The Peace Pact
ON Monday Mr. Kellogg, the American Secretary of State, made another speech about the Peace Pact, and we have read it with particular pleasure because it is a confirmation of the opinion we expressed that Sir Austen Chamberlain's reply to the proposal would be interpreted in America as a wholehearted acceptance. "I am convinced," said Mr. Kellogg, describing the struggles of Europe towards peace, "that the leaders of the Governments believe that there should be one more step in their efforts, and that is a simple declaration against war as an instrument for the settlement of international controversies„ . , We now find peoples and Govern- ments united in a common and sincere desire to prevent, so far as possible, the outbreak of any war anywhere. ..- It is a most impressive manifestation of the spiritual nature of man." Those are not the words of dissatisfac- tion. It is incredible that Mr. Kellogg should have spoken thus if he had felt that Sir Austen Chamberlain had tried to water the meaning of the Pact down to nothing.
How can it have happened that any other view was taken of Sir Austen's reply ? We have no doubt our- selves that the explanation we have already offered was the true one. Sir Austen was frightened by the thought that if he did not dwell upon the possible circumstances which might drag Great Britain into war (very much against her will) it might be , said that having signed a Pact renouncing war she was nevertheless resorting to war. We can easily understand how the wide difference of political methods"in America and Great Britain makes it possible for an American Secretary of State to regard qualifications and explanations of the formula as un- necessary and for a scrupulous • and careful thinker like Sir Austen (who will commit himself to no principle until he sees himself in command of the details) to regard a rather full series of explanations as a necessary safeguard against misunderstanding.
The .French, being even more precise and logical than the British, go further in their explanations, so far, indeed, that the explanations amount to definite reservations. But even with that treatment Mr. Kellogg did not express any disappointment on Monday. On the contrary, anyone who reads between the lines of his speech must be impressed by the ,fact that he went out of his way to be complimentary to France. Evidently he shares with Sir Austen the feeling that a bridge must be built for France, since the Treaty would be but a mean success if France remained outside. Mr. Kellogg declares that his Pact had its origin in "the grand conception of the French Foreign Secretary," and that that conception was undoubtedly inspired by "the deep-seated desire of the French people to prevent another great cataclysm of war." As though to make those words more emphatic he gratefully acknowledged that the United States "borrowed from M. Briand the idea of a simple, straight- forward, unequivocal declaration against war."
Everybody knows that when Sir Austen wrote about regions of the world in which Great Britain would be compelled to take action if her position were challenged he was thinking in particular of Egypt and India. He explained that such action would be an essential part of the defence of the Empire. Some Liberal and Labour newspapers here have started an alarm that Sir Austen is developing a British Monroe Doctrine, and that there would be no end to the dangers of it. No sane person would wish to add to the burdens of our foreign policy a superfluous general doctrine, but we think it is fairly obvious that Sir Austen's amplification was written without a suspicion that his words could be given so black a complexion. He was simply providing against the contingency of its ever being said that when he signed the Pact he had not "thought it out." His whole purpose was to show that he had thought it out to the uttermost detail before expressing his willingness to sign. Such a procedure, so far from detracting from the approval which Great Britain has given to the Pact, considerably adds to it.
We are now safe from the possibility of Americans com- plaining that if, for instance, we should ever be compelled tb redeem our pledges by forcibly protecting foreigners in Egypt we should be breaking the Pact. Not that we think that the State Department in Washington would ever bring accusations against us in such circum- stances, but evidently Sir Austen feels that it is hardly possible to be too plain. The distinction between a political war and a war from which no nation could escape —a war of self-defence, for instance—is really simple: To the disreputable category belong such wars as Bismarck waged. His purpose was to unite Germany- in an Empire, and war was his method. To carry out his design he fought the Danish War, the Austro-Prussian War, and finally the Franco-German War. He succeeded ; but he leaves a name which will always be smirched with the odium of a cruel cynicism.
Most Englishmen are so intent upon peace, and are so content with what they believe to be the earnestness of Mr. Baldwin's Government in the cause, that they are bound to be distressed when they find others entirely misreading and perverting the statements which have. been made in the name of Great Britain. The American paper, Time, in its issue of May 28th, 1928, has the following :— " His Majesty's Government will support the movement to the utmost of their power. . . .' Such was the totally misleading theme-sentence of a suave, lengthy reply returned, last week, by British Foreign Minister, Sir Austen Chamberlain, to the proposal made by U.S. Secretary of State, Frank Billings Kellogg (Time, April 23rd, et seq.) for a treaty renouncing war as an instrument of national policy' among the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Japan.. Tucked away in the twelve additional sections of the British reply are a series of interpretive qualifications which would deprive of all meaning the phrase renouncing war as an instrument of national policy.' For example, Sir Austen Cham- berlain declares : 'I should remind your Excellency that there are certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Government have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with these regions cannot be suffered. Thew protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-defense. It must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect. The Government of the United States has com- parable interests, any disregard of which by a foreign power, they have declared that they would regard as an unfriendly act. His Majesty's Government believe, therefore, that in defining their position they are expressing the intention and meaning of tho United States Government.' The last sentence refers to a recent speech by Mr. Kellogg before the American Society of International Law, wherein he declared that a nation signatory to the Kellogg Pact would not be deprived of the right to make war in self-defense. This interpretation the British have now broadened to mean virtu- ally that any war in which His Majesty's Government may choose to engage will be pro fado a war of self-defense. Disgusted observers deemed, last week, that the negotiations have now become so adroitly involved that no document capable of preventing war between the signatories is at all likely to be drafted, signed."
We have quoted this passage at length because it would be disastrous if Americans thought that such a reading of British action bears the faintest resemblance to the truth. It does not. Sir Austen has taken almost morbid precautions against the possibility of even seeming to break a promise. but his glosses need not, and we sincerely hope will not, form part of the Treaty. They are, in effect, marginal notes. They could be placed upon record in a separate document. He is, we believe, alive to the value of allowing the Treaty to consist simply of a renunciation of war as an instrument of policy.
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