no Government, even if it had wished to do so, could have prevented the British people ranging themselves on the side of France if Germany had sprung upon her last July. So much for the essential error of the Matin, which has foolishly and inaccurately, as well as recklessly, done its best to give the utterly false impression that the British Govern- ment fanned the flame of war, instead of, as is the truth, doing its best to keep the peace. It remains to note, from a wider and more general standpoint, the dangers of irresponsible journalism to which we have alluded above.
Owing to a multitude of causes, one of which is the new muddle between the interests of commerce and the general interests of the State, the journalists have become astonishingly reckless. They find international questions interesting, they suffer themselves to grow interested, they discuss everything with literary verve, and therefore they create about every international dispute an atmosphere in which the smallest flame burns as brightly as an oil-fed furnace. The diplo- matists feel as they read the papers that the nations are watching them, and can hardly, in their new sense of the interest of victory, help losing the moderation and self-restraint which should be the first qualities of diplomacy. Every dispute therefore tends to become a. quarrel. The Ambassadors can hardly bear to be "defeated," and are ready very often to go beyond instruc- tions rather than fail to make the impression which the constituents of the newspapers will approve. If they are small men, they let things " leak " ; if they are big men, they welcome interviewers, who in their turn are jealous of their own reputations for adroitness and wit—in its old sense—and frequently make of what was intended as explanatory comment a "revelation." Prince Billow, for example, cannot have intended in his recent appeals to th...3 public to leave the impression, which he certainly did leave, that his master regards the " isolation " of Germany on any occasion not only as inconvenient, or, it may be, injurious to his States, but as personally affronting to himself. The general effect is that inter- national business is transacted, not in quiet cabinets where an indiscreet utterance can be bowed away or laughed away, but amidst a clamour which sometimes carries the interlocutors off their heads. We all witness the process every day in municipal affairs. The reason- able and astute Municipal Councillor finds the gallery attending to him, reads severe or applausive comments on his speeches, and next time seeks the applause or attempts to explain himself in utterances which are challenges to a battle by the vote. It is said that an English Ambassador once stopped an imminent war by a complaint about his furniture. His opponent had threatened war if a certain thing were done, and the Ambassador, as if in involuntary annoyance, moaned over a useless expenditure. His rival, being quick-witted, recognised that this meant that the threat was accepted, and as he did. not quite mean such a result, he modified his language. There was no war ; but if the words of that interview had been reported in the European Press next morning, nothing could have prevented one.
What is the remedy ? There is no complete remedy, for diplomatists are human, and the business of journalists, as Mr. Delano once said, is publicity ; but if both journalists and diplomatists would feel their responsi- bilities a little more deeply the evil would at least be diminished. The journalists can think for a few minutes whether the " sensation " they will cause is worth the misery they may produce ; and the diplomatists, who are in many ways a corporation, can make "leaking," or interviewing, or any other departure from the policy of strict secrecy such "bad form" that they will be as reluctant to commit it as to be insolent to Sovereigns or impolite to ladies. Journalists should remember also that if the present tendency towards irresponsibility grows, the newspapers will lose their influence. The nations may for a time tolerate revelations that imperil their highest interests, but in the end they will find some means of guarding against evils so great and so patent.
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