JUGOSLAVIA AND THE AXIS
By HUGH SETON-WATSON
JUGOSLAVIA is the principal State of the Balkan penin- sula, and of great importance to the Axis Powers. Her economic resources are eagerly sought, and have often been described in the British Press. But equally important are certain strategic features of her geographical position.
The northern province of the country is Slovenia. Its inhabitants have a language of their own, and have never before lived in the same State as the Serbs and Croats. They separate German Austria from the sea, and part of the main line from Vienna to Trieste passes through their territory. They have a small, but extremely aggressive, German minority, which has succeeded in provoking a number of minor incidents, which the German Press have used to de- nounce the " intolerable, anti-German " attitude of their neighbours. On grounds of " liberation of oppressed Ger- mans " or of " German living-space," Hitler might claim to annex Slovenia as a " protectorate." The dominant Slovene group are the Clericals, whose leader, Koroshetz, as Minister of the Interior and chief personal adviser of Prince Paul, has secured in the last years an effective autonomy for his people.
The Clerical politicians claim to be optimistic about the German danger. They declare that Italy will never allow Germany to seize Slovenia, since the Germans would then be separated from the Adriatic only by a small strip of Italian territory, inhabited not by Italians, but by Slovenes. (It may be remembered that similar arguments were once used about Austria and the Brenner.) Although some Slovene priests would be content, in the last resort, to be annexed by Italy, and hope that the Pope would guarantee their rights, the majority of Slovenes have no desire to be " liberated " by either Dictator from Jugoslavia, in which they have never had reason to complain of oppression. They know well that their kinsmen in Italy are even more brutally maltreated than those in Austria. But the Slovene peasant, although econo- mically and culturally more advanced than the Croats or Serbs, has no tradition of political activity. He passively obeys his leaders, whose policy, although backed by all the subtleties of Catholic diplomatic intrigue, is not always beneficial to Slovene independence.
The north-eastern part of Jugoslavia is formed by Croatia, Slavonia and Vojvodina. Slavonia is the plain between the two rivers, Drava and Sava, the chief tributaries of the Danube in South-Eastern Europe. The main railway line from Italy to the South-East passes through Slavonia between Zagreb and Belgrade. Last year great efforts were made to create a strip of German colonists along the Drava, connect- ing South-East Austria with Vojvodina. Poor German peasants suddenly acquired large sums of money to buy the properties of Croats or Serbs. This is now prevented by a ban on purchases of land near the frontier. Vojvodina is the Danube province north of Belgrade. Through it passes the main railway-line from Budapest to Belgrade. It con- tains a large Hungarian minority, consisting mainly of land- less agricultural labourers. Its German minority, also large, is composed of prosperous peasants. It is dominated by the Nazis, who profited by the freedom allowed them by the Germanophile Stoyadinovitch to organise it in a compact block.
East of Belgrade, Jugoslavia possesses a section of the Danube, which first passes through Serbia and then forms the frontier between Jugoslavia and Rumania. The Serbian bank is inhabited by a Rumanian minority of over roo,000. These rivers and railways are essential lines of communica- tion for Germany in any offensive to the South-East. All the minorities are useful pawns in the German game. But even more useful might be the discontent of the Croats. For twenty years their claims for autonomy within the Jugoslav States have been ignored by the Belgrade Governments. In April the Prime Minister Tsvetkovitch officially declared the Croatian question to be an important problem, needing immediate solution, and came to Zagreb to discuss it with the Croatian leader, Matchek. The agreement signed by both was rejected by the Prince Regent Paul. Although official spokesmen declare that they desire a settlement, and that the negotiations will be resumed, there is no doubt that great bitterness is felt in Zagreb at the curt rejection of an agreement which was only concluded after numerous con- cessions from the Croatian side. There is a faction in Zagreb which hopes for " deliverance " from Hitler or Mussolini. Although the immense majority of Croats, organised in the democratic and socially progressive Peasant Party, are against this, there is a great deal of discontent and exaspera- tion which could be exploited by a skilful propaganda.
Italy, too, has strategic aims in Jugoslavia. The most obvious of these are in Dalmatia, to which Mussolini has never renounced his claim. Hardly less important is Mace- donia. The route from Albania to Salonica is through Macedonia. If Italy could control this route she would dominate the Aegean. Greece would be encircled on land, and forced into submission to the Axis. Western Macedonia is inhabited by Albanians. These were at first indignant at the Italian invasion. But they have suffered for twenty years from political, cultural and economic oppression, and have no reason to feel enthusiastic about Jugoslavia. There is a certain attraction about unification with Albania, even if it is only under another foreign despotism. Italian agents are increasing their propaganda among both the Albanians and the Macedonian Slays. The latter have been for fifty years a cause of dispute between Serbia and Bulgaria. Under Jugoslavia they suffer from police-terror and economic ex- ploitation. Tobacco is bought from the peasants by the State Monopoly, the only legal buyer, at a twentieth of the price at which it is sold to the public. The Macedonian dialect is forbidden, and its use may be punished with a fine of z o dinars per word.
In these conditions, it is not surprising that the discon- tented population have listened to Bulgarian agitators. Italy supported Bulgarian aspirations after the War, and gave money to Vanche Mihailoff, the leader of the Macedonian terrorists in Bulgaria. Mihailoff was driven from Bulgaria in 1934, and is now in Italy. In Bulgaria itself the people sincerely desire friendship with Jugoslavia, but in the Court group, which dominates the country, the hope of annexing Macedonia is still strong. The Macedonian Slays them- selves claim that they are neither Serbs nor Bulgars, but a separate people. The young Macedonians wish to be no longer a barrier, but a bond, between the two neighbouring peoples. Their aim is an autonomous Macedonia within a Southern Slav Federation, which shall include Bulgaria. They consider Mihailoff as a traitor, an agent of Italian and Bulgarian imperialism. But these autonomists, the most loyal Jugoslays in Macedonia, have democratic ideas, and are therefore rigorously suppressed by the Belgrade Govern- ment, which tries to show its good will to the Macedonians by installing in important administrative positions former members of Mihailoff's organisation, who still work with Italy against the State.
To make the Jugoslays fight against Great Britain and France would be difficult, and against Russia impossible. But the Axis Powers hope to obtain a " neutrality " which will enable them to use the Dalmatian ports, the Slovene railways, the Vojvodina line and the Jugoslav section of the Danube. Control of the latter would mean that in case of war in Rumania, the Germany army in Hungary would establish from the beginning a connexion with the Bulgarian army. If these terms were refused, Jugoslavia might be threatened with disruption. Prince Paul tries to postpone the decision. But his position is weak. Completely isolated in Europe, he must face the consequences of the policy consistently pursued since the death of his cousin. Its motive is his terror of the democratic ideas and social aspirations of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. But the more brutally popular feeling is suppressed, the stronger it becomes. However great the dangers into which the mis- takes of their leaders have brought them, sooner or later these peoples will make themselves felt in Europe.
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