BISMARCK'S LEGACY.
TO suppose that the greatest of German statesmen saw so far into the future as to come to the con- clusion that a second war between Great Britain and the Transvaal was inevitable, and that such a war would benefit his own country, requires no great effort of imagination. Indeed, to suppose that such a statesman did not come to that conclusion is to suppose that he did not realise the relations of the past and of the future, as regards their respective positions in the world as colonising Powers, between our own and the German nations. Bismarck realised those relations very clearly indeed. He knew his countrymen, and he believed that, not perhaps in his day, but at some future time, Germany would make up her mind to dispute with ourselves the position of the leading nation of the world. If, therefore, England could be involved, in any corner of her great Empire, in a war in which she would, so to speak, burn up a large quantity of her national tissue, such a war would clearly be of benefit to the nation which meant to be her rival, and which could increase in growth and health while watching the preliminary weakening of her future adversary. And such a war would be, as he conceived, a war in South Africa. Whether it occurred to Bismarck that it was possible that England might come out of such a war stronger than when she entered into it is more doubtful. Bismarck knew the ruling passions of the German better than he understood the temper and the fibre of the Englishman.
On this point—Bismarck's belief in the inevitability and advisability of a war between Britain and the Trans- vaal—some rather curious evidence has been brought to light by the Berlin correspondent of the Times. The German " Boer Relief Association " has recently issued an appeal for subscriptions. This movement is described by the Association as "devoid of political colour." Upon the same sheet, however, on which the appeal is printed appears an extract from the Relief Association's journal, Der Burenfreund, the title of which is " Prince Bismarck' and the Boers." Of the statements of fact contained in this article there is to be obtained, we believe, no direct corroboration ; but they are worth attention. It is ex- plicitly alleged that Bismarck on a certain occasion—the date is not mentioned—expressed his belief that " South Africa would one day be the grave of the British Empire, and that England would there bleed to death." The writer of the article proceeds to state the Chancellor's opinion of British foreign policy :—" The individual Englishman is sensible, respectable, and trustworthy : the charge of lying is the gravest that any one can bring against him. English policy, on the other hand, is the reverse of all this ; its prominent characteristic is hypocrisy; it employs all those means which the indi- vidual Englishman detests. The policy of France has been at times not very scrupulous in the selection of its methods. In dealing with weaker foreign races in par- ticular, it has acted as cruelly and as brutally as the English. Deeds of violence and treachery have been perpetrated just as under the English regime. But the incredible measure of hypocrisy and perfidy which has often characterised English policy cannot be brought home to France." The Burenfreund goes on to describe a conver- sation which it alleges took place between Bismarck and Dr. Leyds in February, 1896. In that conversation the ex-Chancellor is said to have denounced England—this, of course, if it happened at all, was just after the Kaiser had sent his famous telegram—and to have expressed his sympathy with the Boers, urging them to prepare for the coming conflict. Now, admitting for the sake of argu- ment that Bismarck was in complete accord with his Emperor on the particular subject of the Jameson Raid, is it probable that he actually used the words attributed to him by the Burenfreund ? It is at least possible that he did. Bismarck never really understood England. He distrusted her, but he did not know enough about her to understand her. His actual personal experience of England and Englishmen was not thoroughgoing enough to make his opinion of us weighty, if it could make it interesting. He took the same view of Englishmen as the average Cockney takes of Germans,—nothing wider or more broad-minded. " Humanity, peace, and liberty— those are alirays their pretexts," Dr. Busch records him as saying of us in April, 1888, " when they cannot by way of ' a change invoke Christianity and the blessings of civilisation to savage and semi-barbarous people." And it is certain, in regard to the particular question of the relations between the Boers and ourselves in the early " eighties," that so long ago • as 1885 he had deter- mined that there was something to be gained for Germany by fostering ill-feeling and misunderstanding between the two nations. He allowed Bucher to send to Busch from the Foreign Office documents relating to ourselves and the Boers, in order that Busch might write articles denouncing us in the Grenzboten. Speculation as to what he would have contrived to get inserted in the Press if he had happened to be the German Chancellor in the opening year of the present Boer War can lead, in the light of history, to but one conclusion.
But Bismarck has left his legacy. Somewhere behind the action of the German Press of to-day there still hovers the spirit which suggests what is false and suppresses what is true, if by any means at any time this nation can be harmed and her rival be'benefited. The Kaiser's brother is about to visit the United States. In the United States there exists a belief that at the time when it was doubtful what course would be taken by Europe in regard to the Spanish-American War, England was the friend of the United States, and that Germany was decidedly not the friend. That belief is strength- ened in the American mind by recollection of the action taken by the German Admiral. in Manila Bay. Clearly it was to the interest of Germany that this belief should be dispelled, if possible at England's cost. The semi-official North German Gazette, therefore, a few days ago published the statement that " Lord Paunc,efote's proposal of April 14th (1898) to send a collective Note to the Government of the United States declaring American intervention unjustifiable is an historical fact." This " historical fact " was explicitly denied by Lord Cranborne in the House of Commons, and shortly after the publica- tion of the North German Gazette's statement, the Imperial Gazette of Berlin published the text of the German Am- bassador's telegram sent on April 14th, 1898, to the German, Foreign Secretary. The " historical fact " dis- appears, and all that is left is the German Ambassador's statement that at a meeting of Ambassadors at Lord Pa,uncefote's house it was proposed that the mem- bers of the diplomatic body should communicate with their own Governments. But the first statement has had its effect. Into the ears of part of the multitude a little more poison has been dropped, and the poison is meant to work. It is to foster that spirit of envy which shall some day be great enough to move the multitude not merely to covet, but to try to take. " Envy," said Bismarck to Busch, "is the national vice of the Germans. They can- not bear to see any one hold a high and leading position for any length of time." It was to foster that envy that Bismarck allowed Busch to write on the side of the Boers against England' seventeen years ago ; and it is to foster that envy that the North. German Gazette is allowed to publish misleading statements about England and Germany to-day.
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