The Position at the Naval Conference
THE American and British naval proposals which have been presented since we wrote about the Conference last week are of great importance, and for the first time have taken away the initiative from the able French delegation. After comparing these proposals one would be inclined to say that a complete Anglo- American agreement could be obtained within a few minutes were it not for the necessity of bringing all the other Powers into any scheme worthy of acceptance.
In this encouraging estimate of the extreme similarity of American and British ideas one reservation, however, must be made. Two days after Mr. Stimson had made known the American scheme it was acknowledged that he had not read out from his memorandum a claim to the right to build a great battleship of the ' Rodney ' type in exchange for the scrapping of four instead of only three smaller battleships. We are not sure how to describe this claim. It may be only provisional ; there may be no idea of pressing it ; it may be regarded by the Americans as having less of au official character than the other proposals. It is a little disturbing, however, for although no one in this country dreams of regarding any American building programme with jealously or suspicion, the real point is that the suggestion of an American ' Rodney ' would upset the calculations about parity in battleships which have stood since the Washington Conference. We 'should not have less hope than before of a solution, but the new difficulty would cause a wholly unforeseen delay.
Now, disregarding for the moment the ' Rodney ' postscript, let us compare the substance of the formal American and British proposals. The American proposal was presented in a hurry on the evening of Thursday, February 6th, because it had become known that there had been a leakage of information, and Mr. Stimson was anxious to forestall criticism based on partial or mis- leading statements. The British memorandum was issued on the following evening. It must not be regarded as an answer to the American proposal. Both had been prepared independently and were the detailed culmination of the principles which had been agreed upon by President Hoover and the Prime Minister.
The Americans propose that the American and British battleships should be brought to parity next year by an appropriate reduction in numbers. The British proposal is that parity should be reached within eighteen months of the ratification of the Treaty produced by the present Conference. The period of eighteen months is intended to allow the minimum of time which is thought necessary for preventing a too abrupt dislocation in employment and so forth. If all went well there would be very little difference between the two proposals. At the Washington Conference 1942 was agreed upon as the year in which battleship parity should be attained, so that the new proposals mean a distinct speeding-up. The parity figure of fifteen battleships requires that Great Britain should scrap five of her older battleships and that the United States should scrap three. The American memor- andum contains nothing about reduction of the tonnage of capital ships, and nothing about reduction in the size of guns. The British scheme, on the other hand, suggests that the maximum tonnage of a battleship should be reduced from 35,000 to 25,000, and that the calibre of guns should be reduced from sixteen inches to twelve inches.
We pass to cruisers. The Americans ask for eighteen 10,000 ton cruisers with 8-inch guns. Great Britain would have only fifteen of these large cruisers, but in compensation for this " fighting " inferiority the United States would give her the advantage of an extra 42,000 tons in the cruiser class to be distributed in smaller cruisers carrying 6-inch guns. Altogether, the American cruiser class would • have a total tonnage of 827,000, and the British cruiser class a total tonnage of 339,000.
It is important to add here that the Americans suggest that " in order to ensure exact equality of opportunity " each country should have " the option of duplicating exactly the cruiser fleet of the other." In other words, the United States would be allowed to reduce the number of her large cruisers from eighteen to fifteen, compensating herself by increasing the number of her smaller cruisers, and Great Britain would have the right to increase her number of large cruisers to eighteen provided that she proportionately reduced her strength in smaller cruisers. This neat proposal ought to stifle the criticism of some Americans that a global advantage is given to Great Britain, and the criticism of some Englishmen that a " fighting " superiority in cruisers is given to -the .United States.
The British memorandum does not actually accept the American proposal that Great Britain should have only fifteen cruisers carrying 8-inch guns ; it merely says that Great Britain needs in all fifty cruisers. If Great Britain were content with the fifteen large cruisers she would have thirty-five smaller cruisers. We are all familiar with the criticism that if seventy cruisers in all were truly the British minimum for safety in 1927 (as was said at the Geneva Conference) it cannot be safe for Great Britain to manage now with only fifty. How have the trade routes of the Empire suddenly become so safe that they require much less patrolling than was necessary in 1927 ? A reasonable answer is that " security " is a very elusive conception with many aspects. We might, of course, make the trade routes " safe " in a material sense by demanding a great many more cruisers, but the result would be that we should really make them less safe because the new challenge to other naval Powers mould create dangers that do not now exist. There are " risks " in whatever direction we look. Whatever solution we choose is merely a choice of risks. To our way of thinking there is no doubt whatever what we ought to decide now. We ought to make certain of removing naval- competition altogether from international politics, and the only possible way of doing this is to agree to such a formula of parity—inevitably artificial—as is proposed by the United States.
As for destroyers and air-craft carriers, the AmeriCans propose equality of tonnage with Great Britain. They would like to cut down submarines " to the lowest figure." The British memorandum suggests that the size of destroyer " leaders " should be restricted to 1,850 tons and that of destroyers to 1,500 tons, the total tonnage of the destroyer class to be in ratio to the total tonnage of submarines whatever that may be. Both sides (although, as appeared at the Conference on Tuesday, they would like to abolish submarines) insist, in any case, upon the necessity of prohibiting the use of submarines for the summary sinking of merchant vessels. And on Tuesday the Conference was favourable to this restriction.
We must return here to the ' Rodney ' proposal. ' The American argument, as reported by the Manchester Guardian, is that as the ' Rodney ' and the 'Nelson,' each with nine 16-inch guns and with a speed of twenty-three knots, are superior to any existing American battleships, real parity in battleships will not be obtained unless the United States is allowed to build a ship of the same type. The Washington formula for reaching battleship parity was, however, very carefully worked out and it contained no mention of the ' Rodney ' and the ' Nelson.' It is well known that there has been resentment in the United States against these ships ever since the Washington Conference, The British answer to this resentment is that Great Britain is inferior in gun-power even now. She has eighteen 16-inch guns against the twenty-four of the United States ; she has 100 15-inch guns against the 124 14-inch guns and the twelve 12-inch guns of the United States. Perhaps the protests by American public men against the proposal of a Rodney ' for the United States are the swell foretelling a storm of opposition.
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