GREAT BRITAIN IN TURKEY AND EGYPT.
IT is almost impossible to exaggerate the absurdity of the position in which the Ministry now stand towards Turkey, or the danger of the position in which they stand towards Egypt. They have concluded a Treaty with all Europe, under which they are bound to do things, such as restore the Balkans to Turkey and keep the Bulgarias separate, which no other Power cares seriously about, which their own people would not allow them to do alone, and which the people affected insist shall not be done. That is to say, they are bound in the interest of Turkey to lend English soldiers to the Sultan to put down a perfectly justifiable insurrection, caused entirely by their own act in severing the Bulgarias after they had been united by the Treaty of San Stefano. They have also concluded a Convention with Turkey under which they have bound themselves to defend Asia Minor, if the Government of Turkey introduces certain " reforms " which that Govern- ment does not wish for, and will not begin unless very heavily bribed, alleging that as reforms are costly, England, if she wishes for reforms, must defray the cost. That is to say, the British Government is asked to supply a huge grant—nomin. ally a loan, but really a gift—in order that Turkey may place itself in a position to demand of Great Britain, at any moment, the fulfilment of an obligation no onerous that, unless circum- stances were very propitious, it could not be fulfilled. Un- willing, or rather unable, to grant the loan, the Government casts about for other means of affording relief, and is attracted towards a plan by which Turkey, out of her own resources, is to raise the money. If the widows and clergymen, and other small investors, would only trust Turkey once more ! The Sultan is to pledge his Customs' revenue, and France and England are to find Commissioners of Customs, to prevent duties pledged to the creditors being stolen by Pashas. So eagerly has this plan been discussed, that a preposterous re- port that Mr. Goschen had been selected to carry it out was for some hours believed in Parliament,but there is a preliminary difficulty in the way. The Government knows quite well that its dear friend Turkey is utterly untrustworthy, that the loan would be absorbed by the Palace and the Pashas, without the slightest improvement to the country, and will not tempt its subjects to trust the Seraglio with one penny, unless the control of financial affairs passes into European hands. The Sultan is naturally very unwilling it should so pass, as a European Commissioner might not see that the object for which government exists in Turkey is to find money for the Palace and the Pashas ; and he con- sequently declines, even at the risk, as is now loudly whispered, of a military insurrection. The caimes cannot be retired, the soldiers cannot be paid, the soldiers will not starve, and so the dynasty of Othman is to pass, and Osman Pasha to become Sultan,—that is the latest story. Everything is at a deadlock, and the friends of Turkey are growing urgent, de- claring that if the patient is not to die, he must have nourish- ing diet ; that if the organisation at Constantinople is not to perish, it must have a loan from somebody,—and that at once.
Just consider the position which is thus revealed. The Ministry have for years past kept the world in turmoil, and English commerce in apprehension, and the Christians of the East in misery, by their declared resolve to protect Turkey not only against Russia, but against the Christian majority of the population. They have declared the Turkish Government an excellent one, if only it had fair-play. They have pronounced the Sultan a Prince of great abilities and excellent intentions. They have been ready to spend British lives in the defence of Turkish Pashas, and have expended quantities of British treasure. Yet all this while they have been thoroughly aware that the Turkish Government was irredeemable, so irredeem- able, that even if bribed to commence reform the task could not be confided to its hands, and the only condition on which money could be trusted to the Turk is that he should be super- seded in its control by the European. In order to prove his competence to govern, the Turk must abstain utterly from the work of government. So corrupt is he in Tory belief, that if revenue is to be raised, Europeans must be collectors ; if the police is to be made efficient, Europeans must be made officers of gendarmerie ; if the judiciary is to be pure, Europeans must be Judges ; if finance is to be wisely conducted, a European must be Financial Minister. The Turk is so bad, that con- trolling, advising, or urging him is useless. He must be sent away, and then the work of regenerating him can be com- menced. This excellent person, according to his English friends, is so evil, that his word cannot be trusted in the least, —that if he is helped with money he will steal it, that if left to manage his own people he will oppress them, that if entrusted with his own affairs he will bring them to ruin, and consequently, he is to be backed up with British lives and money against the world. There is so little strength in the Empire, that it cannot live without a loan. There is so much hatred for it among its own subjects, that it cannot live without support. There is so little honesty in it, that it cannot be trusted with a loan. There is so much pride in it, that support is, except on its own terms, contumeliously rejected. Yet this Empire, which the Govern- ment almost openly pronounces insolvent, dishonest, and un- trustworthy, is to be backed up as we have never yet backed any civilised State, is to be allowed to oppress its subjects as it pleases, and is even to re-enter a province which had thrown off its fatal domination. If the Government believe as they say, that Turkey desires reforms, and is only checked by a moment- ary want of supplies, why do they not find the supplies, with- out conditioning for the supersession of all Turks ? Simply because they do not believe their own words, and know per- fectly well that if they send money to Turkey, they will neither get it back, nor receive its interest, nor obtain reforms. Why should they ? The Khalifate does not exist in order that a pack of Giaours should have everything they want. In Egypt, in spite of Sir Stafford Northcote's smooth sayings, the Ministry are in a much more dangerous position. They have so placed themselves, that if the Khedive defies them, or removes the European Commissioners, or does not pay the French finan- ciers who hold almost all the Floating Debt, they cannot object to allow the French Government to coerce him. They have admitted the principle of coercion for the benefit of Bond- holders, and if no other method will do, they must allow the French to employ force. Yet if they allow them, France will rule in Egypt,—will, in fact, have in her pocket the key of our Indian house. Yet how stop her, except by a threat which might mean war, and would certainly mean a rupture fatal to all co-operation in Eastern Europe ? The alternative is to join France ; but a joint expedition to the Valley of the Nile would not only be a very expensive, but a very dangerous enter- prise. If the two countries govern Egypt together, jealousies will soon paralyse the administration, even if they do not produce, as they would produce, embittered disputes between the two Cabinets. If, on the other hand, the Powers select a European Khedive, they must support him, for the Mussulmans will not obey him willingly, and will be backed by all the remaining power of Constantinople, where the course of submission to Russia always remains open. Or if they choose a Khedive who would be obeyed, like Halim Pasha, they would be just as ill off as with Ismail, for Halim would not consent to be governed by European clerks, or pay away his whole revenue for Bondholders who never even gave Egypt the money they pretended to give. Why should he ? The throne of Egypt is a pleasant one, if its possessor has authority, and revenue,, and respect ; but the Khediveship on condition of pupilage under two European clerks, both intent on objects other than the Khedive's comfort, with no army, no spare revenue, and the loathing contempt of every Mussulraan subject, is no ob- ject of desire. There are no other alternatives, and the worst, the joint occupation of Egypt, is almost inevitable, for the bond- holders cannot be paid, and the Khedive is evidently determined not to be a nonentity in his own dominions. And the Govern- ment in this case has not even the excuse, which it pleads as regards Constantinople, that it could not help itself. There was no objection whatever to the bankruptcy of Egypt, which would be the worst thing that could happen. The Govern- ment, though a radically bad one, would have been much the better for inability to borrow and the absence of any external obligation to rob the Fellaheen, and might even have been decently lenient. The Bondholders would have suffered, but what is that to the Government ? Have they declared war on Spain, or sent a fleet to Callao, or urged an expedition to the City of Mexico ? Their interest is that Egypt should either be independent or British, and the result of their policy will be, and that quickly, that it will be either ruined, or French, or the occasion of a furious quarrel between the two Governments whose disunion is fatal to the West.
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