OBSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC BUSINESS.
LETTER II.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE SPECTATOR.
London, 10th April 1848. SIR—In treating of the subject of these letters, it is difficult to give a full idea of the remedy without entering into details; and in giving details, to keep within due limits, or to avoid the obscurity which usually attends the attempt to be brief. The object of my former letter was to show that the Ministry cannot act with effect without organized aid in the subordinate departments of Government whether general or local; and without an organized Parliament. And although it must be admitted that the organization must originate with the Minister, yet to accomplish these ends, requiring general concurrence, it was felt that the Govern- ment needed the cooperation of the people at large, or at least that they should be so instructed in the ends and machinery of government that they might not by their prejudices or by their indifference interpose an obstruction or deny their aid to measures calculated to secure those ends in a right manner.
I shall not at _present touch upon this point, which involves more particularly the state of our local governments, but confine myself to the organization of Par- liament, and the machinery which the Government possesses or should possess for enabling it to present its measures in a shape to encounter the greater activity and keener scrutiny which would result from the organization of Parliament being more perfect. In the publications referred to in my last letter, the necessity for a further divi- sion of labour in legislative measures was shown by the varied pursuits and occu- pations of many of the most distinguished Members of Parliament; and the means of accomplishing that division with more or less effect was also shown. It was recommended that the House of Commons should be divided into some ten Com- mittees of fifty members each; of which Committees five should provide for the local distribution of matters--England, Scotland, Ireland, Colonies, 1 oreign Affairs; and five should provide for the subject distribution of matters--as Revenue, Ea-
r:tare, Trade, Law, and general mattes; Library, Privileges, &c.: that the and these Committees should ait on alternate days, by which it was calcu- lated that the time of the House would be extended at least fourfold, (a greater increase being precluded by the occasional necessity of two or three Committees meeting in conference on the same measure); that the business would be con- ducted more methodically; that a greater number of Members could share in useful labours, and thus be induced to forbear from seeking distinction in much speaking; while the number of the Committees (fifty) would afford a guarantee for a fair and open discussion, and prevent the chance of good measures being fees_ tested by intrigue and jobbery.
If those General Committees were divided into Special Committees of five, to consider matters of subordinate detail, with power as in the case of the General Committees to communicate with other Special Committees, the fullest provision would be given for deliberation and for controlling legislation. By an arrangement of this nature, Parliament would lose much of its indispo. sition to entertain matters of recognized defect or grievance which are now in-
beriously postponed for years; and the principles upon which such matters should conducted would be soon determined, and assume the vulgar but valuable position of commonplace. Parliamentary inquiries, petitions, bills, returns, sod all such matters, would be as of course assigned to the Committee to which their subject should belong; and if the members and officers of the Committee should not become fall and ready-minded, there would be at least in its li. beery an accessible store of needful information. The important office of Clerk of the Parliaments, which has sunk into a sinecure, if not abolished, should be re- stored and well organized; while the corresponding officers of the Clerk-Assistant of the House of Lords and the Clerk of the House of Commons should be furnished with all needful facilities, and as far as it may be necessary organized also; so that the Crown, the two Houses, and their Committees, should have all available aid. Nor need this be done at once, nor involve extensive arrangements: the better distribution of the business would not only suggest the requisite improve- meats in the arrangements of the two Houses, already much better manned and organized than many public departments are, but it would have the immediate effect of producing a better distribution of business in the official departments, in the higher offices first and gradually in the inferior ones; and thus, by bringing the information in a less crude and undigested state before Parliament, render ad- ditional aid unnecessary.
To enable the Government, however, to cope with the improved arrangements, it must be provided with better and more regular and established means of inquiry, and of preparing the details of legislation. This need not involve one farthing additional expense. And it would, if well managed, get rid of that paralysis, the characteristic of modern statesmanship, which results from the terror dresponsibility, making each Minister feel that he is to be responsible not only for the principle and purpose of his measures, but for every detail how- ever minute, and deterring him from encountering a measure, confessedly neces- sary, till he is master of details as well as principles.
Any improvement in this direction can be realized only by the Minister establishing the distinction between what is administrative and what is ministerial; aided, as above suggested, by better provision for inquiry and for preparing the details of legislation. He should require his ministerial officers upon their responsibility, to suggest the appropriate details, reserving to himself the determination of the principle and policy, and the ultimate decision after open discussion of the fitness of details. This division of duty and responsibility should be recognized by Parliament; and it should be made a point of constitu- tional principle, that as the Sovereign may do nothing without the advice of her Ministers, each Minister as to matters within his province should be advised by his principal subordinates, who should be held responsible for such advice, while the Minister should be at liberty to reject or overrule it. Let us suppose that the Minister is provided with a well-constituted Board of Inquiry; and that a matter of public import—such, for instance, as the amend- ment of the Income-tax—is pressed upon his consideration. He calls upon the officers whose duty-it is'to inquire; to ascertain, with the aid of the principal minis- terial officers of revenue, the present state of the matter generally, what has been done or proposed before or elsewhere, with the objections that have been made, and to collate the whole an that all matters which relate to the same sub- ject, however opposite their character, may be brought together, and also to ascertain all suggestions of remedies and treat them in the same manner, super- adding the pros and cons; suggesting how, if the Minister should adopt any suggestion, it should be carried into effect; and finally their own recommen- dations in its behalf. Let this report—made in a settled form, rejecting sur- plusage, compact and methodical, so as to be at once full and easy of reference— be published, and opportunity be given for its discussion in the press, the Minister all the while standing by and quietly forming his opinion, not only of the abstract and official merits of the various views, but of the policy (in the larger sense) of adopting any and what, and applying them in legit-dation. As a further practical test, let him require the officers charged with the pre- paration of the details of legislation, to collate the present law in the form of an enactment or digest, to realize in the shape of a bill the recommendations of the officers of inquiry, and also to a greater or less extent the alternative measures; pointing out what is impracticable what is difficult, what requires collateral amendment or alteration, and if need be pointing out other and better means. Let the bill so prepared be published and circulated. The Minister will then be placed in a much more creditable position than he is now. Instead of being compromised by imperfect measures, suggested by per- sons practically irresponsible, often ill-informed, or but partially informed upon the subject matter, his measures will usually be comprehensive and complete. There will be fewer objections; for one set of objections will be answered by another, or swallowed up by apt and judicious provisions realizing the objects of both. The obvious result would be, that he would seldomer have to retract or qualify measures about which the public expectations have been raised. And if he should, the responsibility would mainly devolve upon his principal officers; while the public, knowing beforehand all the exigencies and difficulties of the case, would be less disposed to regard it as his duty to perform impossibilities.
Since the restricted discussion of petitions, the Minister needs these special aids in a greater degree; and he needs them the more for that his early training has rarely made him conversant with details, which he is apt to despise from his ignorance of their relation to his purpose. Some weeks ago, you mentioned a plan of preparing legislative measures, which in its main features appears to meet the wants of the case in all its bearings: but, having already reached the limits of the space which you can afford ins on this occasion, 1 must forbear from any further statements of it.* The above arrangements would be attended by these advantages. Parliament would be capable of appreciating measures in detail, and of entertaining them in such manner that the claims of all localities, Imperial, Colonial, Provincial, may be regarded in a fair degree. The work may be so distributed over time, that subjects may not at one period be unduly postponed and at another be unduly precipitated. Every question of public import may make a steady progress, from the incipient statement of a defect or grievance, through inquiry and deliberation, till it reach the state of a law. The law may be so matured as to offer the fewest possible hindrances and difficulties to the people, and to the officers charged with the administration of it whether in the executive offices or in the courts of judi- cature. And as regards those imperfections which are unavoidable, there would be a fair prospect of importing amendments which experience may suggest without disturbing the framework of the law, and without introducing inconsistencies cal- culated to make further occasion to amend it ad infinitum, instead of gradually • See articles entitled " Aida to Correct Lawmaking," In Spectator Math and 2611 February.
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