SIR IAN HAMILTON'S DESPATCH.
SIR IAN HAMILTON'S despatch describing the Dardanelles operations from the end of June to October 16th, 1915, will be read and re-read in ages to come as one of the most thrilling military documents in history. It will lead to endless discussions, and in those debates in which students of military history fight battles over again it will be shown how the disappointing combined attempt to cross the peninsula from Anzac and Suvla might have succeeded had this or that been done :— " Had I done that, had I done this,
So might I gain, so might I miss."
Thus the mind posed by a problem, or tormented by a doubt, must always work. Whatever may be the judgment of history, however, we cannot help saying at once that in our opinion Sir Ian Hamilton need not have acquiesced at a terribly vital moment in the conditions produced by the prevalent inertia of corps and divisional commanders at Suvla. Of course, it may be said that as the troops, owing to the alleged faults of those commanders, were not ready to move, it would have been courting disaster to send them forward. But the answer to that is that Sir Ian Hamilton himself pointed out to the commanders that the troops had both food and water and had rested. We cannot escape the conclusion that, though the preparations to move were obviously incomplete, an advance in greater strength than was actually attempted as a matter of urgency could have been carried out if Sir Ian Hamilton had insisted on it. He had left his normal position as Commander-in-Chief to visit Suvla and inquire into the complementary operations there, yet when he recognized that his subordinates were in a condition of lethargy through having lost control of the situation, he to some extent acquiesced in that despair. This of course is only to say that Sir Ian Hamilton did not display the excep- tional power of saving a muddle in a few hours which marks a leader of genius. No one has a right to complain of a man for not being a genius. All that can be fairly said is that if Generals Stopford and Hammersley are rightly blamed, Sir Ian Hamilton himself, as we read his despatch, incurs much of the responsibility he imputes. There was not enough of the spirit of the superior officer in India who, when his subordinate reported to him that a proposed attack upon a hill-fort was impossible, retorted : Impossible, Sir ? Why, I've got the order in my pocket ! " That spirit, illogical in form though it is, is the only one which will retrieve desperate faults. But we must now look into the despatch and reach the Suvla failure in its proper sequence.
In June Sir Ian Hamilton was promised five new divisions as reinforcements, and he set himself to decide between four possible means a attack : (1) To attack with all forces from the point of the peninsula ; (2) to attack on the. Asiatic side of the Straits ; (3) to attempt to seize the neck of the peninsula at Bulair ; (4) to strike towards the Narrows by a surprise landing at Suvla Bay-, in con- junction with a strong attack from Anzac against Sari Bair. As we all know, the fourth plan was chosen. Before this new plan was formed the second battle of Krithia had taken place on May 6th, 7th, 8th. This battle had proved that the British force was not powerful enough to advance, and Sir Ian Hamilton had, consequently, asked for reinfordements on May 10th, and again on May 17th. Hopes had been based at one time on the possibility of help from Russia, but events had dissi- pated them, and it was not, as we have said, till June that reinforcements from home were promised. If only we had had more men to send in those profitless days ! But to return to the attempt to seize Sari Bair in August with the help of the surprise landing further to the north at Suvla. We now see that the proposed seizure of the great mountain of Sari Bair was the main object. The idea was for the Anzacs to push across thence to the Narrows at Maidos, and thus cut off the Turkish army in the south of the peninsula. General Birdwood, however, could not reach the top of Sari Bair, but some of his Gurkhas and, Lancashires advanced high enough up the slopes to see the Straits and the coast of Asia Minor. The narra- tive of this fighting should be read by all. It is a wonderful story of courage and endurance against all kinds of mishaps and disappointments, chief of which was the failure of the Suvla Bay forces to arrive.
As for the Suvla landing, there is no doubt that when it was carried out (on August 6th) it caught the Turks napping. The conduct of the operation fell to Sir Francis Stopford, and in spite of the heat and the want of water he urged his divisional commanders to push on so as not to lose the advantages of the surprise. After an advance on August 7th the divisional commanders, however, believed themselves unable to move further for the present. It was when Sir Ian Hamilton recognized that things were not going well at Suvla that he took the risk of losing his supreme control over the operations towards Sari Bair and at the point of the peninsula, and went to Suvla himself on August 8th. When he urged that even now a concerted attack should be made he "was met by a non possumus. The objections of the morning were no longer valid ; the men were now well rested, watered, and fed. But the divisional commanders disliked the idea of an advance by night, and General Stopford did not care, it seemed, to force their hands." Sir Ian Hamilton then took the responsibility of ordering that at least one brigade, the 32nd, which was admitted by General Hammersley to be more or less concentrated and ready to move, should advance at the earliest possible moment. It did so at four in the morning of the 9th, and though it had to fall back, Sir Ian Hamilton contends that the progress made shows that if the complete division had started, " they would have made good the whole of the heights in front of them." Sir Ian Hamilton sums up the military atmo- sphere at Suvla by saying : "Driving power was required, and even a certain ruthlessness, to brush aside pleas for a respite by tired troops. The one fatal error was inertia. And inertia prevailed." Enough water was at hand ; it was apparently the means of distribution that failed. All this time the strength of the Turks was steadily increas- ing. When the troops were really ready it was too late. On August 15th Major-General de Lisle took over the command of the 9th Corps from General Stopford.
After the Suvla Bay failure Sir Ian Hamilton estimated that the Turks had 110,000 rifles to the Allies' 95,000, as well as all the vantages of ground. The British divisions were then 45,000 under establishment. He informed Lord Kitchener that if these gaps could be filled up and 50,000 men be supplied in addition, it seemed to him a certainty that he could clear a passage for the fleet to Constantinople. These, he learned, could not be sent, for a reason which" prevented me from any further insistence." From that time onwards the supply of men and munitions fell away. There was also much sickness. It was therefore hopeless to try to advance. We appreciate the fact now that after the Suvla Bay fiasco withdrawal from the peninsula was most desirable, if not quite inevitable. The only doubt was whether the _losses incurred by the extra- ordinarily perilous act of withdrawal would not be prohibitive. Sir Ian Hamilton, on these or other grounds, was strongly of opinion that withdrawal was " unthink- able "—his own word. On October 16th he received orders to return to England.
This story of bitter disappointment must not obscure our recognition of the amazing gallantry and cheerfulness with which our troops behaved. There are few such records, and those are to be found mostly in this war. Sir Ian Hamilton in many skilful and vivid passages sets the scene before our eyes. In our criticism of his own part in the Suvla. Bak affair we do not forget that an heroic rallying of a confused army at the last possible moment—indeed when it is perhaps wholly too late—is not one of the arts of leadership to be recommended. It is only a desperate remedy for a desperate need ; and it is only one man in ten thousand who could apply the method with success. The secret of victory lies in the conditions precedent. Napoleon used to say that he was the most pusillanimous man in the world while his plans were in preparation. Was there enough pusillanimity of that proper kind at head- quarters when it was decided to send the 9th Army Corps to Suvla ? The answer to that question must be the last word, whether of praise or blame, upon Sir Ian Hamilton's generalship.
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