15 SEPTEMBER 1860, Page 15

THE SITUATION OF AUSTRIA.

HE would be a bold man who should say that the Austrian em- pire is on the brink of destruction, but he would be a bolder who should say that she is not -menaced by serious dangers from with- out and from within. At present, that bolder man appears to be the Emperor, who is blinded by imperial pride to the perils among Which he moves. He still seems to have faith in despotic govern- ment, just as the Pope clings on to the temporal power. From Vienna, as from Rome, have come penodical promises of "forms," "ameliorations," and so- forth, with an Antonelli and

a de Merode to carry them out in one place, and a Thun and a Rechberg as the active ageats in the other. Nay, in Vienna they have gone a step further. A Council of Notables has been in session ; these also talk of reforms, and Count Rechberg gives assurance of his desire to "enter the path" leading thitherward. But it is to be feared that the Emperor and his minister are still intent upon the old game of cheating the devil by balancing parties one against tee other; and that he has not the least inten- tion of surrendering any portion of his power.

There are four or five parties in Austria, leaving out altogether the Republican and ultra-Liberal section which has not yet re- covered the blow it received in 1848. There is the high military interest, so essential to the system of bureaucratic centralization, introduced by Schwarzenberg and Bach, perfected by their suc- cessors, and now a chaos of failure in every department, bank- rupt in its religious polity, bankrupt in finance' bankrupt on the battle-field itself. The military interest, all for holding down the provinces by the bayonet, though if report speak truly, rudely shaken in a belief rampant before Magenta and still vigorous be- fore Solferino, is perhaps the weakest of all the interests at the present time, for it has not recovered the advantages which two crushing defeats gave its civil rivals. Indeed the next great party, the feudalists, nobles of all provinces, made a spring at power immediately after the Italian war. They form a large and powerful element in the Reichsrath, and though there is a great difference between the extremes, a common idea pervades the whole party, that of governing by semi-feudal institutions to be administered by themselves. They would like to control the monarch, the army, the civil administration, the exchequer ; in short they desire to get possession of power for themselves. Be- low these come the middle class party, with timid liberal ideas of provincial diets, municipalities' well-regulated finances, and mo- derate centralization. While the supremacy of either the mili- tary chiefs or the nobles would be a retrogade step even in Aus- tria, the acquisition of power by the middle class would be a step forward towards responsible government in the centre, and self- government in the extremities ; but it would be far from giving the whole state that collective force which it is desirable every state should possess. Lastly, there is the Hungarian party. If the statesmen of this section were desirous of applying to the other provinces the measure they would mete out to themselves, it would be well for Austria and Europe that they should succeed. The Hungarian party demands from the Emperor of Austria the fulfilment of those obligations implied in his usurpation of the Hungarian throne. They ask for their old constitution, and desire to have the mending of it themselves, and they would have the Emperor submit to be crowned King, and take the oath which his ancestors took when the Emperors of Germany and of Austria became Kings of Hungary. Now, it is manifest that the Power which has its seat at Vienna and stretches its hands over so many diverse countries, menaced as it is with tremendous dangers from without, dangers from Germany as well as from France through Italian complications, must reconcile conflicting interests within or perish. A cry of Delenda eat Austria has gone forth, and Austria herself alone can save herself from the fate of Carthage. Unless this reconciliation be effected, she will be broken up by the coincident action of ex- ternal and internal forces. The .Reicharath has existed long enough to show the Emperor that every class of his subjects— Hungarian, Croat, Illyrian, Bohemian, Tyrolese, Gallician, and Austrian—vehemently desires institutions, under which it can be free within the law, and permitted to develop its own re- sources untrammelled by bureaucracy. The fate of Naples is be- fore him ; yet he procrastinates ; Hungary, burning with hatred, is dose to his palace door ; his Viceroy there tells him the truth, yet he hesitates to do right. Germany grows daily more indig- nant with him because he is one great obstacle to an union ; and from the peculiar character of his non-German possessions, a continual source of danger to Germany herself, because his existing mode of Government involves perpetual and tremendous liabilities of war and revolution. The mere possession of Venetia alone is a standing menace to the peace of Europe, and the safety of Germany. Unholily acquired, " con- veyed " by Napoleon Bonaparte and the Directory to the House of Hapsburg, it is retained upon the pretext that it is a bulwark to Germany, whereas it is at best only a bulwark to Austria, but a bulwark whose expense exceeds its utility. When Austria lost Lombardy, and the privilege of quartering troops in the Duchies and on the Papal territory, her Italian dominions ceased to be a paying occupation. After Solferino, it were better to have sold Venetia to Piedmont than to make peace and retain it. The stronger and the freer Italy becomes, the more expensive a pos- session will Venetia prove to Austria the more dangerous to Ger- many. For Austria will always be striving to drag Germany with her in any war or wars she may have to wage for Venetia, and Germany might purchase security, and strength by internal union at far less cost than would. be entailed by supporting Austria. Italy strong and free from the Alps to the Adriatic, would be a better bulwark for Germany than Venetia enslaved and Germany herself disunited ; and Austria would be stronger were she to withdraw from Italy, did she restore legality in Hun- gary, and satisfy the real wants of her many populations. That is the problem which the sword may have to solve by its rough and bloody methods, unless, par impossibile, common sense should prevail for a time in Vienna, and enforce a solution in accordance with the imperative facts.