" F, A STERNISM " ONCE MORE.
AN article by Sir Frederick Maurice in the Daily OAronide of Thursday plainly expresses a fear that the strategy of Easternism, which events, we should have thought, ought finally to have discredited, is raising its head again. Sir Frerick Maurice does not say whether he has any reason to assume a fresh outburst of official support for Easternism. The record of the Government, of course, makes it possible that such a thing is happening, but on the whole it seems too bad to be true. Indeed, Sir Frederick Maurice quotes the recent words of Lord Milner to the effect that " America's strength, great as it is, can only be relied upon to bring about a decision if it is added to the forces of the European Allies and not substituted for them." These words may fairly be taken to mean that Lord Milner con- templates the concentration of a crushing superiority of force in one area—namely, in Flanders and France. It is sincerely to be hoped that that represents the opinion of the whole of the War Cabinet. It is to be remembered, however, that there is a type of mind which is tempera- mentally impatient, and which simply cannot resist the temptation to play with agreeable fancies about the possi- bility of dodging the main German force and rushing into the German stronghold by some hitherto undiscovered back- door. The Prime Minister's speech in Paris in November of last year was full of such fancies. He spoke of the " impene- trable barrier" which the Germans had set up in the West, of the apparent futility of our continually knocking our heads against it, of the appalling sacrifice of men, of the small amount of ground gained, and of the fuss which news- papers were compelled to make about small captures of men and material in order to keep up our spirits. As a contrast to all that, he described the mighty geographical annexations of Germany, including the annihilating victory over Rumania, and he hinted that he preferred to our costly and disappointing pounding away on the Western Front a scheme described by the American Correspondent of the Times for advancing OA the enemy by way of the Carso and Laibach. No doubt the attractive language in which the Prime Minister always frames his thoughts created doubts in minds as receptive and volatile as his own about the wisdom of our military experts. But one might have thought that what the Germans did in the spring of this year would have convinced everybody that the dull, wearisome, and heavy task in strategy is really the only sound one. The Germans by the mighty offensive which they began in March proved that they at all events had no misconceptions about the nature of victory. The East was already stretched helpless at their feet. Old Russia, Finland, the Baltic Provinces, the Ukraine, Siberia, Rumania, Serbia, were all theirs to exploit or finally to destroy. By the geographical measure they had amassed enormous riches for themselves. If victory meant freedom of passage throughout vast areas instead of the destruction of the armies still opposed to them, Germany might well have drawn a defensive line on her Western Front and proceeded to enjoy the fruits of her great victories. But she knew that nothing of the kind was possible. She knew that till the threats which the Allied Armies still made against her were ended, and till the pressure of British naval power was removed, her victories were empty. Nothing would serve her purpose except that the Allies in Flanders and France should be crushed. She knew that it was hopeless to look for real victory where the enemy is not. However long you may evade the issue, you must at last come to the point, if you wish to win, where you must meet your enemy and over- whelm him. That was the reason for the German offensive, and the strategical lesson which it contains is of course every bit as true for us as it Was for Germany. The Central Powers are fighting inside a circle, and we are fighting outside it. The illusion that we can run round the outside of the circle quicker than the Germans can run round the inside may be set forth in brilliant and seductive language, but it remains an illusion. At the present moment the discovery that the Germans have a considerable number of more or less fortified lines behind the famous Hindenburg line is no doubt the soil in which the fallacy of Easternism is trying once more to sprout. It has sprouted vigorously in an article by the Times "Correspondent on War" published on Wednesday. The correspondent points out that if we are to make a success- ful advance on the Western Front we must force the Meuse line. " Nothing less directly menaces the security of the Fatherland." He then goes on to argue in favour of an offensive in the East. He rules out enterprises based on the Murman Coast and Archangel, and also operations in Siberia, as those "must depend mainly on the Russian people themselves." Finally, he declares in favour of an offensive against Turkey :— " Germany is now on the lines of Russia's historic expansion. We are flanking them from the north ; we are in a position to oppose them in Siberia ; but the main line—the south-east passage, as it has been called—runs between the Black Sea and the Caspian, southwards to Persia, eastwards to Afghanistan and Central Asia. This south-east passage can only be blocked by the overthrow of Turkey. The whole of Germany's Asiatic ambitions, the chief hope (apart from the prospect of economic gains in Russia) that she has of getting anything out of the war, rest on Turkey. Germany must be defeated ultimately in France. But that defeat may be delayed, and against the dangers of that delay we must insure and reinsure ourselves in the East, and above all in Turkoy."
It will be seen that the writer does lip-service to the stratego, of Westernism, but it is nothing more than lip-service. He cannot bring himself to believe in the strategy of Westernism as sufficient in itself. If this kind of advice is followed, victory, in our belief will be indefinitely delayed. Even if the doctrine of the dispersion of force were not contradicted by military history, our present circumstances would prevent us from undertaking efficient distant enterprises. We have not got the ships ; we have not got the material ; we have not got the men for keeping open long lines of communication.
The glorious results of the strategical doctrine to which Sir Douglas Haig has been faithful, and on which Sir William Robertson insisted so long as he was Chief of the Imperial General Staff, are the cause of the fine message of congratula- tion which Sir Douglas Haig was able to address to the British Army this week What a contrast with the desperate Order he issued at the height of the German offensive when our troops were being forced back into the narrow strip of land between the Flanders front and the Channel coast! If the War Cabinet wish to prevent any unnecessary and enervating speculations about the Western strategy for which Sir Douglas Haig stands, they could accomplish simultaneous acts of wisdom and gracefulness by publicly offering their con- gratulations to Sir Douglas Haig. For our part, we could not read Sir Douglas ilaig's moving message without feeling some vicarious humiliation. In that message everybody is thanked—the soldiers are thanked, the industrial army who have made the soldiers' successes possible is thanked. The only person who is not thanked is Sir Douglas Haig. Of course he could not thank himself ; but we trust that not many days will pass before the Government think fit to say what the nation feels.
Previous page
