VIEWS OF THE WEEK
SOVIET UNION
OK With No K?
DEV M URARK A writes from Moscow:
A year without Khrushchev has turned out to be a year of both innovation and consoli- dation. The Soviet leaders have been slow in pushing reforms, as they promised they would be. The results of the reforms will be even slower, yet no one seems to mind it, because the overwhelming feeling here is that, whatever the merits or drawbacks of the new measures in agriculture and industry, they have been care- fully thought out., What the reforms promise in agriculture as well as industry is a slow upheaval which will transform the face of the country in a decade. No effect will be felt before 1966 or 1967 at the earliest, thus disproving all speculations about the changes in the Soviet hierarchy. The minor changes announced last week are merely formali- sation of earlier changes. The KreMlin is not in a hurry, but the method of some commentators seems to be that if one keeps on saying there will be changes, even if they come after years, their role as oracles on the Kremlin will be safe. What is clear is that Kosygin's speech at the party plenum on September 28 marked the de- cisive break from the age of Khrushchev, the age. of daring innovations, muddles, failures and, above all, of liberalisation of Russia. From now on Kosygin and Brezhnev are on their own.
The essence of all these measures is still politi- cal. To call them a return to capitalism is to be unduly superficial. To call them revolutionary is to betray an ignorance of Soviet history, of the forceful economic debates which have raged in the past and which often ended in the ex- termination of the dissenters. Indeed, reading through Kosygin's words, one is haunted by memories of causes lost, of men forgotten by the silence of history.
The economists will debate the pros and cons of the reforms proposed, whether they are ade- quate Qr not. Yet the most immediate impression is the desire of the Soviet leaders to check and balance, to be adventurous and cautious at the same time. Years ago the question of impera- tives was uppermost in Soviet economic debates. We need not go into the reasons for the historic verdict in favour of heavy industry, but it is noticeable that Kosygin's reform is the first serious attempt to balance the claim of consumer goods against the demands of heavy industry. The reasons may be economic, but they are more likely to be political, and the clue was pro- vided by Kosygin himself at the outset of his speech: 'It is necessary to amass tremendous accumulations for capital investments and at the same time to secure a considerable increase in the material well-being of the people.'
This is an end to the great debate about priorities. The Soviet leaders have now acted upon the assumption that the country's economy is so developed and its resources so vast that simultaneous growth can be sustained in all sec- tors. The realisation had been there before, but the conditioned reflexes from the past had previously prevented the toppling of heavy in- dustry from its high pedestal. Politically such action was overdue because the public does not want any more deprivation for the sake of
accumulation. Kosygin has also struck a new note on an old problem, centralisation and decentrali- sation. In brief, while management is being decentralised, arrangement is being again cen- tralised. By abolishing the fifty regional councils, what Kosygin in effect is saying is that inter- mediate responsibility makes everybody irre- sponsible. The lower ranks were not sufficiently impressed with the authority of these centres, while the centres themselves did not have enough power to plan or manage industries effectively on their own. The new proposals give more power to the factory manager as such, but the overall arrangement of priorities rests with Moscow, in some cases to be shared with the Republics.
As if worried about the effect of such free- dom on the managers, the role of the party has been re-emphasised and could be a source of friction, preventing smooth transition to the new order. In any case, much will depend on the progress of the agricultural reforms, promulgated in ' March. If October 1964, when the new government took over, is to be held as a starting- point, as the Russians themselves hold it, then the dose of reforms on three fronts, political, agricultural and industrial, is now complete. The answer to the question, 'What will they do?' has been given.
We don't know as yet the answer to the ques- tion, 'What will be the result?' Nothing is more revealing of the quality of the present political leadership in the Soviet Union than that its own answers are tentative, if hopeful. They have posed the problems, they have found some solutions which they believe to be correct, but they promise no utopia next year or the year after. In fact, their time-table extends to many years before even a beginning can be made to assess the results. They may be cautious, but they are neither timid nor unimaginative men. A year of power has given them confidence to look ahead and some of this confidence will be displayed at the Twenty-third Party Congress, which is to be held from March 29, 1966.
There is a general mood of quiet expectancy among the people. They do not want extravagant promises or wild schemes. The present leaders have inspired confidence in their efficiency and the belief is that things will be done, if slowly. Yet it would be a mistake to think that the leaders are ahead of the mass expectations. The reforms may appear to be revolutionary and daring to casual observers and in view of what has been done before. But the intelligentsia at least knows that they do not go far enough. One comment on Kosygin's speech was that in eco- nomics Russia was still behind Czechoslovakia.
It may be apt to describe the new economy as a kind of managerial revolution, but it is also more than that. It is a revolution in political awareness. The people are talking about Soviet shortcomings, they are not only expecting but demanding, with all the means available to them, a better life. The leadership is responsive and pledged to bring this about. It is comfortable to believe that this can only be accomplished in the framework of western democracy. But it is just as well to realise that even within the framework of Communism much is being ac- complished, transforming radically the daily life.
Even if all the expectations aroused by Kosygin's speech are not fulfilled, there is little doubt that they will open the way for further improvement and there will be no turning back to the past. The excitement of the last week in Moscow and, one imagines, in the whole Soviet Union was not physical but emotional: the emotion on the verge of a new era and being aware of it.
The only missing element was a lack of ob- jectivity about the transition period of Khrush- chev. If the Soviet leaders can today take radical measures and still leave the public unsatisfied, the credit should go to Khrushchev's leadership, under which they themselves had helped to stir the snow-bound consciousness of the masses. But perhaps one should not be too harsh on them for their embarrassment on this score. Just now few mourn the passing of the age of Khrush- chev, for their eyes are fixed on better things to come.
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