15 MARCH 1902, Page 14

[To THE EDITOR OP THE " SPECTATOR•"1

Spa,—With reference to the problem put by Admiral Penrose FitzGerald, and to your editorial note thereto, the following points have occurred to me. In the first place, it seems to me —a civilian—that it would be impossible to fire into a boat flying the white flag, and making no attempt either to resist or escape, as the captain and crew would. rely on your respect- ing the signal of surrender, even though the surrender were made with the ulterior object of securing the escape of their consorts. You seem to have somewhat overlooked this point. If the torpedo-boat had been sunk without first surrendering, I think the commander of the destroyers would certainly not be bound to; in fact, he would be bound not to waste his opportunities of catching the other boats by stopping to pick up the crew. (Would there not be a chance of catching all three boats if on the hindmost surrendering the commander of the destroyers signalled to his consort to take over the captured crew, sink the torpedo-boat, and then immediately follow him in pursuit of the two others ? If the second destroyer overtook the first before the latter had finished dealing with the middle torpedo-boat, she—the second destroyer—might go straight on in the hope of catching the remaining enemy. Whether successful in this or not—and the question is too technical for me to judge -of—there would be no need to sink either the second or third boat, which would be towed into port as prizes.) Secondly, in answer to Admiral FitzGerald's question as to giving a torpedo-boat quarter, surely the answer is '‘ Yes," as she is a recognised engine of naval warfare. The question is a moral one, as Admiral FitzGerald says, and I think that Commander B in his letter would serve his country better than Commander A, and that the outcry on the Continent at the conduct of the latter, though such conduct might arise from failing to see things in their true proportion, would in this case be justified and would be joined in by others at home besides the "Little Englanders." Even if I am wrong, it would perhaps be better to err on the side of Quixotism than on that of expediency. [I may add that hi coming to the above conclusions I have been influenced by considering what line such a man as the present Commander-in-Chief of the British Army would be likely, to take in similar circumstances.]—I am, Sir, &c.,