LORD HARTINGTON ON THE SOUDAN.
AVE wonder how many of the British people realise the amazing character of the drama now playing on the Red Sea, the bewildering way in which, with a small squadron of second-class vessels and a handful of soldiers, they are making history, the romantic character of the problems which every day present themselves to Downing Street for settle-
ment The struggle with the Mandi's agent by itself probably involves the immediate fats of Arabia, and possibly- that of Islam ; the English occupation of the •Western littoral of the Red Sea certainly involves that of Eastern Africa ; while the struggle to get out of the Soudan without more- massacres compels a knot of quiet English gentlemen in Downing Street to play a part usually played only by mighty conquerors,—to distribute kingdoms, to found dynasties, and, it may well be, to commence new epochs. Since that little knot of Greek Generals who followed Alexander to the grave held their Cabinet Council, and, as they must have done, distributed the Eastern world, nothing has occurred more enticing to the imagination than the Cabinet Council in London which settled that Great Britain, by herself or her dependants, must hold the Red -Sea littoral, lest other Powers, civilised or uncivilised, should hold it ; that the Euro- pean agents now governing Darfour, the Equatorial Provinces,. Bahr-el-Ghazel, and Khartoum might, in the name of the Khe- dive, govern them without Egyptian control ; and that England must stop in Egypt till a Government had arisen there stable enough not only to govern, but to assure European interests. All that was announced in Lord Hartington's speech of Monday. The Minister for War did not, as the Tory papers say, announce a policy differing from that of Mr. Gladstone ; but he defined fea- tures in it which before were undefined, and added details which extend the area of its range very widely. He said, as plainly as a Minister ever speaks, that England must hold the Western littoral of the Red Sea, because she could not restore it to barbarism, and for her " own interests " could not admit any other civilised Power there. That utterance could not have been made by a man in Lord Hartington's position, except as the utterance of a Government ; and it makes Great Britain supreme down a coast-line of nearly a thousand miles, stretching from Suez to Massowah, where last year we had not a ship or a station. Henceforward, whatever is exported from Eastern Africa, or is imported into it, will be protected on the shore by the British flag, or the flag of a dependent ally. All along that lengthy coast will rise little trading stations —soon to be prosperous towns—trading busily with Arabia, with India, with Europe, and, in all, the English will be at home. To those stations will flock not only traders, but every man in the interior who needs asylum, and from them will stream westwards into all Soudanese States adventurers of all colours and nations intent on gain, and intent also on breaking up for gain the loneliness and in- accessibility of Eastern Africa. A more important announce- ment for the future of a continent was never made in terms more simple. We do not hesitate to say that it trebles British influence along that coast, and ultimately in Arabia, and will excite both in the Mussulman and the European worlds more attention than any other part of our action in Egypt. To-day, however, we are occupied with what seems to us the romance of the situation, the astounding development of European and English influence which the Government, in its own despite, has been compelled to sanction. When Lord Napier in 1868 re-embarked from Zoula with the force which had just crushed King Theodore, without claiming an acre of land or a cowry of tribute, who would have dreamed of this? Who, indeed, ever before saw a Government dragged to empire by the hair of its head We are not certain that the next announcement was more important, but it was even more striking to the imagination. Apart from the general question of the Soudan, the special question of the great territory hitherto ruled from Khartoum has greatly perplexed the Government. There is no native Power extant in Khartoum and its dependencies to which the Govern- ment in the first instance can be transferred. There is no relic there of any ancient dynasty, while the local notables could not maintain themselves against insurrection or against the Mandi for a week. A government must be created from the ground, and in despair of any other solution, General Gordon has proposed to appoint Zebehr Pasha Emir of Khar- toum. He could maintain himself, by his influence with the half-caste tribes, and no other Soudanee noble could. There is, however, an objection. General Gordon has still to explain his reasons for a suggestion so astonishing, that of itself it sug- gests that he must know facts unknown in London ; but failing his despatch the proposal is rejected, alike by the people and the " Government of Great Britain. The people cannot bear the notion of turning the greatest and most callous slave-dealer in Africa into a recognised king, and the Government do not see how any sufficient " guarantees " can be taken from him, or why, as an independent Emir, he should remain friendly to Egypt. The man, remember, is not only to reign, and gather an army if he pleases, but to possess the most important point on the whole Nile, so that he could tax or stop all direct trade between Egypt and the upper portions of the Valley, or even, when Europe was occupied, try his fortune in a descent on Cairo. It is too rash an experiment, and the Government, rather than make it, will, Lord Hartington says, allow General Gordon to continue ruling in Khartoum. They do not see why he should not rule there without Egypt, or why Lupton Bey, the Englishman who is just now legal Governor in Bahr- el-Ghazel, or Emin Bey, the Christian who governs the Equatorial Provinces, or Slaten Bey, who holds Darfour, should not continue ruling without Egyptian help. As the British Government explicitly refuse to undertake the govern- ment of the Soudan beyond the coast, this must mean that if General Gordon, and Mr. Lupton, and Slaten Bey, and Emin Bey like to go on ruling as independent potentates, Great Britain will have no objection, will recognise them, will by-and-by accept them as allies. That is a new and singularly romantic idea, but it is not, therefore, to be summarily condemned. It is quite certain that it would be better for Europe and the world that civilised Emirs should rule in the Soudan, than that slave- dealers or Pashas should rule. And it is equally certain that it is better for the inhabitants of the Soudan to be so ruled, than that they should be handed over to men who recognise in kid- napping human beings the most available and productive source of revenue. The best thing that could happen to any African State would be to accept a dynasty distinctly better, and abler, and more far-seeing than the population, and that is what this apparently dreamy project would involve. The single question, therefore, is whether the idea is practicable ; and we should say in answer that it is, if the Mandi's power is broken by his lieutenants' defeat, or if he agrees to sink into an Emir of Kordofan, but that if he keeps on attacking, it is not. In each case there is evidence that mere insurrection is not the danger to be feared. Emin Bey and Lupton Bey, as a matter of fact, have raised armies for themselves by emancipating slaves and drilling them, and those slaves are not likely to rebel for the benefit of their oppressors. Neither of these gentlemen has had, as Lord Hartington says, any effective assistance from Egypt; nor do they need any, Lupton Bey distinctly declaring in his last letters home that his emancipated slaves will and do fight and defeat the furious followers of the Mandi, in spite of their fanatic courage ; and that his difficulty is not his men's fidelity, but his losses in battle. General Gordon can do the same, as he did before, and the three would doubtless in a very short time be in very effective alliance, and hold their own with tolerable ease, with no further British help than a liberal supply of needed weapons at cost price, and liberty to officers on half-pay to join them in the interior. They would, of course, maintain a rude order, and under that order the ports of the littoral would be full of commerce, and rapidly grow rich. If they failed, it would be through defeat, and the victor would be the natural successor ; and if they won, the whole problem would be solved, and new and trustworthy dynasties of European blood and European culture would be dotted over Eastern Africa, holding the Nile from Egypt Proper to the Equatorial Lakes. Such a scheme reads almost too dreamy to discuss, and yet it might be realised, if only the Mandi is discredited by defeat, or by the silent renunciation of his spiritual claim. But then—and this is the weak point as yet of the scheme— can we, if we occupy Egypt, allow General Gordon at Khartoum to be defeated in war ? Would not the victor with his army hang like a cloud above Egypt, arresting all progress and endangering all finance, until he was again compelled by force
to "retire into his interior" We fear it would be so, and that possibility must be foreseen ; but then, that con- tingency attaches to every plan for governing Khartoum by native chiefs. Zebehr Pasha might threaten Egypt just as easily as General Gordon's conqueror ; and so might the Mandi or other Soudanese who conquered Zebehr Pasha.. There is no escaping from that liability while we occupy Egypt, and already it has been recognised by the Government, which is ordering up British troops to assist in protecting Assouan, and may even send a column to Berber, to consolidate the influence of General Gordon. While the British are in Egypt, no army must come from the south down the Nile Valley, but then no such coming is rendered likely by the rule of General Gordon. It is, on the contrary, rendered so unlikely, that it could happen only after a violent revolution ; while under Zebehr Pasha, if he seated himself firmly, it might happen any day. No native Sovereign seated at Khartoum, who felt himself in possession of such an army as could be made of Soudanese, could avoid thirsting for the possession of the rich Delta, where all the wealth of the Nile, the river " which never reclaims its un- exhausted improvements," has been concentrated for ages, and where, apart from a foreign soldiery, there is no inherent power of defence. Let the European Emirs reign in the interior of the Soudan, if they can, and find successors for themselves as they may, while England holds the coast. That seems the wisest solution of a problem which grows in magnitude every day.
Previous page
