Political Commentary
The case for an October election
Patrick Cosgrave
I wrote, just after the first round of the local elections, that it was perfectly possible that Mr Heath could call an autumn general election with every chance of victory; while, if he Went on much longer, he would have to face every possibility of defeat, At the time most of my colleagues, and most politicians I spoke to, treated my argument with friendly scorn. Now, after Mr Powell's speech at Stockport on Friday last, and his subsequent broadcasts this week, precisely that speculation is very Much in the air, even if the majority of comMentators regard it as unlikely to take the form of reality. It seems a good moment to rehearse the pragmatic case for going to the country next October.
A government's advantage over an opposition of being able to take the initiative, not only in naming an election date, but in various other kinds of action which enhance its electoral prospects obviously diminishes as the last possible election date approaches, for then the scope for manoeuvre is reduced and, If an administration's evident popularity does not pick up, they are driven into increasingly desperate measures to win support. Both the Conservative government of Sir Alec Douglas-Home and the Labour government of Mr Wilson, in the run-up periods to their general election defeats, made increasingly wild promises to the electorate which, properly suspicious, doubted their capacity, and turned to the opposition. It is a fact about the British voter with which every Prime Minister has to ?ontend, that he is much more critical in Judging a government's prospectus than sPeech writers and pollsters commonly allow. But, you may say, the analogy between Sir Alec and Mr Wilson is a very imperfect one for, while Sir Alec waited until the last possible moment, Mr Wilson plunged long before he needed to. The general point about loss of Initiative as the life of a government progresses is, however, evident in both cases. Por, as he now admits, one of the dangers that impelled, Mr Wilson to go to the country In June 1970 was his fear of a major industrial dispute in the autumn; and he incorrectly calculated that strife with the unions was a greater danger to him than price inflation. Mr Heath is unlikely to make the same mistake. And that leads me to the first practical argument for an election in October. The Price Commission is being extraordinarily lax in its enforcement of price restraint. Cadbury Schweppes and Birds Eye have been given Permission to increase prices by 7+ and 6 per cent respectively., Walls Meat have teen allowed 8+ per cent; Strand Hotels 7+; Dunlop 6; Carrington Viyella 6+ and prices in the transport and print areas are being allowed to !Ise by 7+ per cent. Every such list is seriously Inflationary. All this is in spite of the fact that there is a great deal of scope (not being used) Tor price reductions in the retail and service sectors. This has to be put alongside two Other facts. First, small firms need not apply tO the Commission to increase prices provided their accounts do not eventually show excessive increases in profits: the accounts never show any such thing, of course, since the increases can be hidden away in research and promotion. Second, since the intronetion of VAT, retail spending has declined DY 7 per cent, and this slices into the prosDeets for the present boom.
Now, if by the end of the year it is clear that industrial action is not causing price inflation (since the unions have been quite well-behaved during Phase 1 and Phase 2); clear at the same time that price inflation is continuing; and clear that a wage boom, the justice of which the country might well support, is going to be demanded by the Unions then Mr Heath could be on the run for the rest of his term. If, on the other hand, he called an election in October, it would be at a time when, relations with the unions being at least polite, he would be in no danger (if he won) of preciptating the kind of death struggle between government and organised Labour which he would have faced had he accepted suggestions a year or so agd that he should fight a campaign on a who-runsBritain ticket.
I have, however, already suggested that Mr Heath is not likely to underestimate the dangers of price inflation. If this is so, there must be some explanation of why his price control machinery is proving so rickety rackety. The orthodox Conservative answer is that price controls, particularly in an economy heavily dependent on food imports, simply do not work without rationing and a fully socialised set-up. There is, I believe, a lot in this. But, more important in the specific circumstances of today, is the fact that these controls were cobbled together in a great hurry; the fact that they were subjected to little adequate critical scrutiny (the prices code was not available for debate by the Commons committee which examined the prices and pay legislation); and the fact that Mr Heath's decision to introduce controls ran into such strong Tory disillusionment and opposition that to have made them more comprehensive might have run the risks of a very powerful revolt indeed.
The risk of being caught in a rise by the potential contradictions in his own economic policy is the strongest argument for Mr Heath going to the country early, especially as the polls are beginning to indicate a distinct improvement in his standing and that of his Government. But there are one or two other Points also worth his consideration. The first is that an autumn election might well catch Labour in serious disarray over industrial policy; while after autumn the left wing of the Labour Party are likely to have made further concessions in the interests of unity, and likely to be standing four-square behind Mr Wilson and the so-called moderates.
The second argument is more problematical. It is fairly clear that Mr yowell's speech at Stockport is Oigned less to announce a decision that he has already taken as to prepare the minds of his followers for a decision he may have to take. If he is able to accustom them to the possibility that they may either vote Labour or abstain, and if he is able to maintain his hold over them during such a process of persuasion, then the longer the wait before an election the more dangerous he will be. Learned commentators, of course, pour scorn on the idea that the EEC could be a serious factor — especially in the way Mr Powell presents it — in a national .campaign, but that was not the experience of Tory workers at West Bromwich. Anyway, even if the voters do not see the subject of membership of the Common Market as a door-die matter of parliamentary sovereignty, it is undeniable that they can be persuaded to see the Community as a machine for increasing price inflation which, in some measure at least, it is. That, at any rate, is the way the majority of Labour spokesmen will present it. There are of course, some who say that Mr Powell is being extremely illogical in advocating a possible Labour alliance, in that Labour is not committed to withdrawal. But Labour is at least far more hostile to the Market than any alternative and, as Mr Powell said at Stockport, "Presented, if they were presented, with two opposing parties which offered them a choice between the option they desired and the option they did not desire, electors would be perverse indeed to choose what they did not want for fear that those who promised what they did want would not perform it." And if all this seems a little abstruse for the common voter, Mr Powell seems to think it appealing enough; and it would be a brave politician or commentator who claimed to know more than Mr Powell about the electoral mind.
Even those who are prepared to admit the force of some or all of these arguments are inclined to adduce Mr Heath's known stubborness, his exceptional unwillingness to be hustled, as a point against his adoption of any such course. But the Prime Minister — and this is one of the most interesting things about him — is more than ordinarily capable of the sudden and dramatic decision. His dismissal of Mr Powell in 1968, for example, and his decision to allow a free vote in the House on the EEC, were both taken fast and unexpectedly. He is often impulsive, and sometimes harshly so, as when the other day he launched a blistering attack on British industrialists in the company of many of their number. He has a capacity for the unexpected, and even for the dramatically unekpected which, since he feels it to be a weakness, he normally curbs: but it sometimes breaks out.normally to his advantage.
Those who imagine that some sense of responsibility,' however vaguely conceived, as well as those who believe in the reality of the present boom, will counsel delay. Mr Peter Walker, for example, who is convinced that the present dramatic advance in British economic prospects, being export-led, is different from any upsurge we have enjoyed since the war, will certainly be inclined to wait until-A-really smashing blow can be strutic at Labour. And there are those, too, who 'recall with what faint prospects Mr Heath himself entered the 1970 campaign: trapped, it seemed, by an enemy who had chosen the flood tide; and they fear an overturn of the obvious. No doubt Mr Heath will weigh all this advice carefully: but the case for autumn remains powerful.
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