Clear and present danger
Russia’s actions in the past week should not have taken anyone by surprise. The fact that they did illustrates just how gravely in denial the free world now is about the threats that it faces. Before 9/11, all too few people could imagine a terrorist attack on a Western city killing thousands — even though Osama bin Laden had declared war on the United States in 1996. In much the same way, too few contemplated the bloody reality of Russian tanks rolling across an internationally recognised border, despite the clear signals sent by Vladimir Putin’s increasingly bellicose actions in recent years.
The Russian propaganda machine and its useful idiots have been busy claiming that Georgia was the aggressor, and that Russia was only acting to protect the people of South Ossetia. Let us be clear: South Ossetia and Abkhazia, another separatist enclave, have a right to self-determination. But it is as naive to accept that Russia’s actions were driven by concern for the people of these regions as it is to think that al-Qa’eda is primarily motivated by the absence of a Palestinian state.
Moscow has for many years rejected the presence of impartial international peacekeepers in either of these regions, preferring instead to rely on a predominantly Russian Commonwealth of Independent States force which has done little, if anything, to curb criminality or to stop cross-border violence. It was clumsy of Mikheil Saakashvili, the Georgian president, to respond so forcibly to attacks by South Ossetian separatists, who are trained, equipped and, in reality, controlled by Moscow — thus giving the Russians the pretext they wanted to act. But walking into a trap is not the same as being the aggressor.
Once the invasion was under way, Russia’s actions revealed that its true priorities lay far from South Ossetia. It attempted to bomb an energy pipeline far away from the notional war zone, expanded the conflict to include the far more strategically important region of Abkhazia — thus derailing a German effort at mediation there that was making some progress — and ignored offers of a ceasefire until it had degraded Georgia’s military capabilities. Moscow was sending a message that any country in its near abroad that did not accept Russian suzerainty would be punished.
Do not forget: Russia, in its soul, is still smarting from the indignity of descending from superpower status to being bailed out by the IMF in a decade. It craves a renewed sphere of influence — but it would be a mistake, both strategically and morally, for the West to allow it to achieve this goal. Leaving aside the moral dimension, to permit Russia a firm hold over its near abroad would significantly entrench its control over Europe’s energy supplies. This is a clear and present danger, given that Russia under Putin has shown such a consistent willingness to use energy as a weapon. And who can doubt that he, rather than President Medvedev, is still effectively in charge after the events of the past few days? And, where would giving Russia a veto over who is allowed to be a Western ally end? Would we return the Baltic states to the Russian sphere of influence for a continuing flow of Russian gas?
The West should declare that if Georgia is prepared to allow Abkhazia and South Ossetia to determine their own destinies, then Georgia itself should be accorded the same courtesy. A rapid timetable for Georgian membership of Nato should be set out — the only conditions being Georgia’s continuing development of robust democratic structures and an explicit readiness to accept the result of any internationally monitored plebiscite in the regions under dispute. If the necessary unanimity within Nato cannot be achieved, America should unilaterally designate Georgia a major non-Nato ally. Russia should not be allowed to profit from its aggression.
This is not a return to the Cold War. It is, as Philip Bobbitt so eloquently explains on page 12, the unfolding of a new saga. The free world faces an ever-changing configuration of threats to its interests and values. The need for leadership is as pressing as it is lacking. As Russia flexed its muscles, President Bush was at the Olympics; his ‘freedom agenda’ appears to have risen from the sands of Iraq only to be buried on the beach volleyball court. The British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary are focused on an imminent violent struggle — but it is the battle for the Labour leadership rather than the crisis in the Caucasus. France and Germany, by making clear that Russia had an effective veto over Georgia’s membership in Nato, merely emboldened Moscow.
Yet, amid all the paper-shuffling and platitudes, there are glimmerings of hope. They come not from Senator Obama, whose initial statement on the crisis was replete with blather about the need for both sides to show restraint — demonstrating both that he had not grasped what was truly at stake, and just how inexperienced he is in the field of foreign policy. In sharp contrast, John McCain, who was warning about Putin’s authoritarian tendencies back in 1999 when Western leaders were fêting him, immediately understood and articulated what this crisis was actually about: Russian aggression. Several days later, Obama caught up with his position.
McCain’s clear-sighted intervention also galvanised the dozy debate in Britain. After talking to the Republican nominee, David Cameron laid out a series of robust policy options that stood in stark contrast to the government’s inactivity and verbiage, and suggested that he is gradually developing the kind of foreign policy instincts that will stand him in good stead if he becomes prime minister.
Those who hanker for a multi-polar world might care to reflect that Russia’s assault on Georgia offers us a preview of what it would be like. Powerful states would bully weak states, force would be used when it could be, not when it must be, and no international institution would be able to stop this; a ‘post-American’ world would not be a Kantian paradise but a Hobbesian jungle. Both Americans and Europeans must wake up to this ineradicable reality if such horrors are to be averted.
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