15 JULY 1960, Page 4

Unlucky Congo

By ANTHONY HARTLEY RATHER than apportion blame for the anarchy into which it has fallen, it is better to say that the Congo has been unlucky. Unlucky in having suffered a colonial administration which deliberately neglected the formation of an African elite. Unlucky in having M. Lumumba, whose combination of fiery speech and ineffica- cious action has hardly been what the situation required, as head of the Mouvement National Congolais and its first Prime Minister. Unlucky in having General Janssens, whose lack of tact seems to have antagonised the Congolese politi- cians with whom he was intended to co-operate, as commander of the mutinous Force Publique. (The General, incidentally, seems to be building himself up into a Belgian Massu; his first action on returning to Brussels was to go to the statue of Leopold II in the Place du Trone, salute and announce, 'Sire, its votes Pont cochonne !'—a demonstration of opinion about the Congo which has understandably upset Belgian parliamentary politicians.) Whether or not the Congo gets itself out of its chaos with the aid of United Nations forces or whether it becomes the scene of bloody inter- tribal• warfare remains to be seen. But develop- ments there have given a nasty shock to thinking on African problems, and, if it is difficult to suggest what to do in the Congo, I think it is worth while asking what to avoid elsewhere.

For the Congo should remind us of the im- portance in such circumstances of an African Cure trained in administration and politically mature. No method has so far been evolved for dealing with territories where such an elite does not exist, and, in particular, no problem of Afri- can indepoidence has yet been solved in a terri- tory where there are white settlers (the possible exception to this is Tanganyika, but the white population there is only 25,000). In other words, in the formation of the new African States the worst (or the most ticklish) is yet to come, and the Congo is, patently a territory where a thorough mess has been made of what should have been a carefully worked-out transition.

There are two common reactions to the realisa- tion of these facts, both of which are wrong. One is simply to say, 'Dr. Verwoerd was right,' and that hardly needs any refutation from any sane man who reads the papers. Whatever Dr. Ver- woerd or anyone else says, the days of European administration in Africa are over. There will be new African States. What has to be considered is getting them into existence with the least possible bloodshed and disorganisation, and also, if 1"39' sible, to prevent Africa becoming a more comPlgS Balkans. The other reaction is to take the view that AO can nationalists are right on every issue and Ihgl, European communities in Kenya or Rhodes°. have no claim to any .sort of protection of their interests. If Mr. Macleod and his advisers were to take this attitude, then they might be faced hY some kind of desperate reaction on the part IIf numerous white communities who arc not not for their respect for legality—a reaction which II would be difficult to call on British troops g° suppress. The Congo has shown in a striking manner th difficulties inherent in the idea of a multi-racial community where relations have previously been bad and where the whites have had all the eor nomic advantages. No doubt, multi-racial en'ir munities are possible-,in Brazil, for instance' but the situation is very different where the estafr lishment of such a system means in effet., transfer of power from white overlords to. MIT can nationalists embittered by past acts of °P' pression and legitimately determined to less° the economic differential between the races 13/, such measures as expropriation of land. It world be asking too much of human nature to expect any such system to work, and the Congo has shown how it can collapse. Does anyone serf' ously think that all the white settlers in Kenjs will be able to remain there after the countrY becomes an independent African State, whate■eg, built-in constitutional 'safeguards there may be' But, if this is the case, would it not be better for the British Government to acknowledge the fact that the multi-racial solution is impossible and simply buy the white settlers out? .1 he operation is by no means impossible financially. There are some 58,000 whites in the territory. by no means all of whom arc settlers. To buy then property and assist them in some sort of resettle• ment elsewhere would cost a good deal of mono'. but there is as good a case for spending money on removing an insoluble political problem from a new African State as there is for granting economic aid after the State is established—pk to mention the fact that lands so acquired and turned over to the new Government would be very substantial economic aid. In a territory like Kenya the disappearance of the white settler as the dominant partner is inevitable. It is simply a question of whether that disappearance 15 effected under good conditions or accompanied by political bitterness and possibly social strife.. At the moment the multi-racial concept 15 being used in Southern Rhodesia as a cover log continued domination of white over black and in Kenya as a substitute for any real solution of the problem of what to do about the white settlers. One of the lessons of events in the Cong° would seem to be that this camouflage cannot continue. Another lesson, of course, is the impor- tance of a properly worked-out plan, by which independence comes into being in phases. The model here is Nigeria, and the Congo would have been better off for a year or so during which the Provinces exercised autonomy pending the foun- dation of a federal government. That is past Praying for now, but it is possible to draw the moral from this catastrophe. For it is increasingly with really difficult problems that Britain will have to cope in granting to Black Africa the independence which it so, much desires. Unfortu- nately there is also Sir Roy Welensky, and it does not seem likely that his conclusions from recent events will be particularly useful to the cause of a peaceful transfer of power in Africa.