TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE VICTORY OF TAMANHEB.
TT was touch-and-go, this time. " Moral effects " are not much understood in the Desert, where they think that God rules to-day, as he did yesterday ; and the Arabs, though just defeated at El Teb, burst on the English soldiers at Tamanheb with such fury, that the 2nd Brigade shook, men like the Highlanders of the Blaik Watch and the Marine Brigade were forced back, and but for the exertions of the officers and the splendid handling of the 1st Brigade, under Sir Redvers Buller, the course of history might have been changed. If Sir G. Graham's force had been annihilated, as for ten minutes seemed quite possible, the Arab world would have been• in arms, and some twenty millions of the only Asiatics who have the courage and the inherent brain-power of Europeans would have again stormed out of their secluded fastnesses to found an Arabian Khalifate. The destiny of the white man, which for a century past has so broken the heart of the darker races, prevailed once more, and with one dead-heave Osman Digna's force was scattered, his canton- ment stormed, and he himself driven back a broken man into the hills. It is easy to see what made the differ- ence between El Teb and Tamanheb. In the former engagement, the Arabs had to charge across a broad, open space, swept incessantly by bullets, and, except when the British cavalry charged, never could touch the white soldiers. In the latter struggle, the clansmen—why are they " savages," any more than the Scotch at Bannockburn, who fought with the same weapons, and nearly as naked ?—had only fifty yards to cross, the smoke gave them further cover, and though they lost probably half their number—the tale of the dead exceeds 3,000—they reached the Europeans. Then the struggle be- came Homeric, and the lithe, sinewy Arabs, all bone and whip- cord, with their scimitars and spears, and magnificent contempt for death, proved almost too much for the English, some of whom, if the Times' correspondent is right, broke into actual flight ; while the rest, though stubbornly fighting, were forced back on each other, and the Brigade became a crowd. A charge of cavalry, however, checked the terrible rush ; the European advantage, that power of re-forming which only discipline gives, began to tell ; the untouched First Brigade moved up like. a living machine, and the overwhelming rifle-fire, the only fire which really thins out an enemy, proved too much for human daring. The battle became again a civilised struggle, and, of course, civilisation won ; the Arabs were swept over the low ridge into the valley, the valley was crossed, and Sir G. Graham rested, master of the field. It is mot probable that he will be again challenged, and so long as the British flag guards the littoral, it will be free from the attacks which, if it were withdrawn, would instantly recommence. These Arabs are not the idiots that London Editors believe all men without trousers must necessarily be. Osman Digna calculated his strength with perfect accuracy, and he, and every Sheikh in alliance with him, knows perfectly well that that rush would have scattered any Asiatic troops in existence, from our own Sikhs downwards, and that except from Europeans, the clansmen have nothing to fear. The European science,. the European fire, the European persistence are too much for them ; but the Desert men are too strong now, as they were a thousand years ago, for any Asiatic resistance. If ever a Government was justified yet by events, the British Government was justified in deciding that unless British soldiers defended it, Osman Digna would take Suakim.
The Government is now urged to march to Berber, and the decision on that point must be matter for anxious thought. It must, in our judgment, depend upon the final resolve to defend or to abandon Khartoum, If it is held that Khartoum, commanding as it does-the confluence of the two Niles, is a place so important that a Soudanese Emir, commanding men like those who, on the 13th, shook her Majesty's 65th, would be a permanent danger to Egypt, then a march to Berber might be most expedient. We should obtain the power to settle General Gordon there either as white Sultan or as British Agent, and give him the prestige necessary to form a native army. But if Khar- toum is to be abandoned, it is doubtful if so serious an expe- dition is justified in order to rescue a garrison which may possibly escape otherwise, and which, but for its own cowardice, could perform the march to Suakim unresisted. An expedi- tion to Berber would be a serious enterprise. If entrusted
only to cavalry, as General Gordon is reported to propose, they ought to be double the number now at Suakim, they will be ten days on the march, and they will on their return be ham- pered by a convoy, which cannot be trusted to pass the 250 miles in less than twenty days. The supply of water is believed to be most inadequate, and the Arabs may once more attack in force.. It would be ruinous to trust to the moral effect of Tamanheb, which may be as slight as that of El Teb ; and the position of English cavalry, unsupported by riflemen, guarding hordes of panic-struck fugitives and surrounded by clouds of Sou- danese, may be left to experts. On the other hand, if success is to be made certain, and General Graham with his Expedi- tion is to march to Berber,.the force must be strengthened, especially in artillery, the means of sinking wells must be perfected, one considerable station must be formed half-way, and the whole movement must be arranged in the most serious and far-sighted manner. That is a grave enterprise to- undertake, and though we are far from saying it should/ not be undertaken—for if we keep Egypt we must in the end build a railroad from the Nile to the Red Sea—the de- cision should be made dependent upon the general Egyptian. policy adopted. Our own wish as to that policy has been made sufficiently clear ; but we would rather see it abandoned, than see the Government committed to grave expeditions. without any adequate end. The littoral of the Red Sea was worth fighting for, and security in Khartoum may be worth fighting for ; but an extra chance of safety to the old garrison of Khartoum, which ought to be perfectly able to take care of itself, is hardly worth a campaign. Who ever heard before of a great body of soldiers, with good rifles, wanting an escort to• protect them from possible attack by beaten men worse armed than themselves ?
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