THE TEMPER OF FRANCE.
filHE great difficulty in the way of forming an opinion as 1. to the attitude of France in foreign affairs, is to decide whether the directing classes do or do not direct. In other words, when matters grow serious, will the peasantry give the orders, or will the journalists, politicians, and leading officers be allowed to give them ? Hitherto, the latter class has had much of its own way. It has carried out a Colonial policy at once feeble and ambitious,—a policy looking to the conquest of Madagascar, the formation of a Franco-China stretching from British Burmah to the Chinese frontier, the annexation of Tunis, and the ultimate acquisition of the vast and possibly rich territory of Morocco. A part of this design, which is due to Gambetta, has already been carried out ; and although the country voters have seemed restive, have checked the Indo-Chinese division of the plan, have stinted supplies for Madagascar, and were distinctly irritated by the mass of suffering involved in the Tunis Expedition, which debilitated, though it did not kill, an astounding number of conscripts, they failed to interpose any decided veto, and at all the points mentioned, the French claim a partial or decided victory. The question, therefore, is, whether the peasantry will refrain from interference when larger enterprises are on foot, enterprises involving war, and it is one of grave importance to the history of the next few years. We do not doubt that the French peasantry are on the whole peaceful, that their self-confidence was shaken by the events of 1870, or that they are passionately desirous of pecuniary prosperity. But then, neither can we doubt that the directing classes are showing their old historic temper, that they are chafing with fury at the loss of their lead in the world, that they are ready for any enterprise which would give satisfaction to their wounded pride. It is not only Germany which has cause to watch France ; she is threatening almost every Power except Russia. If she could obtain the Russian alliance, she would, if the directing classes had their way, attack Germany at once; and she makes extraordinary, though hitherto futile efforts, to secure it. It is not too much to say that the whole policy of France in Eastern Europe is dominated by a wish to please Alexander IH., and that for this she has thrown overboard the idea of protecting nationalities, the idea of defending Constantinople, and the idea of using Austria as a counter- poise to Germany. Her historic friendship for Poland, her recent adherence to England in Turkish affairs, her direct interest in seeing Austria strong,—everything is forgotten in the hope of a grand revenge. This approach to Russia is a standing threat to Germany, and the true cause of German anxiety and sensitiveness ; but France is not content with pur- suing one grand object. Apparently out of sheer irritability, she is snapping at all around. The English can do nothing right. They, are offensive in Egypt, treacherous in China, barbarians in Hayti. Because Ireland is troublesome, Frenchmen are loving Ireland. We literally want nothing of France ; most of us think she is entitled to Alsace-Lorraine, or at least entitled to demand a plebiscite there, and a good many among us would rather she possessed herself of Morocco than not ; but wherever the French Government can give the British Government a sharp pin-prick, it gives it. We cannot move in Egypt without direct opposition, aggravated by torrents of abuse ; if we try to make the wretched Negroes of Hayti adhere to their agreements, we are denounced as savages ; if a salute is not fired in a French port, it is due to the infamous discourtesy of the English, and the German leanings of their Queen. If we may believe the journals of Paris, France would delight in the humiliation, or suffering, or even extinction of England. A very few years ago, the daily provocations given by the French would have produced a panic, and even now there are grave men who doubt if France is wholly disinclined to a war with England, with Egypt as the battle-field. The Italians are almost as frequently affronted, though with more reason, as the Tripartite Treaty is more or less a menace to France ; but still, with such persistence that the great French party in Italy is temporarily dead, and all hold over her policy has been lost to Paris. Italy believes that France would willingly break her up. As to the Pope, he has been treated not only in French clerical affairs, but in the Pekin affair, as a deadly enemy, and with such discourtesy that he feels the French threats more than much more serious blows. Even Spain does not escape. The interests of the two countries in Morocco are, it is true, not reconcilable ; but the French statesmen accentuate the points of difference until there is grave doubt in Spain whether they are not seeking grounds of quarrel, or even dreaming of compensations to be obtained across the Pyrenees. That seems nonsense to Englishmen ; but there has never been a great ruler of France who, checked to the North and East, has not glanced southward, and the last French invasion of Spain was ordered by a feebly Conservative Administration. Spain is in as much danger from France as Italy, and there is not an Italian who does not know that if France had the power, she would take Piedmont and Sardinia, and replace the Pope in his full sovereignty at Rome.
It is easy to say that the trite explanation of all this rest- lessness is the secret anger of the French at their inability to fight the Germans ; but the explanation is insufficient. The French are not a childish people in foreign politics, but a keen, selfish, and quick-witted people, who know, as they are showing in the Russian case, how to conceal their predispositions when it is expedient. They do not love Russia, we may be sure ; but as they want help from Russia, they are all to a man playing the part of her devoted friends and allies. Why, then, are they offending and impeding everybody else I We can only believe that it is from an uncontrollable desire for self- assertion, a wish to feel that they are still important, an inten- tion to take the first opportunity of convincing the world that their claim to be the great military people is still a real one. The directing classes of France have shown this disposition at intervals all through her history, some- times when her people were ardently desiring peace ; and we believe that the impulse suppressed by the events of 1870 has, with the restoration of her strength, revived in all its force. They are fretting at their position until they would delight in a straggle with any Power if they only saw a fair chance of triumph. Whether this temper will in the end display itself in action, depends first upon cir- cumstances, for the French are not reckless, and next upon the power of the leading classes to act before the peasantry interfere ; but the continued quiescence of France is by no means assured. A war with England would mean a maritime war, and France doubts herself at sea ; but a triumph over England would delight France in her present mood, and were England engaged, as she might be with Russia, we should expect to see Egypt become a battle-ground. France would avoid a great naval battle, and strike at our Colonies and our commerce. Italy is safe, we suppose, under the shield of the Tripartite Alliance ; but Belgium is not, nor Spain, and with Spain a cause of quarrel could be created in a week. Spain would either fight for Morocco, or approach as near to fighting as was safe ; and France has a " question" with Morocco about frontiers which can never end. Some of the present disposi- tion to hector may be attributable to the nervous irritability of journalists, or to the restlessness of the Army ; but it is by no means certain that it will all exhale in words. It is impossible to deny that the French Republic abroad, as well as at home, has been a disappointment to its friends, among whom we may reckon ourselves, or that Europe has reason for watching the intentions as well as the temper of France. She has always been the disturbing Power in Europe, and seems just now inclined to play her old rdle of universal provocation in a way which, though it may be partly explained by her relation to Germany, is not justified by it. Lord Randolph Churchill says there is nothing to fear anywhere, if only we will be sensible about Bulgaria ; but there is ample reason in the temper of France for keeping our powder dry. A war with France would be a frightful calamity ; but there is one thing which would be worse, and that is to be so unready that France should believe we would never go to war.
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