15 JUNE 1962, Page 14

A Block to Aggression

It is not only the Yugoslays' economic heresies, of course, which have made Titoist Communism so unacceptable to the Soviet and Chinese blocs. They are signs of a more general, and highly unwelcome, independence of mind. And that independence of mind both reflects and motivates Yugoslav political independence. Tito's reluctance to do anything to bring down the Bulgarian or Hungarian—or even apparently the Albanian —regimes, for fear the result would be non- Communist, sometimes gives an impression of basic rapprochement with Moscow. But con- siderations of power in fact forbid this—unless and until the Russians relax their system and their ideology to an extent which would anyhow create a new situation for all of us. Meanwhile, the Yugoslays have faced the Soviet threat, since 1948, from a position of particular danger. Flying from Skopje at quite a low altitude one can still see, like millstones, the Albanian and Bulgarian mountains on either side. Nor has the threat been purely a psycho- logical one. As Mr. Zilliacus has told us, Rakosi was actively considering making war on Yugo- slavia.

Of course, Yugoslavia's freedom depended in Stalin's time, and still depends, on the existence of the West, and Yugoslav leaders are quite acute enough to understand this. If it were not for fear that it might involve him in general war, the Khrushchev who struck down Hungary would have no qualms about doing the same to Yugoslavia. The `Shangri-La,' cruising off the Piraeus or by Prinkipo, defends Yugoslavia as much as it does the Eastern bulwarks of NATO.

The Yugoslays know that there is no military threat to them from the countries of the West. Belgrade looks north from its fortress-headland in the direction from which the Nazi tanks came in 1941, and where, just a hundred miles away, Soviet tanks were shooting down the local Com- munists only six years ago. Ideology is one thing: survival is another. It is most unlikely that the Khrushchevite cycle of threats and blandishments would ever lead to any real relaxa- tion of Tito's guard. Infuriating, and politically unsatisfactory, as Yugoslavia is, it remains inde- pendent, strong and alert—a solid obstacle to Soviet expansionism, informally completing and complementing the defence line of peace that runs on through Salonika to Kars and Ardahan.