15 JULY 1854, Page 14

COLONIAL AND IMPERIAL RELATIONS.

London, 6th July 1854. Sra—I am encouraged by your kind notice of my last letter to make some further observations on Mr. Howe's speech.

His chief objects appear to be-1. to set forth the greatness of the British American Colonies, and the improbability of their long remaining contentedly subordinate and dependent ; and 2. to show that they ought to be "incor- porated" with England.

It appears to me, Sir, that Mr. Howe is more careful to prove, and more successful in proving, the 'first of these propositions than the second. You quote his speech against the views expressed by Lord Ellenborough in favour of separation ; I must say I think it tells quite as strongly the other way. In my last letter I endeavoured to show that " incorporation " is im- possible, and I gather from your comment on that letter that you incline to the same opinion. If the event prove that I am right, Mr. Howe will, I conclude, become a separatist ; for he says plainly, "Either North America must claim consolidation with the realm of England, or she must hoist her own flag."

Now, Sir, this is a serious matter, and deserves attention. Mr. Howe is Prime Minister of the second in population and wealth of our American provinces. His abilities are considerable, his popularity great, and he has proved his loyalty and attachment to England in very trying circumstances. It is surely worth while to consider what he says on this subject.

In Mr. Howe's opinion, then, the British Americans are outgrowing their political position, and are assuming the characteristics as well as the dimen- sions of a nation. Mr. Howe evidently expresres the popular sentiment when he dwells on the painful impression which a sentiment of conscious in- feriority perpetually produces on their minds. They see, he says, that in the eyes of the world they are of no account. Nations not half so great and powerful as they are despise them as "provincials," and they have no voice m questions of international policy, even where their own interests are most deeply concerned. We have been in the habit of saying that in compen- sation for these disadvantages they have our protection. But it is very evi- dent that this language does not satisfy or please them now : the word "protection" grates upon their ears ; they are beginning to think they can protect themselves, as nations weaker than they are have done before now. in short, I see in Mr. Howe '3 speech a decisive proof that the bolder and more thoughtful among the colonists are aspiring to nationality—nationality in connexion with England, if possible, but, at any rate, nationality somehow. On the other hand, the Colonies are loyal; that is, they are really and deeply attached to the Mother-country, and would be very sorry to separate from her. Thus they are acted upon by two conflicting sentiments, each noble and honourable in its way, and which, I greatly fear, the nature of things precludes the possibility of reconciling. But it is evident, also, which of the two has a tendency to become stronger, and which weaker, by time. On the one hand, the Colonies are growing, with almost incredible rapidity, in numbers and strength; and of course their aspirations for the complete freedom and independence which constitute nationality will grow eorrespond- ingly. On the other, the sentiment of loyalty to England is exposed to perpetual checks and trials, from the very nature of the relation, with its undefined rights and duties. For example, if Lord Derby were in office again, I spinet at all sure that he would not attempt to prosecute what he calls England's " miasion" to establish literally her own constitution in the Colonies, whether they liked it or not. At any rate, he would be pretty sure to insult and annoy them sufficiently to effect, in a very short time, a considerable change in their sentiments of "loyalty." Again, cases of bona fide conflicting interests can hardly fail to arise : for example, we might get into a war with the United States about some matter with which the Colonies were not con- cerned : in such a case, nevertheless, their hearths and homes would pro- bably be the seat of war, or, at any rate, their interests would be vitally effected. Or they may get into quarrels, and if we refuse to get them out they will be desperately offended. On the whole, I cannot help feeling that the tie of sentiment, strong as it is at this moment, is essentially precarious. When I look back at the period preceding the war of American Independence, I see that loyalty was, to all outward appearance, as much the prevalent feeling among colonists then as it is now ; yet it passed away under the influence of misgovern- ment, like a dream; and so it would be again under similar circumstances. I have striven against this conviction ; I have endeavoured to believe that the national subordination of a colony to its metropolis might continue to exist for an indefinite time, provided the latter conceded local self-govern- ment. But the more I think on the subject, the more I am convinced that I have been wrong, and that the colonial relation cannot be looked upon as permanent, or in any other light that as a training for independence. The Greeks, Sir, took a different view of colonial relations from that which modern nations have taken. They considered that the business of a colo- nizing country was to found, not to govern. From the very day on which the band of emigrants left their native shores, they possessed not merely complete autonomy, but every other attribute of a nation. It does not ap- pear that the feeling which prevailed between the metropolis and the colony was the less cordial and affectionate from their political independence. Rather the more, perhaps. Corinth held herself, under ordinary circum- stances, morally bound to succour Syracuse against the Carthaginians, and Athens Ionia against the Persians, as we should to succour Canada against the Yankees. The colony, too, possessing a national organization of its own, was able to return the obligation. There was, in fact, as a general rule, a perpetual offensive and defensive alliance between them, supported, not by formal stipulations, but by mutual affection, habitual intercourse, commu- nity of race, language, historical traditions, and religious rites. It appears to me that this was a better political arrangement than that which has pre- vailed in later times. But it does not follow that we can return to it. I am quite ready to admit that our colonists, having gone out on the understanding that they were to remain formally "part of the empire," have a right to the fulfilment of it ; and I think, if this country were ever .so base as to cast them off against their will, because they were a burden to her, she would deserve the "decline and fall" which her cowardice would prognosticate. But it is a very different thing to hold theca by force, if they wish to go. This, I trust, the British people will never attempt to do. I do not think there is anything disgraceful in letting it be clearly understood that we have no interest in this matter separate from theirs, and that what- ever is best for them we shall be ready to promote. It is just possible that our commercial intercourse with them might be to a certain extent diminished by their independence ; it is possible also (though very improbable) that they might annex themselves to a foreign nation, and contribute to the aggrandizement of a rival power. A more probable evil would be the dis- couragement of colonization among those who while changing their country shrink from the idea of changing their nationality, and wish to remain Englishmen still. But, after giving due weight to these objections, I am sure the attempt to retain a colony in unwilling subjection would involve far greater evils ; not the least of which would be the sup- pression or distortion of those natural and honourable aspirations for nationality of which Mr. Howe's speech is a sign, and which the noblest and most gifted among the colonists will feel the most keenly. But the strongest argument against such an attempt, after all, is its hopelessness. A nation of three millions of Englishmen is really master of its own des- tinies. If our dominion over British America were materially a source of strength not of weakness, a privilege and not a burden, it would still be foolish to engage in a contest of which the issue, sooner or later, could not possibly be other than defeat.

Whenever, therefore, the colonists shall, with anything like unanimity, demand independence, we should give it them at once, even joyfully, and without one arriere-pensee of ill-feeling or regret. And, keeping constantly before our minds that this demand must come, we should in all ways en- deavour to prepare for it ; so that when our children set up house for them- selves, they may have no reason to complain of the education which their parents gave them. With this view, in the first place we should concede to or rather impose upon our Colonies, the most complete freedom of internal self-government. Upon this point it is not necessary to enlarge, as most British statesmen admit the theory, though their practice is often lamentably ; inconsistent with it.

But besides this, we should promote the military organization and mar- tial spirit which are the natural accompaniment and the best safeguard of freedom. By assuming not only the military defence, but to a great extent the police duty of our colonies, we have systematically made them helpless and effeminate, and have thereby incapacitated them from protecting them- selves and from assisting us. When British America has an army and navy proportioned to its population and resources, it will, I hope, be equivalent to a corresponding augmentation of Our. own forces. If the colonial policy of Corinth had been the same as ours, there would have been no Syracussa triremes at JEgos-Potamos. • Again, still keeping the same end in view, we are bound, I think, to call out and exercise the higher qualities of statesmanship in our colonists by every means in our power. Why should they not ever be employed in the diplomatic service, or in-India, or as governors of colonies ? If we wished to make them discontented with their present position, and yet unfit for a higher one, we could adopt no other course. It is by systematically training the colonists to manage their own affairs, bear their own burdens, and defend their own rights, that while we prepare for the inevitable severance of the colonial relation, we shall also postpone it until it be clearly desirable, and prevent, as far as possible, the risks by which it must be accompanied. On the other hand, those who would act on the assumption that British dominion over colonies is a right to be main- tained by force, that colonists are destined to remain permanently subordi- nate, and that their affairs are to be managed according to our notions of what is right, and not their own,—such politicians, I say, are separatists of the worst kind. If they had their way, not only would the colonial con- nexion be shortlived indeed, but its severance would inevitably lay the

foundation of civil anarchy and international hostility. J.