It is useless to shut our eyes to the possibility
that we may be on the eve of far greater disasters in South Africa. All the native tribes but recently subdued may accept the massacre at
Insaudusana as a signal for insurrection, which might thus cover all our dominions, from the Transvaal almost to Cape Town. In that case, we should have South Africa to reconquer, and should be for a time paralysed for any other effort. It is, however, still more useless to expect an emergency of this kind, which, like a general insurrection in-India, might arise at any time, or be postponed for half-a-century, or never occur at all. States- men cannot act in expectation of earthquakes. The great pro- bability is that the malcontents throughout South Africa, Natal excepted, will wait for further defeats, and so outstay their opportunity ; and the only duty is to be prepared every- where for quick action, should a new calamity occur. It is quite clear that our weak point everywhere—and this is not revealed for the first time—is a sufficiency of light cavalry, organised upon some plan a little less elaborate, costly, and inelastic than the present. Except in India, we are wanting in Cossacks, and the Indian regiments seem unavailable beyond its borders. We want a few regiments which can move quickly over long dis- tances, and enable our commanders, at all events, to know something about an alert enemy's movements. We always break down at the same point, always devise a reform, and never carry it out.
