TOPICS OF THE DAY •
WHAT THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ' HAS DONE.
THE very prevalence of the discussion as to whether the League of Nations has been defeated or has won a victory is in itself an excellent sign, though we confess that to us the issue, as it is usually presented in a rigid, logical form, has not very much meaning. There is no such thing as an absolute victory or an absolute defeat for the League, if only for the simple reason that the League has no power to impose a settle- ment in international affairs. Anyone who takes the trouble to read the Covenant can find this out for himself. We do not, of course, deny that the Janina crisis is a very serious one for the League ; if the League had .failed to exert considerable influence, if it had been flatly repudiated, and if it had folded its hands and sat down quietly in face of that defiance, its authority would steadily have diminished henceforth. But, happily, that is the reverse of what has happened. The League has exerted influence, and the terms of settlement put forward by the Ambassadors' Conference are in substance the terms proposed by the League.
The most important point of all is that the League by its intervention—an intervention accomplished in perfect form, as it was a response to the appeal of Greece, a mem- ber of the League—achieved publicity. Publicity meant delay, and delay meant the comparative moderation of second thoughts on the part of Italy. It is only by such trials as this that the repute of the League can be built rip and maintained. In the ultimate analysis the decisions of the League are only the expression of public opinion in the various nations associated together in it. The fact that unanimity is required in the Council would prevent the League from settling any matter outright when there was one dissentient party, and we thus see that the great function of the League is to bring together in consultation those who are in danger of acting in a passion. The League establishes the important principle of delay.
Think what would have happened during the past fortnight if there had been no League. Italy would have gone full steam ahead without let or hindrance. Other nations friendly to her no doubt might have protested, but in their exhausted condition they would have done nothing very practical to restrain her. Even if they had wished to hold her back by compulsion, they might well have thought that to add force to force would have been to confer no benefit upon the world, but only to plunge it into deeper anguish. Besides, the peoples not immediately touched by the dispute between Italy and Greece, greatly though they desire peace, would not move just now. They are not only "fed up" with fighting, but mistrust all wars for what they regard as distant or political causes. In such circumstances the only thing that can possibly help a distracted world is such a body as the League, which has already gathered round it a moral authority.
Without it, as we have said, Signor Mussolini would have gone full steam ahead ; the tragic days of July, 1914, might easily have been repeated. On looking back we see that if there had been a League of Nations in 1914 there would have been a rallying point for those who wanted to make time for the cool fit to succeed the hot, and even the Great War itself might have been averted. Events have proved the League to be necessary. If it were not there we should be in the position of having to invent it Is it not plain that the League has on the whole come well out of the crisis ? It seems to us so. Hotheads who rush into acan, caroless of their responsibilities to others and of their custodianship of the public law, will know in future that the League will call them to account. They may affect to despise it, but they cannot safely ignore it. That is a tremendous point gained.
It has been said even by some of those who hold that the League was competent to deal with the Janina crisis that in point of fact its management of that crisis was execrable ; that the Council, by thundering out denun- ciations of Italy's disloyalty to the League, blew up passion to a white heat and very nearly brought about the calamity which it wished to avoid. Well, we suppose there are always a certain number of people with excellent intentions who think it tactless to call a spade a spade.
But really quiet conversations at Rome behind shut doors would have been of no use. If that was the right course why believe in a League at all ? In our opinion Lord Robert Cecil took exactly the right line at Geneva. He told the plain truth, and of course it was a very disagree- able task for a sincere friend and admirer of Italy as we know Lord Robert Cecil to be, and yet he did not tell the truth in a frenzy or in a tone of provocation. Would it really have been wise to speak and act as though Signor Mussolini were a chfld who must be warned by circum- locutions and allegories, but never by a direct and solemn statement ? We do not believe it for a moment. On the contrary, experience has shown us that there is something in the Latin temperament that responds favourably to an uncompromising and even a vehement declaration. If you do not say exactly what you mean the Oriental thinks that you are afraid to say it, for he nearly always • divines your meaning. The man of Latin race is not quite like that, for he would not accuse you of fear without much better evidence, but he does see in circuitous language and ambiguous action signs ot hesitation, which encourage him to make use of his opportunities. • • We rejoice that the British Government were known to be whole-heartedly behind the League. If the Govern- ment had considered their own convenience or some immediate advantage, if in fine they had played for position instead of being desirous of asserting a principle, they could easily have patched up some sort of accom- modation with Italy. "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" is a rule that can always be applied in international affairs, and as for a moment it generally averts the worst form of strife, it is actually applauded *by many persons who would be pained if you called them cynical. The rule, however, can be applied only at the cost of all the higher aims ; it gives you a breathing space at the price of subsequent wrong and suffering which may become permanent.
The crisis is not over yet, but we feel confident that the British Government will not fail. France was for a time in great danger of condoning what Italy has done in the spirit which we have just deprecated. We hope that danger is passed. If not, the crisis may take on new forms, but will remain as bad as ever. To the question of Corfu will succeed the question of Fiume. The League will again be threat- ened. The small nations which are members of it will feel that their interests are being disregarded and that the League provides them, after all, with no sort of protection. If Italy quarrels with Jugo-Slavia the Little Entente cannot remain disinterested. France, however, is behind the Little Entente, just as the Little Entente is behind the Jugo-Slavs. There are complications that make • the brain reel. The only way of safety is for France and Great Britain to say that, come what may, they will take all their troubles to the League.
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