FRENCH FORTIFICATION SCHEMES.
IF the French are of many minds respecting their internal policy and forms of government, they are practically in agreement on the subject of Fortification. An undoubted majority is clearly determined that the country shall possess such security as can be obtained through the medium of strong places, constructed on the latest principles of offensive-defensive strategy. Reorganisation of the Army proceeds slowly, although the old Intendance is about to disappear, and the new Territorial Auxiliary Army about to arise ; but while political, or perhaps it would be more correct to say social, considerations hamper Army reconstruction, on the more scientific ground of fortification the engineers have it all their own way. The reason is simple. In sanctioning grand schemes of material defence, the Assembly have to vote only money ; in framing an army, they deal with the rights and liberties of constituents. Moreover, the extensive and costly plan of fortifying Paris, which we discussed four months ago, showed that an undue reliance on brute obstacles has got possession of the French mind, and that, so far at least as the capital is concerned, the Engi- neers have triumphed at the expense of sound military principle, common-sense, and the public treasury. The main instrument upon which nations should depend, whether it be their lot to defend themselves from attack or to become the assailants, is the trained, animated, movable, organic entity called an " army." Fortresses and entrenched camps are, or should be, regarded as purely auxiliary, and woe is in store for any people which fails to see that the function of immovable defensive agencies, however indispensable, is purely secondary. Their part in warfare is well defined. They serve to bar important routes, forcing an enemy to waste time and means in capturing or circumventing the obstacle ; they shield arsenals and depots, which are bases of supply ; they command the outlets giving access to extensive tracts of country ; they secure the passages over streams, they lend support to armies great or small, operating between them. If they are few and seated on cardinal points, they are powerful helps ; if they are many, whether well or ill-placed, they are sources of weakness in proportion to the number of troops abstracted from the active army to furnish garrisons more or less stationary. Hence a nation having too few errs less than a nation having too many, and whether few or many, the fact should never be forgotten that the sole effective defence of States having land frontiers is a well-trained, well-led, and adequately numerous Army.
The objections which we offered to the Paris scheme, in April last, do not apply to the plan prepared by the Defence Commission, and recently sanctioned by the Assembly, for the fortification of the Eastern frontier. The projects adopted are large, indeed, but not numerous, and the estimated cost, though great, is only a little in excess of the amount which will be lavishly spent on the metropolis. The Commission has recog- nised the dominant fact, which should have been accepted and acted on before 1873, that under existing conditions the best defensive line is not one resting on Paris as a base, but on Lyons. For neutral territory covers Northern France from Dunkirk to the outworks of Thionville, and again from Basle to Geneva. The open spaces are the frontiers of Germany and Italy. Covered on the north by Belgium and on the south by Switzerland, the French find their principal possible opponent compelled to issue from a comparatively narrow front, lying between Thionville and Belfort, and forced to operate either towards Paris or the Southern Departments. Under such physical conditions, what should be their aim ? Not, as heretofore in every campaign, to risk the defence of France upon the battle- ground between the frontier and the capital, but to establish that defence solidly between the frontier and the southern metropolis. And for this reason,—that so long as a strong and well-commanded army is in the field south of the Moselle, no hostile army will dare to march upon Paris, because its vital communications would be at the mercy of the defenders. And for this further reason, that an invader would be forced to seek, and if possible, bring to action a defensive army, which, until defeated, would imperil the success of every movement and
threaten a formidable counter-stroke. It would matter very little that a hostile force should even push forward between the Seine and Marne, so long as a French army, seated securely about the sources Of the Meuse and Moselle, was ready -to seize any advantage and profit by any error. Whether, in the event of a campaign, political considerations, mainly arising out of the apprehensions of Paris, would permit the Govern- ment to choose the indirect ititlhod, can only be known by actual experiment. We infer, however, that the Commission is of opinion that the defensive system should, and could, be made to turn on the concentration of a really powerful army, not on the classic plains between the Oise and the Seine, but in the more rugged country bounded by the Alps and the Loire. It is an act of wise foresight, and materially improves the chances of France, should she be called upon once more to contend with a Teuton invasion.
The plan adopted includes the formation near the frontier of vast Entrenched Camps,—all the larger fortresses now come under that designation. The principle acted on in constructing these vast places of arms is that of occupying a series of com- manding and supporting heights with detached works. Thus, in order to hold the Meuse valley, the right bank of that river at Verdun will be fortified by building a strong place on the high ground known as the Bois Brule, so that the passage of the stream will be in French hands, and a large circumference about the old fortress and town will be beyond an enemy's reach. In like manner, and on a larger scale, Toul will be converted into a great camp. here forts will arise on both banks of the Moselle, one on Mont St. Michel, a second at Ecrouves, a third at Domgermain, and a fourth at Villey le Sec, each seated on high ground, and having, collectively, a wide influence, imme- diate and remote, over the whole neighbouring region. The position of Frouard lies a few miles to the north, and it becomes more important from the contiguity of Tout At the same time, Nancy, Luneville, and St. Die are to be protected from a coup de main, while Epinal, further south and strate- gically more useful, is to have more serious defences. Through Epinal, the smaller cardinal points on the road to Belfort—St. Loup, Luxeuil, Lure—will be occupied, and thus the fortress on the Moselle will be linked with the really enormous camp which is to dominate the famous Gap between the Jura and the Vosges. Belfort, indeed, will rival in extent and strength the German fortresses on the Rhine. Not satisfied with the works thrown up by Colonel Denfert-Rochereau, the Engineers have drawn lines including Roppe, Salbert, Mont Vaudois, Vezelois, the Rhone and Rhine canal, Mont Bard, and even Pont de Roide and Blamont. Indeed, the scheme embraces all the communications passing through the Gap towards France, creates a formidable obstacle to invasion from Alsace, and provides a ready passage to the Rhine basin in case of need. Due west of Belfort and south of Teul stands the plateau of Langres, the centre and crossing- place of many roads leading to the great river-valleys, and long ago described by German strategists as an admirable site for an entrenched camp or fortified defensive position, " to cover Paris against an army of invasion emerging from the Rhine Valley, or even from the Sarre." Langres is no longer to be neglected. Not merely the plateau on which the town stands is to be fortified, but detached forts will be built at Peigney and Buzon, and on points so far forwards as St. Menge, Dampierre, and Le Cognelot, whilst the erection of a work at Beauchemin is only deferred. Next in importance is Besancon, on the Doubs, the rayon of which will be enlarged so as to ensure protection for the place, and command, on one side, the roads traversing the adjacent valley of the Oignon ; on the other, access to the plateaux of the Jura. South of Langres and west of Besancon, Dijon, Chagny, and Autun will be occupied, because they are seated upon the great roads con- necting the Rhone basin on that side with central France. In the positions we have briefly described, covering every- thing between the Alps and the Upper Loire, a defensive army should find safety, and great facilities for an offensive move- ment at the right moment. But the system sketched out is completed by the attention bestowed on Lyons, justly described in the Commissioners' Report to the Assembly as "en quelque sorte le reduit de la defense de la frontiere de 1'Est." The defences of Lyons will be carried as far as the Mont d'Or, on the right bank of the Saone ; Vallejo north of Sathonay, on the other shore ; Bron, on the side Of Dauphine, will be the centre of a series of works, which will be connected with the Rhone below the city by an entrenched -position near St. Fonds and Feyzin. Thus the triangular space included between Toni, Belfort, and Lyons will at once furnish a means of re-
sistance and a base for offensive movements outside its limits. Before a hostile army can strike at Paris, it must deal with a nearer foe, possessing ample opportunities of manoeuvring amid prepared positions too large for investment. So far as against Germany. Nor is Italy left out of account, for the projected works at Grenoble and Briancon are designed expressly to parry dangers from the Italian kingdeth.. But the main object, as we take it, is the sound one of providing an ample and powerful base of operations on the southern and eastern fronts of the new German frontier, so as to preserve Paris from direct attack, and oblige the adversary to make war under the least favour- able circumstances. It need scarcely be added that the most skilful and redoubtable preparations, consisting of mere brute obstructions, will not avail, unless the army in the field is numer- ous, disciplined, well armed, and directed by able Generals. If Paris insists on attracting to itself the larger force disposable, the advantage which might accrue from the new system of works will be diminished, probably to the vanishing-point ; but if the real defence of France is based on the appropriate and powerful action of an Army south of the Moselle, then, bad generalship apart, neither can Paris be taken nor France subdued. The new fortifications must be regarded solely as means and appliances, and the main reliance of France must be upon a good Army and a great Captain.
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