TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE FASHODA DESPATCHES. THE whole country is now convinced, as our own readers have, we hope, for some time been convinced, that Lord Salisbury has no intention of "backing down" about Fashoda. Ile could not have done it even if he had wished, for half his Cabinet, half his party, and the majority of electors would at once have deserted him ; but he did not wish. We take it that Lord Salisbury's posi- tion is that there are very few questions worth the tremendous risks and losses which would follow any British declaration of war against a first-class Power, a declaration which would be instantly followed by every State in Europe leaping at some prize, but that there are some which are worth those things, one of which is the control of the Valley of the Nile from the Medi- terranean to the Lakes. We have for nearly fifteen years expended men and treasure in profusion to secure that ; we have fought three great battles, those of Tel-el-Kebir, the Atbara, and Omdurman, to ensure that ; and we have for that run the most grave and incon- venient diplomatic risks. To surrender such an object just after it had been achieved by such sacrifices would have been a folly, fatal to British expansion in the future, and we do not believe that the idea of surrender ever entered the Premier's mind. It certainly has no place in the despatches which, probably to convince Frenchmen of his sincerity, he has this week published to the world. From first to last there runs through the instructions to Sir E. Monson, and Sir E. Monson's conversations with M. Delcasse, evidence of a quiet but unalterable decision that the White Nile belongs to Egypt and Great Britain, and that Egypt and Great Britain having conquered the Mahdi, there can be no longer any question of their rights. This is no new pretension. The Khedive's rights were ad- mitted by France in 1895, and British claims recognised under protest. The pretension has only been made ffective by the defeat of the Khalifa, just as a suitor's claim is made effective by a verdict in Court. By ancient sovereignty, by more recent negotiation, and by the right of conquest Fashoda is ours; and that being the case, there is nothing for France to do except to disown Major Marchand as only "an emissary of civilisation," or to recall him as an agent whose mission has not been suc- cessful, or to declare war. The fourth alternative, to bargain, which M. Delcasse, the present Foreign Secretary of the Republic, throughout the despatches suggests, though he talks only of "negotiations," and does not hint at his terms, is declared to be inadmissible. Nothing can be more definite than the manner in which Lord Salisbury informs the Government of France that upon this matter there cannot even be discussion ; nor is there any sign that M. Delcasse fails to believe that the intimation is sincere.
It remains, therefore, for the French Government to make up its mind as to which of the alternatives it is ready to accept, and we cannot believe that after re- flection it will decide upon the third. It is true that the Government is in a condition of extreme alarm and irri- tation, fearing it hardly knows what from its internal enemies, and reluctant to make the most reasonable con- cessions lest its critics should have an excuse for accusing it of cowardice. It is true also that the Army is so uneasy at the injuries its reputation has received in the Dreyfus affair that it might wel- come a war which would distract attention from the misdeeds or incompetence of the Etat-Major. And it is true, we suppose, that Paris, as usual, is more or less on the side of war as a relief from smaller excitements, and ready to cry "A Londres " as it formerly cried "A Berlin." But there is a practical side to almost all Frenchmen, and such a war for such an object would appear to others than financiers too stupid. The very first incident of the war would be the arrest of Major Marchand and the final disappearance of the immediate subject of quarrel,—an incident which is almost ludicrous. Fashoda is not a place which France would ask for at the end of a war, even if it were successful, for it is thousands of miles from the region in which she desires to extend her terri- tory. ThPri the war must be a maritime one. France is not ready for that, as M. Lockroy has confessed, and even if she were, no victory at set would rehabilitate the prestige of the French Army. Of course, if the honour of France were concerned reasons like these would have no weight ; but the honour of France has not been touched or menaced by England in any way. Englishmen have no more desire to humiliate France than to humiliate America, no desire even to prevent her expansion either in Africa or China. There is fretfulness under Russian expansion because i1. seems to have no limit except the ether, and there was till yesterday vexation with German projects because of the Emperor's telegram and the design it was supposed to. imply; but France is in this country an object neither of distrust nor hate. If she rounded off her North African Empire by absorbing Morocco, no Englishman would be solicitous except for the freedom of Tangier, and there are men among us who go even further than that. They believe that Africa ultimately will be French and English, France ruling in the North and West, and we in the East and South, sovereignty on the Niger being exchanged for sovereignty on the Congo. It is the necessity of France in Africa to remain where she can utilise her Arab and Senegalese troops, so as to spare her conscripts from tropical service, and it is our necessity in Africa to keep in direct touch with our Indian Empire. It is folly, with such destinies before the two peoples, to suppose that we- are jealous of France, or wish to humiliate France, or grudge to France anything she can acquire outside the- limits which have been fixed by negotiation or battle. All we ask is that she shall keep outside them, and not in- trude within our sphere upon pretexts so futile as the idea that the Soudan is derelict, which M. Hanotaux. expressly affirmed it was not, or that the sovereignty of the Nile can be affected by the talk of the great men of "the Shillooks," a tribe which has not even arrived at the dignity of wearing clothes. France, in fact, has no reason for war with Great Britain, and nothing to gain by it, not even the pleasure of winning a pitched battle ; while, as Lord Palmerston once pointed out to Count Walewski, she has a great deal to lose,—namely, the whole of her splendid dominion in North Africa, which Germany would be delighted to accept in exchange for her present possessions.
But there must be some honourable method of escape from the situation provided for M. Delcasse ? Certainly ; and if he will suggest one, the more honourable the better, it will be accepted at once. Lord Salisbury wants the White Nile, not a victory over an opponent, and if the astute diplomacy of France cannot provide one it must have lost much of its old resourcefulness. Talleyrand would have found one in ten minutes. Even outsiders can see two or three methods of retreat entirely consistent. with prestige, for be it remembered the French Govern- ment is not responsible for the ill-advised talk of a Press made bitter by the prospect of "revision." One, perhaps. the best, is to treat Major Marchand as a most gallant and successful explorer, and direct him to continue his explorations, say in the direction of Darfour or of the sources of the Bahr-el-Ghazel. Nobody will interfere with him except by furnishing him with supplies and carriers.. Another way is to direct his attendance in Paris to aid the Ministry with his information and counsels, and give him a great appointment in Algeria. A third way is to hint to the Russian Embassy that a letter from the Czar expressing his great regret that any such dispute should arise so soon after his peace manifesto would greatly relieve the French Government and do no harm to anybody. Frenchmen would consider that letter ample reason for a retreat from an untenable position, and would console themselves by quoting it as fresh evidence of the immovable attachment of Russia to France, which made a wound to the amour propre of one country inflict a pang of acute suffering upon the other. At all events there must be some way, for every deadlock is a discredit to diplomacy, and a deadlock which even tends to produce a useless war is a disgrace. When M. Marchand is gone it will be time to consider whether there is not any division of Africa in which we can, as a mark of friendship to France, acknowledge some of her claims.
Previous page
